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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW837, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: NII PM, MOSCOW, RUSSIA,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW837 2009-04-02 09:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow 
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0837 0920928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020928Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2681
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
 
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: NII PM, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, 
LICENSE NO. D411583 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 0602 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a pre-license check to determine the legitimacy 
and reliability of the end-user, NII PM (The Research Institute of 
Applied Mechanics named after Academician V.I. Kuznetsov), Moscow, 
Russia. The company is listed on BIS license application D411583 as 
the ultimate consignee of forty (40) radiation hardened MOSFETs. 
These items are controlled for national security and anti-terrorism 
reasons under ECCN 9A004. The licensee is International Rectifier 
Corp., 233 Kansas Street, El Segundo, CA 90245. 
 
3. On March 18, 2009, LES Natalya Shipitsina spoke with Gennady 
Afonin, Head of Purchasing and the NII PM point of contact for the 
reftel commodity.  LES Shipitsina advised Afonin that the Moscow 
export control team would like to conduct a pre-license check with 
NII PM regarding its intended purchase of forty (40) radiation 
hardened MOSFETs from the U.S. company International Rectifier 
Corporation.  Afonin stated that he would need to talk with the 
Director of NII PM before scheduling the meeting. 
 
4. On March 25, 2009 the Moscow export control team received a 
facsimile from Mr. Krekhtupov, First Deputy General Director of NII 
PM, stating that NII PM would not meet with the Moscow export 
control team and that NII PM no longer wishes to purchase the reftel 
commodity.  The facsimile also directed the export control team to 
the NII PM web site if more information is needed about NII PM. 
 
5. NII PM was the subject of a previous unfavorable PLC on December 
12, 2008.  See Moscow 3588. 
 
6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend NII PM, Moscow, 
Russia, as reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
 
(FCS MOSCOW/ JMARKS/PLISTON) 
BEYRLE