VZCZCXRO2880
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1115/01 1200641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300641Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3102
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001115 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP AMGT ASEC AFIN RS
SUBJECT:  CODEL Levin with Duma Foreign Relations Chairman Kosachev 
on post-Start, Iran, and Missile Defense 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) On April 15, State Duma International Relations Chairman 
Kosachev told Senators Levin, Collins, and Nelson that President 
Medvedev had issued instructions to finalize a post-START agreement 
by the end of the year.  Although he stated that negotiators must 
re-link arms control and defensive systems, the disposition of 
removed warheads, and the number of U.S. carriers.  He accepted 
cooperation on missile defense development in principle, avoided any 
specific commitments, and called for a joint threat assessment as a 
first step.  He also shared his view of Russian security threats, 
putting terrorism high on the list, but dismissing the threat posed 
by Iran's nuclear program.  He urged the U.S. to avoid provoking 
Iran into leaving the NPT and dismissing IAEA inspectors.  Kosachev 
stated that Medvedev was firmly in charge of Russian foreign policy 
and that PM Putin gave advice but not instructions.  End summary. 
 
Post-START Negotiations 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In an April 15 meeting, State Duma International Relations 
Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev discussed with Senators Carl 
Levin, Susan Collins, and Bill Nelson prospects for U.S.-Russia 
relations, cooperation on missile defense, Russian views on security 
threats including Iran, and issues that must be addressed in 
post-START negotiations.  Kosachev attended the April 2 G20 meeting 
with President Medvedev and reported that after the April 1 meeting 
with President Obama, Medvedev issued explicit instructions to the 
government on completing a framework agreement on a post-START 
accord by the July summit and finalizing a full text by December. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Kosachev said that from the Russian perspective, 
post-START negotiators needed to resolve three issues:  restoration 
of the linkage between arms control and anti-ballistic missile 
systems; clarification on what will be done with removed warheads 
(storage, re-use, or dismantlement); and the number of U.S. carrier 
groups.  He was skeptical that the U.S. military would be flexible 
in negotiations.  Senator Levin commented that Kosachev put too much 
value on the role of the U.S. military on policy-making and that it 
was important to reengage the military-to-military relationship. 
 
Missile Defense and the Iranian Threat 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Senator Levin said that the main focus of the delegation's 
visit was to discuss the potential for developing joint missile 
defenses against the common threat posed by Iranian nuclear and 
missile programs.  Kosachev reacted strongly to Levin's statements 
that in London, Medvedev had acknowledged that Washington's 
assessment of Iran's progress on missile development was more 
accurate than Russian assessments.  "I confirm that in London, 
President Medvedev acknowledged that Russia underestimated Iran's 
development," but that the U.S. and Russia should have a better 
dialogue, he said.  He also noted that American information was "not 
always right," as demonstrated by events in Iraq. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Kosachev called Iran an "uncomfortable partner" that was 
not transparent.  He argued that Russia was not seeking to earn 
money through cooperation with Iran, pointing out that Germany had 
three times more trade with Iran than Russia did.  He assessed that 
Iran had not yet decided on whether or not to move forward on its 
military program.  "We have no proof that Iran violated the NPT.  If 
we treat them as if they already have, we will provoke them to 
pursue a nuclear program.  Just like North Korea."  In his view, the 
best path was to maintain the presence of the IAEA within Iran. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Kosachev also disagreed with U.S. assessments of Iranian 
missile development, commenting that the current stage was dangerous 
for Israel, but that the range of Iranian missiles was 2,000 
kilometers, well short of being able to reach Warsaw.  Referring to 
the exchange of letters between Presidents Obama and Medvedev, 
Kosachev said that a quid pro quo between Russia and the U.S. on 
missile defense and Iran was not sustainable and that the two sides 
should work to build trust and transparency. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Senator Levin asked whether practical cooperation on 
missile defense, including sharing radar information and sites, was 
possible.  Kosachev hedged, saying everything was possible, but that 
it needed to be taken step by step -- although he mentioned that 
Turkey was a more sensible location for missile defense assets. 
Avoiding direct comment on practical missile defense cooperation, 
Kosachev said that the two sides must instead revisit the linkage 
between offensive nuclear weapons and defensive systems, "START was 
done in a different environment of nuclear parity and under the 
blanket of the ABM treaty.  It is not possible to carry forward in 
 
MOSCOW 00001115  002 OF 002 
 
 
the same way."  He continued that the U.S. dominated in conventional 
and nuclear forces and that there were voices in the Russian 
military that did not want to negotiate.  He said, "We need to reach 
a workable and sustainable balance and not seek an agreement that 
provides greater efficiency for one side at the expense of the 
other." 
 
¶8.  (SBU) For Kosachev, the necessary first step in practical 
cooperation was the development of a joint threat assessment.  "The 
military does not accept" the U.S. threat assessment and because I 
am not an expert, "I have to accept their view."  While dismissing 
the ten to twenty proposed interceptors as "nothing," Kosachev 
called the deployment of a radar in the Czech Republic as "something 
different." 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Underlining his visits to Pyongyang and Tehran, Kosachev 
said that these two regimes were motivated by the threat of a 
U.S.-led regime change in their countries; they did not want a 
situation like Iraq.  He argued that the leadership of these 
countries did not wish to strike the U.S. but to prevent an attack 
by the U.S.  Kosachev blamed U.S. policies that ignored 
international law and the role of the UN as forming the basis of 
North Korean and Iranian concerns.  Kosachev said it would be better 
to work to build better democracy and transparency in Iran.  In 
reply to Senator Levin's appeal for assistance in accomplishing 
this, Kosachev said that when Russia repeats the importance of 
democracy and transparency, Iran counters that it does not want to 
end up like Iraq. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Senator Levin pushed back saying that Iran had threatened 
the existence of another state, Israel; it had not been transparent 
with the IAEA, and it continued to support terrorism by funding 
HAMAS and Hizballah.  Kosachev reflected that Israel had nuclear 
weapons and that Iran had no response; if Israel was to abandon its 
nuclear weapons, it could change the situation. 
 
Russian Threat Assessment 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The primary threat facing Russia, Kosachev argued, was 
not Iran or proliferation but terrorism and religious extremism, 
followed by narcotics (especially from Afghanistan).  Proliferation 
and the possibility of a terrorist getting a weapon of mass 
destruction was a distant third place, because "frankly Russia is 
not likely to be the first target."  Kosachev also said that Russia 
is still confronted by threats to its territorial integrity, 
including its declining population and its dependence on the export 
of raw materials. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Senator Levin recommended that Kosachev add climate 
change to his list of threats.  Kosachev responded that climate 
change was not on Russia's short list of threats, as it "was not a 
matter of any concern."  He added that it may work to Russia's 
advantage by reducing the cost of transportation and easing access 
to petroleum resources in the far north. 
 
Medvedev in Charge 
------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Responding to Senator Nelson's question on the potential 
personal chemistry between PM Putin and President Obama, Kosachev 
replied that Medvedev is "firmly in-charge of Russian foreign policy 
-- Putin provides advice but not instructions."  He continued that 
of course there would be a meeting between the two during the 
upcoming meeting in July, but the relationship between Putin and 
President Obama was less important than that between the President 
and Medvedev. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Commenting on decision-making during the war with 
Georgia, Kosachev admitted that Medvedev depended on Putin's advice 
and instructions then, but over time Medvedev had become more 
confident and independent.  He was careful to point out that "Mr. 
Putin does not interfere because the tandem functions.  Putin trusts 
Medvedev to make the right decisions." 
 
¶15.  (U) CODEL Levin did not clear this message. 
 
BEYRLE