Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI686, BHARAT BALLOT 09: A MATTER OF COALITIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NEWDELHI686.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NEWDELHI686 2009-04-07 14:59 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO1627
OO RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHGI
RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNE #0686/01 0971459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071459Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6068
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7534
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1239
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6178
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3265
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1616
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6226
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7823
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8230
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000686 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM IN
SUBJECT: BHARAT BALLOT 09: A MATTER OF COALITIONS 
 
REF: BHARAT BALLOT 09 SERIES 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The fragmentation of political power away 
from Delhi and the national parties to the states and 
regional parties means that no single party is capable of 
forming a national government by itself in India.  With 
little more than a week to go before the start of the polling 
cycle on April 16, the intense period of negotiations and 
deal-making to lock in pre-poll alliances has ended and the 
election campaign has begun in earnest.  Going into the 
polls, Indian electoral politics today hinges around five 
axis: a Congress Party-led alliance; a Bharatiya Janata 
Party-led alliance; a communist-led Third Front; the 
Brahmin-Dalit combine of Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister 
Mayawati; and a "Fourth Front" of regional political parties 
in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.  This cable explores the nature 
of coalition politics in India.  We will examine the Congress 
Party and BJP alliances in subsequent cables.   End Summary. 
 
Coalitions Here to Stay 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Indian parliamentary elections are notoriously 
unpredictable because of the inherent difficulty of assessing 
the pulse and mood of an electorate that is so widely diverse 
in geography, language, ethnicity, religion, economic status 
and a host of other attributes.  A large roster of viable 
political parties makes it harder to assess their relative 
strengths during any given election cycle.  Caste and ethnic 
configurations and local development and governance issues 
can shift widely from one constituency to the next, making it 
even more difficult to predict aggregate results. 
 
3.  (SBU) However, one of the few predictions that can be 
made with a high degree of confidence about the upcoming 
April-May parliamentary election is that it will result in a 
coalition government, as no single party has the strength to 
come close to a majority in parliament.  Every Indian 
government since 1991 has been a coalition (or a minority 
government supported by other parties.)  And, this trend has 
been accelerating over time.  The current United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government is a coalition of 13 political 
parties in government and at least half a dozen that support 
it from the outside.  The previous 1999-2004 National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was a coalition of close 
to two dozen parties. 
 
Powers Shifts Away From the Center 
---------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) For the last 40 years, political power in India has 
moved steadily to regional parties or single-issue parties, 
which are often caste-based and dominated by a single 
personality.  The once mighty Congress Party, which led the 
freedom struggle and for long held absolute power in Delhi 
and the states, has lost its luster and fallen on hard times. 
 It once served as a coalition in itself, bringing together 
all of India's castes, religions and ethnic groups under one 
umbrella.  The Congress Party's credibility has eroded over 
time because of the arrogance of power, the autocratic ways 
of its leaders, its failure to respond to regional 
aspirations and its inability to adapt to the changing India. 
 
 
4. (SBU) The penchant of the Nehru-Gandhi family to 
centralize power in its own hands and bring down regional 
party leaders to ensure that no one can challenge its 
supremacy has been particularly damaging to the party. 
Regional political leaders, especially in the key states of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, have steadily peeled away from the 
party and set up their own political bases.  The result has 
been that the Congress Party is virtually nonexistent in 
these two states that together comprise about more than 20 
percent of the lower house of parliament.  These two states 
 
NEW DELHI 00000686  002 OF 003 
 
 
were at one time the heart of the Congress Party's electoral 
calculations and the disappearance of the party's strength 
there mirrors its national decline. 
 
5.  (SBU) The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has 
never been a truly national party.  With roots in Hindu 
nationalism as a response to centuries of Muslims and 
Christian rule, its appeal was limited to the Hindi heartland 
in northern India.  While it has managed to spread to the 
non-Hindi speaking states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa and 
Karnataka, the BJP has not been able to sufficiently broaden 
its appeal geographically and across caste and identity lines 
to threaten to win a majority on its own.  Both the Congress 
and the BJP must, therefore, rely on fractious and unwieldy 
coalitions with smaller parties to govern. 
 
Pre-Poll and Post-Poll Alliances 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Coalition politics in India is of two stripes.  In 
pre-poll alliances, parties reach an understanding early, 
generally before the candidate nominations have been declared 
and the elections campaigns begun.  The allied parties 
apportion election districts in a state or a region between 
them on the basis of some seat allocation formula that is 
roughly commensurate with the strength of each party in the 
sub-regions of that state or region.  By pledging to 
consolidate their votes in each district, the allies improve 
their chances against candidates of other parties in these 
districts.  In post-poll alliances, the parties come together 
once elections results have been declared.  They have fought 
the elections independently and often against each other. 
Both types of alliances are common in India.  Indeed, both 
are necessary in order for any configuration of parties to 
reach a stable majority in parliament and form a viable 
government. 
 
Ideology-free Coalitions 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) The distinctive feature of coalition politics in 
India is the almost complete absence of any ideological 
grounding of most of the regional parties when it comes to 
alliances for governing coalitions.  Pre-poll alliances are 
forged only so that parties can pool their voter bases and 
avoid multi-cornered contents.  Once the elections are over, 
political parties, big and small, negotiate for the best deal 
they can get to secure a piece of the pie, which different 
parties see differently.  Some parties, for example, will not 
want ministerial berths in the federal cabinet and will 
bargain for power in their home states.  Others will want 
specific portfolios in the federal cabinet because they 
consider them either as a source of patronage (Railways) or 
fund-raising (Chemicals and Fertilizers, Steel, Coal, Mines). 
 Still others will demand a certain policy change or 
government action designed to benefit a specific person or 
group as the price for their support - the price demanded by 
the Samajwadi Party in  return for its support to the UPA 
during the July 2008 confidence vote reportedly was an UPA 
agreement to slow down prosecution of Samajwadi Party 
president Mulayum Singh Yadav in a criminal corruption case. 
 
7.  (SBU) There are only a handful of combinations that can 
be ruled out in advance.  Only one or two of these are on 
pure ideological grounds - it is difficult to imagine, for 
example, the communist parties entering a BJP-led coalition 
at this time (although they have supported each other in the 
past.)  A few other combinations are unlikely for political 
rather than ideological reasons - most regional parties that 
battle each other in a given state would likely not be a part 
of the same coalition in Delhi (Tamil parties DMK and AIDMK, 
for example).  Similarly, regional parties whose principal 
opponent in the state is the Congress Party would not likely 
be part a coalition led by the Congress Party (Shiromani 
 
NEW DELHI 00000686  003 OF 003 
 
 
Akali Dal).  Beyond that the parties see the field open to 
them to reach the best deal possible, regardless of any 
ideological compatibility issues. 
 
The 2009 Fault Lines 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The frenzy of negotiations, deal-making, feints and 
counter-feints over pre-poll alliances ended last week, with 
several crucial alliances sealed and many that did not 
materialize.  Both the Congress Party and the BJP got some 
rude shocks, with the Congress having greater difficulty 
finding partners ahead of the polls.  As the campaigns have 
entered full swing, the main alliance fault lines are as 
follows: 
 
Congress Party: It entered into pre-poll alliances with the 
Karunanidhi's DMK in Tamil Nadu, Mamata Banerjee's Trinamool 
Congress in West Bengal, and Sharad Pawar's Nationalist 
Congress Party in Maharashtra.  It failed to reach an 
understanding with UPA allies: Malayum Singh Yadav's 
Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, Lalu Prasad Yadav's 
Rashtriya Janata Dal and Ram Vilas Paswan's Lok Janashakti 
Party in Bihar, the Nationalist Congress Party outside of 
Maharashtra.  Tamil Nadu's PMK also left the UPA alliance to 
team up with another regional party in that state. 
 
BJP: It has entered into pre-poll alliances with the Janata 
Dal-United in Bihar, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, the Shiromani 
Akali Dal in Punjab, the Indian National Lok Dal in Haryana, 
the Rashtriya Lok Dal in Uttar Pradesh, and the Asom Gana 
Parishad in Assam.  The BJP could not reach an agreement in 
Orissa with its long time partner, the Biju Janata Dal, which 
broke away to fight alone in that state. 
 
Third Front: The communist parties have been working hard to 
assemble a third alternative to challenge the Congress and 
the BJP.  Parties that have signed on with varying degrees of 
commitment include the four communist parties of the left 
front, the Telegu Desam Party and the Telangana Rashtriya 
Samiti in Andhra Pradesh, the AIDMK in Tamil Nadu, and the 
Janata Dal-Secular in Karnataka. 
 
Fourth Front: Lalu Prasad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan in Bihar 
and Mulayum Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh, after having dumped 
the Congress Party ahead of the polls, have pledged to 
support each other in their respective states and not field 
candidates against each other in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. 
 
Mayawati: Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati's Bahujan 
Samaj Party has not attempted to enter into an alliance or 
understanding with any other party.  It goes into the 
election with its Brahmin-Dalit combine alone and will 
contest countrywide although its strength lies mainly in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
BURLEIGH