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Viewing cable 09PANAMA348, PANAMA: MARTINELLI ADVISER WEIGHS IN ON ELECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PANAMA348 2009-04-30 15:10 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0348/01 1201510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301510Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3336
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PM PREL
SUBJECT: PANAMA: MARTINELLI ADVISER WEIGHS IN ON ELECTION 
DAY 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Dennis Allen, former Electoral Tribune (TE) magistrate 
and current "electoral process adviser" to Alliance for 
Change presidential candidate Ricardo Martinelli ran down for 
the Political Section his vision of how Panama's May 3 
elections will play out.  Although the election would 
probably proceed without major incident, Allen worried that a 
close vote would cause the loser, whom be believed would be 
Balbina Herrera of the ruling Revolutionary Democratic Party 
(PRD), to cry foul.  Technical innovations to the tabulation 
system are being used for the first time, and he was 
concerned about potential failures and mistakes.  Allen also 
noted that the Panamenista Party was mounting an effort to 
drive up its participation on election day in a campaign to 
improve VP candidate and Panamenista Party President Juan 
Carlos Varela's stature within the Alliance, and that the 
Martinelli camp would need to lean heavily on the 
Panamenistas for organizational support on election day.  End 
summary. 
 
----------------- 
Mapping out May 3 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Allen explained that although the campaign had been 
"too conflictive," he did not expect violence beyond minor or 
isolated incidents.  Allen was more concerned about the 
potential for tabulation confusion or errors.  The TE is 
using a new Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) system to 
tally the votes, and Allen expressed concern over the 
potential for computer crashes and counting or typographical 
errors by the 20,000 TE inspectors.  Under the new system, TE 
inspectors send via cellphone a text-message of voting 
results to a central location where they are automatically 
entered into computer software to be tabulated.  (Note: In 
the past, TE inspectors called the TE operation center and 
reported the tallies verbally; this system allowed for a 
verbal confirmation of the correct number that is lacking 
under the WAP system.)  "If the vote is close," Allen feared, 
"this new method will be called into question and the loser 
may challenge the whole thing."  Since the present election 
is particularly tense, Allen opined that this may not be the 
best time to debut the new system.  He hoped that to avoid 
such potential problems the victor won by "at least 20,000 
votes so the PRD cannot cry fraud and challenge the results." 
 Allen revealed that Martinelli's Democratic Change (CD) 
party polls indicate that Martinelli would win by 100,000 
votes, but admitted that Panamenista Party polls showed a 
smaller margin of victory.  (Note: 2.2 million Panamanians 
are registered to vote; local analysts predict 75% turnout.) 
In any case, Allen hoped that the loser would concede soon 
after the prelimQry results are released between 7:00 and 
8:00 PM.  He added that his team was prepared to call 
President Martin Torrijos to push Herrera to concede if she 
fails to do so within an acceptable timeframe, in order to 
"maintain calm and relieve anxiety." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Panamenistas: Check the right box 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) According to Allen, Panamenista leaders are mounting 
efforts to ensure that their supporters vote for Martinelli 
under the Panamenista banner in order to give Varela 
increased negotiating power should the ticket emerge 
victorious.  (Note: Panamanians casting a vote for Martinelli 
must do so under the banner of one of the four parties that 
comprise the Alliance for Change; the logic is that the 
better-represented parties would hold more sway in a 
Martinelli presidency.)  The Panamenistas are also in charge 
of the Alliance's own election-day tabulation system that 
will "run parallel to the TE."  According to Allen, "Although 
Martinelli has thousands of independent volunteers, they lack 
experience. It is the Panamenistas who have the structure to 
deliver on election day." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
4. (C) Panama's TE is reputable, and the election will most 
likely proceed without major incident.  As in any election, 
there exists in Panama the potential for TE officials to 
mis-report vote results and therefore produce errors in the 
preliminary tally.  But there is no reason to believe that 
 
this would occur, or that TE officials would purposefully 
manipulate the results.  Similarly, computer failure is 
always a possibility, but there is no compelling reason to 
think that one will occur on May 3.  Given these "what if" 
scenarios, and since the system is new, there does exist the 
possibility that some candidates will refuse to concede on 
the pretext that electronic mistakes have skewed the results. 
 But we predict that Martinelli will secure victory by a wide 
enough margin in the presidential contest to prevent any 
serious allegations of errors or fraud. 
 
5. (C) Allen's comments on the Panamenistas' efforts to boost 
their vote tallies tracks with analysts' comments to the 
Political Section over the past few weeks.  A key dynamic in 
a Martinelli presidency will be the relationship between the 
Panamenistas, the country's well-established, second-largest 
party, and the upstart CD party.  Especially with the 
failures of the PRD this electoral season, the Panamenistas 
are looking down the road to the 2014 election, and want to 
try to position Varela such that he can exert authority and 
influence in a Martinelli administration.  Martinelli's 
"autocratic" decision-making style, coupled with what we 
expect to be a strong mandate granted to Martinelli on May 3, 
however, will likely mitigate Panamenista influence in the 
new government; a sizable Panamenista turnout would force 
Martinelli to reckon more with the Panamenistas than he might 
be inclined to otherwise. 
STEPHENSON