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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI735, SOMALIA - FOREIGN MINISTER DESCRIBES EFFORTS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI735 2009-04-11 08:29 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO5874
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0735/01 1010829
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110829Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9163
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3038
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5458
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000735 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MARR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - FOREIGN MINISTER DESCRIBES EFFORTS TO 
GET ASSISTANCE FOR THE TFG 
 
1. (SBU) In an April 9 meeting, TFG Foreign Minister Omar, 
accompanied by Minister of Defense "Gandi," described a 
recent visit to Rome, and the state of his efforts to elicit 
financial support for the Sheikh Sharif government from the 
UAE, Iraq, and Kuwait. Rome, he said, had promised $4 million 
the TFG joint security forces.  Omar thought that the UAE, if 
lobbied by the USG, would be willing to offer substantially 
more. Omar said he would accompany TFG President Sharif on an 
April 17 - 19 visit to Turkey and an April 20 - 21 visit to 
Cairo in advance of the April 22 - 23 AMISOM/Somali security 
institutions Brussels donors conference. End summary. 
 
Promising Noises from 
the Middle East 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In an April 9 meeting, Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omar, 
accompanied by Minister of Defense Mohamed Abdi "Gandi," 
reviewed what he said was evidence of the Arab world's 
commitment to the Djibouti Process.  Although TFG President 
Sheikh Sharif had rejected a $3 million monthly stipend 
offered by the Government of Qatar at the May 30 - 31 Arab 
League Summit, Omar thought optimistically that, in the end, 
Qatar would relax the "unacceptable" conditions it had tied 
to the provision of aid. (Qatar's aid was reportedly 
contingent on the TFG negotiating with some of its most 
uncompromising opponents.) 
 
3. (SBU) Kuwait had offered no aid to the TFG at the Arab 
League event, Omar said, because its foreign minister had 
told Omar that his government did not want to appear to be 
publicly undercutting Qatar's insistence that TFG negotiate 
with its opponents by at the same time providing 
no-strings-attached assistance.  Omar thought that USG 
backing could encourage Kuwait to provide meaningful 
assistance quickly. 
 
4. (SBU) The most promising conversation on the margins of 
the Arab League Summit, Omar said, was with UAE Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Abdallah who "did not blink" when Omar urged 
that the UAE provide as much as $120 million to the TFG's 
efforts to stand up its security forces.  Omar again thought 
it was critical that the U.S. urge the UAE to robustly back 
the TFG.  He had urged unnamed USG officials to use the April 
4 - 5 visit of Sheikh Abdallah to Washington to lobby for 
immediate assistance. 
 
5. (SBU) The Government of Iraq had announced a $5 million 
grant to the TFG at the Summit.  Separately, Jordan had told 
the TFG that it was willing to sell, with USG authorization, 
certain military equipment, including four helicopters, if 
funding could be obtained. 
President Sheikh Sharif would also be seeking military aid, 
including equipment, during his April 17 - 19 visit to 
Turkey, Omar said.  After Turkey, the President would travel 
to Cairo. 
 
Italy and France Offer 
Military Training 
---------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) In meetings with Foreign Minister Frattini and other 
Italian officials, the Government of Italy committed, Omar 
said, to provide training to an unspecified number of joint 
security force officers at the Vicenza European Gendarmerie 
Force headquarters.  An unspecified number of Somalis would 
also receive training by the Guardia di Finanza in order to 
better control port, airport, and other revenues.  Finally, 
the GoI will announce $4 million in aid to the joint security 
forces at the April 22 - 23 AMISOM/Somali Security Forces 
Brussels donors conference.  Omar added parenthetically that 
he was unhappy that only $30 million was being solicited for 
the joint security forces at the donors conference, while 
$230 million was being sought for AMISOM. The TFG was 
critically underfunded in what the international community 
insisted was a "Somali-owned" process, he noted.  He had 
expressed his unhappiness to UNPOS. (Note:  UNPOS is 
currently considering adjusting the amounts solicited, 
perhaps by asking AMISOM to reduce the civilian component of 
its mission and having the AU access up to $100 million from 
the EU Peace Facility.) 
 
7. (SBU) Minister of Defense "Gandi" noted that in recent 
meetings he has had with the French MFA and minister of state 
for defense affairs an offer, made by Foreign Minister 
Kouchner during an earlier visit to Djibouti, to train Somali 
troops was reiterated.  The training would begin in 
September, "Gandi" thought. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Omar numerous times urged the U.S. to support the 
TFG's efforts to get assistance from countries --he mentioned 
the UAE, Kuwait, and Turkey-- with which it has much 
influence  Omar noted that aid from the UAE could come more 
quickly and have fewer strings attached to it than assistance 
from western donors, making it all the more critical that the 
U.S. use its good offices quickly to help his cash-strapped 
transitional government. 
RANNEBERGER