VZCZCXRO2838
RR RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #0771/01 1071508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171508Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8153
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1324
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 5469
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3832
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3777
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6065
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6752
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0868
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9099

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000771 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SF
SUBJECT: SA PERMIT FOR ZIMBABWEANS (PART 2) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  There are currently more questions than answers 
surrounding the SAG's implementation of a temporary permit 
for Zimbabwean migrants to remain in South Africa (ref A). 
The Minister of Home Affairs' (DHA) April 3 announcement of 
the new policy was a surprise, albeit a welcome one, to the 
rights community and apparently even to her own department. 
On April 9, DHA officials discussed the permit's rollout with 
UNHCR, IOM, and rights NGOs in a day-long workshop.  The 
frank and open exchange helped DHA to identify its own 
planning gaps vis-a-vis issuance logistics and criteria, 
interdependencies with police and other SAG departments, 
communications with the public and migrants, and implications 
for long-range immigration policies.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
SAG & NGOs Identify Planning Variables 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On April 9, refoff joined about 20 representatives 
of UNHCR, IOM, and rights NGOs in a full-day workshop with 
DHA officials to discuss the implementation of the newly 
announced temporary permit for Zimbabweans in South Africa. 
Hosted by Wits University's Forced Migration Studies Program 
(FMSP) and local NGO Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), the 
invitation-only session was closed to the press and public, 
enabling candid collaboration.  Modiri Matthews, Chief 
Director of the Home Affairs Inspectorate, and Burton Joseph, 
Director of Immigration Policy, explained what had been 
decided thus far, candidly admitted what was still uncertain, 
and freely welcomed suggestions to guide their planning.  The 
group surfaced more questions than answers, but the session 
helped DHA identify areas for further clarification. 
 
Issuance Logistics 
------------------ 
 
- Timetable: no one knew when rollout could begin, based on 
planning and logistical hurdles; nor was it clear how long 
Zimbabweans would be in limbo between the past and future 
regimes.  Would existing asylum-seekers' permits be honored 
in the meantime? 
 
- Locations: Matthews and Joseph were unsure of issuance 
channels, thinking perhaps existing DHA centers would be 
used.  UNHCR strongly advocated for separation from the 
asylum streams, to avoid competition between crowds.  (Note: 
in April 13 meetings with a visiting USG StaffDel, IOM told 
us DHA is considering using IOM's facility at Beitbridge, on 
the Zimbabwean side of the border, along with other 
"satellite" permit issuance centers throughout Zimbabwe, in 
an almost consular-style processing.) 
 
Screening Criteria 
------------------ 
 
- Nationality test: since all Zimbabweans are eligible, the 
card is essentially a confirmation of nationality, but it is 
unclear how DHA will determine this when most migrants lack 
other ID's.  Perhaps Zimbabweans will be recruited to conduct 
screening, based on language and local knowledge?  How will 
Malawians long resident in Zimbabwe be discerned? 
 
- Data capture: what information will be asked of applicants? 
Will this include bio-data like fingerprints? What are the 
fraud prevention measures, given DHA's acknowledged problems 
of internal corruption? Will DHA's data bases be networked 
nationally, in case the cards are lost? 
 
Interagency Effects 
------------------- 
 
- Deportations: LHR noted that deportations took place from 
Musina even the day after DHA's announcement.  (They were 
QMusina even the day after DHA's announcement.  (They were 
still ongoing on April 16, according to IOM's officer at the 
border.)  A police official explained that his officers could 
only change operating procedures upon receipt of formal 
instruction from the Minister. 
 
- Interagency consultation: NGOs advised DHA to coordinate 
 
PRETORIA 00000771  002 OF 002 
 
 
urgently with other SAG departments, to assess and plan for 
possible implications in the areas of labor, health, 
education, and children's services. 
 
Public Relations 
---------------- 
 
- Communications: workshop participants stressed the 
importance of clear communications about the program, with 
messages targeted to the South African public (particularly 
to avoid fanning xenophobia), to prospective employers (on 
document format, and work entitlements), and to Zimbabwean 
migrant community itself (to defuse suspicion). 
 
- Formalization of the policy: beyond a press statement by 
the Minister, there is nothing more formal committing the 
government to the new permit regime.  Would any more 
authoritative Act, Decree, or Order be forthcoming in writing? 
 
Policy Implications 
------------------- 
 
- Scope creep: although the card is exclusive to Zimbabweans, 
it is for political purposes to be named as a permit for 
nationals of the 14-state Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).  When, if ever, will other nationals be 
able to apply?  Won't other migrants also petition to be 
included? 
 
- Long-range planning: how does the stopgap solution of a 
temporary permit transition to a longer-range strategy?  How 
does this program dovetail into discussions for eventual 
freedom of movement within SADC?  As FMSP's Tara Polzer 
stressed, termination of the program could easily be 
politicized, as it was based on subjective criteria of 
normalization in Zimbabwe, and hence it was crucial to define 
an end-game strategy clearly from the start.  Excessive 
emphasis on the "temporary" nature of the policy could create 
public expectations of mass deportations at the end. 
Instead, in FMSP's view, the program should be positioned as 
a first step toward long-term SADC solidarity and regional 
integration. 
 
LA LIME