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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI645, SOMALIA - DATE OF SOMALILAND PRESIDENTIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI645 2009-04-01 15:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO6812
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0645/01 0911546
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011546Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9034
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000645 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - DATE OF SOMALILAND PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS DISPUTED 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 147 
     B. 08 NAIROBI 1489 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  An on-again, off-again dispute over the 
date of the Somaliland presidential elections, which had most 
recently been tentatively scheduled for May 31, gathered 
steam on March 28, when a special session of the Guurti 
(House of Elders) voted to extend incumbent President 
Riyale's term to October 29. It was to have expired May 6 
(although opposition parties contend it should have expired 
April 6).  The opposition parties have termed the Guurti's 
decision unconstitutional and the public is waiting for the 
Somaliland National Election Commission to make a final 
announcement on the election date.  UCID opposition party 
Chairman and presidential candidate Faisal Warabe has 
publicly opposed the Guurti's decision and lobbied for the 
May 31 election date.  Kulmiye opposition party Chairman and 
presidential candidate Mohamed Silanyo has condemned the 
vote, asserting that it could lead to instability that could 
jeopardize Somaliland's bid for independence.  Many believe 
the extension was a result of heavy-handed tactics by the 
ruling party to delay an election that many believe President 
Riyale would lose if it occurred today.  All parties in 
Somaliland have called for calm in the wake of the vote, and 
there have been no significant public disturbances to date. 
End summary. 
 
Guurti Vote Continues 
Controversy 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A March 28, 42 to 35 vote by the Somaliland House of 
Elders (Guurti) to extend incumbent President Riyale's term, 
which had been due to expire May 6 (although opposition 
parties contend it should have expired April 6), to October 
29, has capped the latest stage of an on-again, off-again 
argument about the timing of the presidential elections and 
the length of the President's term of office.  The vote was 
significant in that the Guurti typically operates by 
consensus and the official results came only after two 
recounts.  The first vote was reportedly in favor of the 
opposition,  40 to 39 not to extend the presidential mandate. 
 With administration supporters claiming a miscount, a second 
vote was reportedly 40 to 39 in favor of the extension.  The 
chairperson then suggested a a roll call vote that resulted 
in the official vote (one abstained and the chairperson did 
not vote).  The division in the Guurti reportedly reflects 
the division among the majority of Somalilanders. 
 
Long-Simmering 
Problems 
-------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Somaliland's presidential and local elections were 
originally to have been held in March 2008, but were delayed 
by the slow and contentious process of re-constituting the 
National Electoral Commission (NEC) and a lack of agreement 
on the voter registration process (ref a).  In April 2008, 
the crisis reached a head when the Guurti unilaterally 
extended the term of the President to April 6, 2009.  After 
several months of extensive negotiations, Somaliland's 
political stakeholders reached consensus on a timetable for a 
full voter registration process. They agreed with the Guurti 
that the presidential elections would be held on April 6, 
2009, and would be followed by local elections.  They also 
agreed on an amendment to the voter registration law to 
accommodate these changes, which was adopted by the 
Parliament and the Guurti.  On June 16, 2008, the three 
political parties signed a supplemental, eight-point 
agreement on the electoral process (ref b). That agreement 
stipulated inter alia that any change of the election date 
and/or presidential mandate needed to be agreed by all three 
political parties, the NEC, and the Parliament. 
 
4. (SBU) After the October 29, 2008 suicide bombings in 
Hargeisa, Somaliland's capital, the NEC requested that the 
election be deferred, from March 31 to May 31, 2009. The new 
election date meant that either Riyale's term would have to 
be extended, or a caretaker government would have to be 
appointed when it ended on May 6. The extension to May 31 was 
agreed to by the political parties, as stipulated in the June 
 
NAIROBI 00000645  002 OF 002 
 
 
agreement, but there was no provision made for either 
extending the President's term, or appointing a caretaker to 
act as president from May 6 until the inauguration of a new 
president.  Meetings among the three parties on that subject 
during the week of March 23 ended inconclusively. 
 
5. (SBU) According to observers in Hargeisa, the 82-member 
Guurti was divided into three factions (roughly corresponding 
to the positions of each political party), at the time of the 
March 28 vote to extend Riyale's term: 
 
-- President Riyale's UDUB party supported a six-month 
extension of the incumbent's term, allegedly in order to 
provide the NEC with sufficient time to ensure that all 
voters were registered, and the elections conducted in an 
orderly manner; 
 
-- Chairman and presidential candidate Mohamed Mohamed 
Silanyo's opposition Kulmiye party argued against any 
extension of Riyale's term of office, insisting it would not 
recognize the current government after April 6; 
 
-- a third faction supported the NEC proposal that Riyale's 
term be extended until May 31, in order to ensure a seated 
government until the election date. 
 
6. (SBU) The Guurti factions buttressed their arguments with 
competing citations from the  Somaliland Constitution.  In 
the event, the vote was largely along party lines, and 
Riyale's majority UDUB party eventually prevailed, but only 
after two recounts, then the recorded vote.  (Note: An 
observer to the process told us that since voting is not a 
standard procedure within the Guurti, the formalized process 
likely intimidated some who did not want to go on the record 
against Riyale). The Guurti's decision was rejected by the 
opposition parties, which argued that only the NEC had the 
right to propose an extension of the President's term of 
office and by extension, an election date.  The NEC has to 
date been silent on both issues. 
 
7. (SBU) On March 31, Kulmiye called a press conference to 
make its position clear -- that it would not recognize Riyale 
as President after April 6.  Silanyo announced that he is 
ready for elections at any time and did not press for a 
specific date.  While he did not state it outright, Silanyo 
inferred that the Guurti's decision was a ploy by the ruling 
party to permanently delay elections.  The opposition leader 
said he would follow whatever decision the NEC makes. 
Riyale's UBUB party fought back in a press release and called 
Silanyo's announcement "alarming and unconstitutional" and 
said it would not be tolerated.  As of April 1, negotiations 
were reportedly still underway, though dialogue is strained 
at best.  While Kulmiye's Silanyo and UCID's Warabe have 
rejected the Guurti's decision, they have reportedly asked 
that their followers not take their unhappiness to the 
streets, and calm has, so far, prevailed. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Reftels detail the ups and downs of this much 
delayed election.  With the latest vote by the Guurti, 
suspicions have crystallized in some quarters that UDUB's 
intention all along has been to keep President Riyale in 
office for as long as possible and avoid the unknowns of a 
presidential election.  While Silanyo continues to fuel the 
debate, he has also been careful not to push too hard because 
he has a strong constituency concentrated in the nomadic 
population that would have abandoned its assigned voting 
districts to move into other areas.  Most observers believe 
that elections will likely be delayed until the end of 
September, but it is less clear that they will be able to 
reach consensus about Riyale's term in office.  While this 
latest episode is further weakening Riyale's popularity, few 
Somalilanders are willing to mount too great a protest for 
fear that it would unleash a reaction that would undermine 
the region's greater democratic ambitions and hopes for 
recognition as an independent state. For this reason, we do 
not expect violence and are encouraging all sides to continue 
dialogue. 
RANNEBERGER