VZCZCXRO9214
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0951/01 1041203
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141203Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2865
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: MOSCOW CITY DUMA POSTPONES ELECTIONS TO 2010 
 
¶1. (SBU)  This message is sensitive but unclassified; please 
protect accordingly. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Summary:  On March 31, the Moscow City Duma members 
postponed elections to their own assembly from the 
originally-planned October 2009 date to March 2010 based on 
Russia's federal law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral 
Rights."  Delaying the elections is a precursor to other 
changes to the Moscow City Duma rules, which could, in 
theory, improve the registration and campaigning processes. 
The extension until early 2010 will, incidentally, legitimize 
a longer term for Moscow's Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  On March 31, the Moscow City Duma agreed to move 
its own elections from October 2009 to March 2010 based on 
Russia's federal law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral 
Rights."  Moscow City government officials told us that 
Article 37.2 of this law allows for flexibility concerning 
the exact election day.  Deputy Chairman of the Moscow City 
Duma and Head of the United Russia faction, Andrey Metelskiy, 
assured us April 2 that it is legal to hold the elections in 
either October 2009 or March 2010. 
 
Why Controlling Moscow's Legislature Matters 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Election of its members to Moscow's legislature 
bolsters the image of political parties in Russian regions 
and enables them to exploit the benefits of publicity and 
concrete action in future election campaigns throughout the 
country.  Moscow City Duma deputies are able to influence 
federal institutions by creating city legislation and by 
building and using close contacts with the federal government 
for their local Moscow constituencies.  In addition to being 
a large city, Moscow City and St. Petersburg are each among 
the 83 federal subjects, putting them on par with constituent 
federal republics and regions, and making Moscow City Duma 
seats particularly attractive prizes for politicians and 
parties. 
 
Current Voting Rules 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Under current law, the Moscow City Duma elections 
have a mixed voting system with both single mandate and 
proportional voting.  United Russia dominates the 35-member 
Moscow City Duma while opposition groups have minimal 
representation.  Deputies elected to fill the 15 single 
mandate seats, representing Moscow's voting districts, all 
hail from United Russia.  In addition, United Russia 
dominates the 20 proportional seats with 14 candidates, who 
serve alongside only four Communist (KPRF) and two Yabloko 
opposition party members.  Independent candidates are allowed 
to run, but they must do so under the umbrella of a political 
party.  An amendment to the federal election law currently 
under discussion, which would also apply to regions, would no 
longer require candidates to pay a registration fee, though 
they would still need to obtain voter signatures in order to 
run.  However, political parties with seats in the (national) 
State Duma, are not required to collect signatures in order 
to nominate candidates for regional assemblies.  (Note: 
Currently only United Russia, Just Russia, the KPRF, and 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia are represented in the 
State Duma.  End Note.)  If a party has no representation in 
the State Duma, Article 34 of the Moscow Electoral Code 
dictates that single mandate candidates must collect 
signatures of one percent of voters, on average 5,000 
signatures, from the respective districts.  In order to field 
candidates for seats distributed in accordance with the 
proportional system, a party that is not in the State Duma 
must collect one percent of the number of Moscow voters, a 
number which fluctuates, but is typically around 70,000 
signatures. 
 
Postponing the Elections to March 2010 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Metelskiy maintained that postponement of elections 
was necessary in light of the economic crisis.  According to 
him, Mayor Luzhkov's priority is to use city resources for 
social support and essential government payments during the 
current crisis.  Metelskiy estimated that the Moscow City 
Duma elections would cost 1.5 billion rubles (about USD 44 
million), and that the government would prefer to defer this 
large expense.  He reiterated that all decisions related to 
the elections were legal, unlike in 1995 when the Moscow City 
Duma deputies extended their term for two years and a 
subsequent lawsuit ended with a ruling that the Duma had 
acted illegally.  On April 8, Lilia Shibanova, Chairman of 
the Regional Civic Organization in Defense of Democratic 
 
MOSCOW 00000951  002 OF 003 
 
 
Rights and Liberties (GOLOS), told us that since the last 
Moscow City Duma elections were held on December 5, 2005, it 
makes sense to postpone the elections in this case.  If the 
elections were held in October 2009, that would result in the 
Deputies' terms being shortened slightly from the normal 
length of four years. 
 
Impact of Reforms on the March 2010 Elections 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Some election reforms look promising in terms of 
creating a more democratic voting structure.  Shibanova told 
us that the Moscow City Duma will need to reduce the 
threshold for parties from ten to seven percent to correspond 
to the federal election law threshold.  While a lower 
threshold means, theoretically, that more parties might win 
seats, she noted that that the KPRF, likely to exceed the 
seven percent barrier in Moscow, might gain additional seats, 
though Just Russia could draw some votes away from the 
Communists.  In the 2005 elections, 10 parties were 
registered, but six failed to pass the 10 percent barrier. 
LDPR, the only party of the six still in existence, received 
eight percent.  Shibanova predicted that in 2010 there would 
be little difference in comparison with the present City Duma 
make-up. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  If the Moscow voting system were to become strictly 
proportional, prospects for opposition candidates might be 
improved further.  The six deputies from opposition party 
members in the current Moscow City Duma won their seats 
through the proportional system, not through single mandate 
voting.  Shibanova thought that the reforms lowering the 
threshold and implementing a strict proportional system would 
be a step forward and would have a positive impact on the 
registration and campaign processes.  But, there is also 
concern that some of the proposed changes to the Moscow City 
Duma election process could play out negatively in the 
planned March 2010 elections.  Shibanova told us that experts 
and politicians have been discussing rumors about changing 
the Electoral Code before the March 2010 elections in order 
to extend the term of office for Moscow City Duma deputies 
from four to five years.  (Note:  In December 2008, Medvedev 
signed an amendment to the Russian Constitution extending the 
term of State Duma deputies from four to five years.  End 
Note.) 
 
Opposition Parties as Puppets 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  While opposition parties in general may have an 
opportunity to gain seats, the experience of Yabloko 
demonstrates potential difficulty for opposition parties to 
be represented in the March 2010 Moscow City Duma.  Yabloko's 
Chairman and Moscow City Duma member Sergei Mitrokhin told us 
March 27 that he thought Yabloko would be pushed out of the 
Moscow City Duma, since Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov would 
prevent Yabloko from running in the next elections.  He 
stated that he was not sure if Yabloko would even participate 
since the party will need to collect a yet undetermined 
number of signatures.  Mitrokhin was particularly concerned 
that Luzhkov would retaliate against Yabloko for having 
spoken out about corruption involving real estate in Moscow, 
as well as for having accused the Moscow City government of 
using its budget for illegal and non-transparent operations. 
Mitrokhin told us that he believed Luzhkov will engineer 
elections so as to install in the City Duma a "quiet" 
opposition party, such as the Kremlin-backed, pro-business 
Right Cause party. 
 
Manipulation and Back Room Deals 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Despite any positive reforms and assistance for 
opposition parties, independent observers say chances are 
slim that Moscow City Duma's elections under Luzhkov will be 
fair and transparent.  According to Shibanova, "back room 
deals will be made prior to the elections," and "the 
elections do not mean anything.  This is a strong vertical 
administration, so the elections do not matter in Moscow, 
which provides lots of resources for United Russia." 
Shibanova described a Moscow City push for more electronic 
voting machines.  She explained how it is possible to program 
electronic scanners to get a desired outcome and that actual 
voting re-counts are not conducted during this type of 
voting.  Finally, Shibanova cited her concern that many 
unregistered voters in Moscow are not permanent residents, 
but the military issues Certificates of Temporary Residence 
for them to vote.  These certificates cannot be tracked and 
people are eligible to vote after living in Moscow for only 
six months.  In short, as long as Luzhkov is in power, 
 
MOSCOW 00000951  003 OF 003 
 
 
Shibanova concluded, he will ensure that the Moscow City Duma 
elections run his way. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Postponing the Moscow City Duma elections could 
also extend United Russia's control and, incidentally, 
Luzhkov's term in office.  Based on the March 2010 elections, 
the majority party in the Moscow City Duma will not suggest a 
new mayor to the president until 2011.  Metelskiy told us 
that all possibilities are open concerning Luzhkov's fate, 
but for now, everyone expects him to maintain stability in 
Moscow during the economic crisis.  Luzhkov may be happy for 
all the help he can get in light of an April 8 Levada Center 
survey, which revealed that his popularity among Muscovites 
is down to only 41 percent.  While new legislative measures 
appear to be window dressing, they could potentially enable 
Luzhkov and United Russia to exert great control and limit 
challenges to their monopoly on power. 
BEYRLE