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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM (COPE), SCA/A (REOTT), AND WHA/CAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA'S INITIAL REACTION TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: STATE 31102 
 
OTTAWA 00000266  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Terry Breese, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Prime Minister will have personally to 
decide whether to extend Canada's politically fraught combat 
mission in southern Afghanistan beyond its scheduled 2011 end 
of operations and subsequent troop withdrawal.  The European 
response to the President's engagement on ISAF at the NATO 
Summit will color PM Harper's thinking about the mission's 
prospects, and Canada's role in it.  Intervention at the 
highest level might get the Prime Minister to show his cards. 
 Canadian government officials are improving defense, 
security, governance, and development in the volatile 
Kandahar Province in a manner consistent with the new U.S. 
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge delivered reftel points (both general and 
Canada-specific) to National Security Advisor to the Prime 
Minister Marie-Lucie Morin in Ottawa on April 2.  Morin also 
included senior Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade and Privy Council Office (PCO) staff in 
the meeting.  Morin was non-committal in response to the U.S. 
specific requests for Canada, but promised to convey them 
immediately to Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his 
ministers in advance of the April 3-4 NATO Summit. 
 
¶3.  (C) Morin especially deferred to the Prime Minister 
Harper in response to the request that Canada "remain open to 
reconsidering its plan to withdraw combat forces after 2011 
as the situation on the ground develops or at a minimum 
retain PRT, OMLTs, Police Mentoring Teams, and crucial 
enablers (airlift, intelligence, engineers) in Kandahar 
beyond 2011."  She noted that PM Harper in his public 
comments so far had "been clear on the 2011 position" by 
emphasizing that the March 2008 House of Commons motion to 
extend Canadian Forces (CF) in Afghanistan would expire on 
December 2011.  "It is up to the Prime Minister himself to 
revisit the matter as he sees fit," Morin remarked. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to Charge's question about Canada's 
military planning for its post-2011 role in Afghanistan, 
Morin said that the Canadian inter-agency was focused on "the 
short-term, the here and now" rather than on what might occur 
in 2011.  She suggested that the European NATO partners' 
responses to President Obama's engagement in Strasbourg/Kehl 
would color the Prime Minister's thinking about the way ahead 
in Afghanistan.  "So far we've heard many appeals, but not 
much of a response to those appeals," she said. The prospect 
of an election "in the next few months," she added, would 
weigh on PM Harper as he considers whether, and if so then 
when, to change course in Afghanistan. 
 
¶5.  (C) Shifting to the other Canada-specific tasks, Morin 
said senior officials were still studying the request for a 
$100 million yearly donation to the Afghan National Army 
Trust Fund.  She noted that Canada, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 
had just held another Dubai Process workshop (septel), at 
which they agreed to border policing, infrastructure, and 
Qwhich they agreed to border policing, infrastructure, and 
trade facilitation action plans in which Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, with additional facilitation from Canada, would 
engage the G-8 and other key partners.  Canada also is 
"actively engaged on promoting alternative livelihoods as 
part of its counter-narcotics (CN) engagement," she said, and 
supports the Afghan national CN strategy in numerous ways. 
On police training and mentoring, Morin observed that Canada 
had just funded the deployment of 50 additional Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers.  (Note:  Canada also 
is prepared to assign a sixth OMLT in the Kandahar region if 
the Afghan army deploys an additional battalion into theater. 
 End note.) 
 
¶6.  (C) "As to the rest (the general points)," Morin 
remarked, "much of it we already are doing."  This, she said, 
was because in many ways the U.S. review results mirror what 
the Canadians learned from a comprehensive review they 
completed early last year.  Like the U.S. today, Canada last 
year concluded that it needed to do a better job of cementing 
progress on the defense and security front via fully 
 
OTTAWA 00000266  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
integrated civilian assistance aimed at improving Afghan 
governance, rule of law and policing, and to improve economic 
opportunity, particularly in agriculture. 
 
¶7.  (C) Separately, Charge had briefed Afghan Ambassador to 
Canada Omar Samad prior to the demarche.  Samad had not 
received parallel instructions from Kabul and did not join 
Charge. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  The April 2 request that Canada remain open 
to reconsidering its plan to withdraw combat forces, mentors, 
trainers, enablers, and its PRT in 2011 likely went straight 
to the Prime Minister's party in Strasbourg, and Canadian 
officials probably spent the night struggling to formulate a 
response.  However, as Morin noted, PM Harper himself will 
have to decide whether, and if so when, to reconsider the 
planned withdrawal.  It likely will take a direct, personal 
approach at the most senior level to elicit an authoritative 
response to reftel request.  The minority status of his 
government and the likelihood of a new federal election 
within the coming year will limit PM Harper's options.  As 
Liberal Defence Critic (shadow Foreign Minister) Bob Rae 
commented separately to PolMinCouns during a more general 
April 2 discussion on foreign policy, "no Prime Minister 
could make a decision to extend a combat role beyond 2011 
until after the next election," and the Liberals would also 
be disinclined to extend even if they come to power. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment (continued):  This demarche already has 
complicated Prime Minister Harper's public position.  During 
and since President Obama's February 19 Ottawa visit, PM 
Harper has repeatedly responded to questions about possible 
extensions by saying that the U.S. had made no specific 
request of Canada.  As Morin noted, Harper now will have to 
deal with the results of a specific U.S. request. 
 
Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
BREESE