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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1052, SBU) GOR AGREES TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF SEIZED HEU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1052 2009-04-23 14:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1052 1131438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231438Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3016
INFO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 3909
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001052 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/WMDT MIKE CURRY AND EUR/PRA NATE 
YOUNG AND T 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC
SUBJECT: (SBU) GOR AGREES TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF SEIZED HEU 
 
REF: SECSTATE 38943 
 
1.  (SBU) Per reftel, Embassy Moscow has taken the following 
actions: 
 
2.  (SBU) On April 21, U.S. Embassy Moscow FBI Legal Attache 
sent a letter to General A.F. Kuzyura, Chief of the FSB's 
International Relations Department, informing him of the 
planned delivery of the sample and proposing logistics.  The 
FSB agreed to take custody of the sample shortly after the 
arrival of FBI Director Mueller's plane in Moscow the evening 
of April 27. 
 
3.  (SBU) On April 22, Embassy Moscow DOE Head sent a letter 
to Deputy Director of Rosatom's International Relations 
Department A. B. Ubeyev informing him of the planned 
transfer.  Embassy Moscow DOE Head also spoke with Federal 
Customs Service representative Dmitriy Danko, who indicated 
that he was aware of a Russian government order on the 
transfer and was already working on logistics. 
 
4.  (SBU) With those notifications accomplished, EST 
Counselor spoke on April 23 with MFA Disarmament and Security 
Affairs Department First Secretary Olga Kuznetsova and then 
with North America Desk First Secretary Aleksey Ivanov on 
April 23, informing them that the FSB had agreed to accept 
custody of the sample and that Rosatom had also been 
informed.  At their request, we followed up with a non-paper 
drawing from reftel points as follows: 
 
5.  (SBU/REL GOR) Begin text of non-paper to MFA: 
 
As we discussed today, FBI Director Mueller plans to arive in 
Moscow on April 27 with a ten-gram sample of seized HEU that 
the Russian government requested for nuclear forensics 
analysis. 
 
As you will see from the attached letters to the FSB and 
Rosatom, we have arranged for a representative from a 
responsible Russian law enforcement authority with the proper 
signatory authority to accept custody of the sample.  The FSB 
has confirmed this will be Andrey Vadimovich Novikov.  The 
transfer of this material will be conducted at the airport 
the evening of April 27, shortly after the arrival of the 
Director's aricraft. 
 
We have placed a high priority on completing this transfer to 
facilitate the Russian government's forensic analysis of this 
material.  The United States and Russia have discussed in the 
past our continuing concern by the prospect that the HEU was 
diverted from a Russian facility and look forward to learning 
the results of your investigation. 
 
The sample demonstrates our hope to collaborate more closely 
on promoting a more effective relationship between our law 
enforcement organizations to counter illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials.  Our efforts to work more closely on 
nuclear smuggling and forensics will help advance the goals 
outlined in our Presidents' recent statement in London of 
securing vulnerable nuclear materials and improving nuclear 
security.  It is our hope that we will be able to establish a 
more systematic mechanism to faciliate U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on investigations into nuclear smuggling cases. 
RUBIN