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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000309 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PINR PTER KCRM TU NO
SUBJECT: FROZEN DELIGHT: NORWAY'S TURKISH MINORITY 
 
1.(SBU)  SUMMARY.  Turks represent one of Norway's 
longest-resident immigrant communities, with the first 
arriving almost fifty years ago, although most have arrived 
much more recently.  Norway was originally a destination for 
Turkish political refugees but for the last decade or more, 
Turkish immigrants have sought prosperity.  Comprising 
Norway's sixth largest non-Western minority group, Turks are 
relatively well-integrated and not a large risk for 
radicalization, although the population does face some 
educational, employment and discrimination challenges.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
WHO ARE THEY AND WHERE ARE THEY FROM? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  There are currently just over 15,000 Turkish 
immigrants (first generation) and Norwegian-born to 
immigrants (second generation) in Norway.  Nearly 6,000 
reside in Oslo, with the rest largely spread between Bergen, 
Drammen, and other cities.  The first wave of immigrants 
began to arrive in Norway shortly after the 1960 military 
coup in Turkey, with others following the 1971 and 1980 
coups.  These immigrants comprised mostly of Kurds, elites, 
and left-leaning intellectuals came to Norway for political 
refuge and have found the Social-Democrat politics of 
Scandinavia a natural fit.  The far larger and more recent 
group of immigrants is more conservative, less educated and 
came to Norway for jobs. 
 
3.(U) The Turkish population is quickly growing and it is 
estimated that it could soon rank among the top four largest 
non-Western immigrant communities in Norway.  Part of this 
increase is a result of family growth, through high birth 
rates and family reunification.  Interestingly, tourism is 
also playing a role.  Many of the newest immigrants are from 
Turkey's numerous popular summer towns and beach resorts 
which are frequented by Norwegian tourists.  Individuals on 
holiday visit these destinations and often meet men or women 
who eventually end up moving to Norway with their significant 
other. 
 
4.(U) Politically, today most Norwegian Turks are 
conservative (excluding, of course, the smaller group of 
initial immigrants).  Mertefe Bartinlioglu, Norway's 
highest-profile Turk in politics, is on the Oslo city council 
and belongs to the Hoyre (Conservative) Party, which 
advocates fiscal free market policies, low taxes, and lower 
government involvement with the economy. 
 
------------------------------ 
HOW WELL ARE THEY INTEGRATING? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) Turks in Norway are generally considered to have 
integrated well into Norwegian society, but still face 
considerable problems.  The community is rather tight and 
cohesive.  They have relatively little interaction with other 
large immigrant groups with which one might expect them to 
have shared interests, such as the Pakistanis, Somalis, and 
Iraqis.  Through work, religion, and some social 
organizations, they do, however, have some association with 
immigrants from the Balkans, smaller Arab groups, and the 
Greeks. 
 
6.(U) Mertefe Bartinlioglu says one problem is that the 
community "has no role models" to provide motivation and a 
good example, so many have difficulty finding work, 
especially women.  To his credit, Bartinlioglu has worked to 
establish small business cooperatives (often restaurants and 
catering businesses) with Turkish women who would otherwise 
likely have trouble working due to lack of skills and/or 
education. 
 
7.(U) The Turkish community's education numbers are well 
below average for the country, and even quite low among 
immigrants in general.  Turks have among the poorest 
education numbers of all immigrants in Norway; a massive 
40.4% of the population has only a primary school education 
or less.  Of registered 16-18 year old first generation 
 
OSLO 00000309  002 OF 003 
 
 
immigrants, only just over 50% are enrolled in upper 
secondary education, which is quite low.  Second generation 
immigrants aged 16-18 fare much better, with close to 90% 
enrolled in upper secondary education--basically on par with 
most other immigrant groups. 
 
8.(U) Turkish women, although posting higher numbers than 
their male counterparts, are still doing especially badly 
compared to the greater population.  Thirty-three percent 
have less than an upper secondary education; the female 
immigrant population average for the category is 15.1% and 
the average among all females in Norway is 23.0%. 
 
9.(U) Tertiary education, although rare among first 
generation Turkish immigrants, shows some signs of promise 
for the second generation, which has around 20% of 19-24 year 
olds enrolled in classes.  Still, this is of course very low, 
even among immigrants. When comparing Turkish women, for, 
example, with other groups, many have more than twice the 
level of women enrolled in tertiary education as the Turks. 
The small percentage of Turks fortunate enough to pursue 
tertiary education do, however, enjoy support from numerous 
student groups and social organizations.  These can be vital 
in establishing professional contacts and are often quite 
helpful with setting up members in successful careers after 
graduation. 
 
10.(U) Electoral turnout is also notably low among eligible 
Turkish immigrants.  The average turnout among all eligible 
voters in the 2007 municipal and county election was 
40.3%--comparable to non-presidential elections in the U.S. 
Turkish turnout, however, was a considerably lower 36.4% of 
eligible voters.  Women's participation was also low. The 
national average was 41.7%, while only 35.8% of Turkish women 
voted. Anecdotal evidence shows a higher than usual number of 
Turkish-Norwegians involved in local politics, perhaps 
demonstrating the potential for the second generation of 
immigrants. 
 
11.(U) Employment is one area where, although still below 
where they should be, Turks have some cause for optimism. 
Around 55% of persons aged 15-74 years are employed, not far 
below the total immigrant average of about 63%.  As is the 
case nationally and virtually across the board for all 
immigrants, a lower percentage of Turkish women are employed 
than men.  The relative difference in employment between the 
genders is among the most pronounced of any community, 
however, with over 53% more men working than women.  For 
comparison, nationally about 9% more men than women are 
employed, and among all immigrants this number is about 21%. 
Common forms of employment are as cooks, small restaurant 
owners, cleaners, barbers, and taxi drivers.  Turks are not 
merely resigned to menial jobs, however.  Many are successful 
professionals--doctors, lawyers, business owners, etc. 
Bartinlioglu, for example, is the owner of a food import 
business, in addition to being a full-time city council 
member. 
 
------------------------- 
IS RADICALIZATION A RISK? 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Discrimination can be a telling marker of both 
integration and risk for radicalization.  When asked if they 
have experienced discrimination of any kind, 48.8% of Turks 
answer "No."  This may sound encouraging at first, but when 
considering the average among all immigrant groups--55.6% 
giving a "No" answer--it is obvious that many Turks feel they 
are subject to considerably more discrimination than other 
immigrants.  In fact, the only immigrants that say they have 
been subject to discrimination more often than the Turks are 
the Iraqis, Iranians, and Somalis. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Turks are by any measure one of Norway's most 
religious immigrant communities reflecting the conservative 
nature of the majority of recent immigrants.  They are 
rivaled in religiosity only by the Somalis and Pakistanis. 
When asked how important religion is in their life, with "1" 
being "not important at all" and "10" being "very important", 
the overall Turkish average is about 7.5.  About 50% of the 
 
OSLO 00000309  003 OF 003 
 
 
Turkish community actually answered "10". Total immigrant 
average is actually not far below the Turks at around 6.9, 
although the average is somewhat skewed because of the higher 
importance ratings given by the far more numerous Somali and 
Pakistani populations.  Many communities are far less 
religious.  The Iranian community, for example, which is very 
similar in size and integration to the Turks, scores only 
around 3.9, meaning they are far less religious (in fact, the 
least religious of any immigrant population).  As would be 
expected, religious activity is also quite high among Turks, 
with most attending around 24 religious gatherings or prayers 
arranged by the community per year.  The immigrant average is 
¶15.  Again, only the Pakistanis, at 31, and the Somalis, at 
25, attend more religious activities on average.  Male 
participation is considerably higher among all these 
mentioned groups, with the exception of the Iranians. 
 
14.(SBU) The importance of these numbers should not be 
exaggerated, however.  There is little indication of Turkish 
radicalization in Norway.  These observations have been 
provided more to highlight two potential areas of concern 
rather than to paint a broad picture of radicalization among 
the community in its current state. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Despite poor statistics in many areas, the large 
Turkish population has a good reputation of being 
successfully integrated into Norwegian society.  The 
community has shown no signs of radicalization.  Quite to the 
contrary, there is every indication that it's problems with 
employment, discrimination, and education will largely remedy 
themselves with the second generation.  Any risk of 
radicalization must therefore be considered minimal, although 
if discrimination and lack of economic success were to 
increase dramatically by any substantial amount this could be 
cause for concern and warrant a reevaluation of their 
situation.  END COMMENT. 
WHITNEY