VZCZCXRO7151
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1047/01 1130632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230632Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3008
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001047 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT:  CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE WITH 
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV 
 
¶1.  (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is not 
intended for Internet distribution. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary.  In an April 14 roundtable at his foundation, 
former President Mikhail Gorbachev expressed to Codel Levin cautious 
optimism on improving bilateral relations and called attention to 
the need to discuss conventional arms reductions given overwhelming 
U.S. capabilities in this area.  The roundtable participants urged 
the U.S. to engage in direct dialogue with Iran as a way to resolve 
the nuclear issue, and welcomed the Codel's suggestion to work 
together on missile defense.  While the Russian interlocutors agreed 
that the U.S. MD system did not currently pose a threat to Russia, 
they stressed that Russia's "psychological trauma" over the 
perception of a lack of consultations was an important factor in the 
issue.  The experts also urged the U.S. Senate to repeal the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (U) Senators Carl Levin (D-Michigan) and Bill Nelson (D-Florida) 
on April 14 met with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at 
the Gorbachev Foundation to discuss U.S.-Russia bilateral relations 
and political-military issues.  Also attending the roundtable were 
former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, MFA 
Ambassador-at-Large for Special Issues Aleksey Obukhov, President of 
the Institute of Strategic Assessments Aleksandr Konovalov, and 
retired general and military analyst Vladimir Dvorkin. 
 
Bilateral Relationship 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Gorbachev opened the meeting by noting with approval the 
Obama Administration's first steps toward restoring the U.S.-Russia 
bilateral relationship.  Commenting on criticism in the Russian 
press that the April 1 Obama-Medvedev meeting in London was all 
empty talk,  Gorbachev called such commentary "unhelpful," saying 
that it would not be easy to put the bilateral relationship back on 
track after the recent tensions, and more discussions between the 
two presidents were likely needed before producing tangible results. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Gorbachev commented that there was an opportunity to 
restore the many good aspects of the bilateral relationship that 
were negatively affected by the war with Georgia.  Most importantly, 
the United States and Russia needed to rebuild trust.  Gorbachev 
asserted that there was a tremendous sense of disappointment about 
the U.S. in Russia, which was a reality that must be factored into 
any consideration of "resetting" the relationship.  The psychology 
and the perceptions of a people mattered just as much as the issues 
themselves.  He pressed for the resumption of the bilateral 
commissions and working groups that once formed a central part of 
the bilateral relationship, as well as more civil society and 
parliamentarian contacts. 
 
Conventional Arms Reduction 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Gorbachev welcomed Senator Levin's statement that he would 
support President Obama's efforts to work with Russia on post-START 
negotiations and the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), calling cooperation on disarmament a foremost goal in 
our bilateral relationship.  On a related matter, he called 
attention to conventional arms reduction, stating that there was a 
real danger of arms race on a global scale and our two countries 
were not paying enough attention to the issue amidst a focus on 
nuclear arms reduction.  In Gorbachev's view, the GOR was likely to 
raise this issue with the U.S., as the U.S. possessed half of the 
world's conventional weapons stockpile.  Given the huge discrepancy 
between the Russian and U.S. conventional weapons capacities, the 
perception of U.S. bases around Russia's periphery was especially 
worrisome, he asserted. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Codel pressed their Russian interlocutors on the 
importance of working together to address Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
Gorbachev in response stressed that the key was the U.S.'s openness 
to resume a bilateral relationship with Iran.  If the United States 
started "to work things out with Iran and Syria," the overall 
situation with regard to missile threats would change, he asserted. 
"Iran is not a lost cause yet," and "is not an automatically hostile 
power."  The other roundtable participants agreed, stating that 
while the GOR was following the situation very closely because of 
the non-verifiable nature of Iran's nuclear program, Russia did not 
see Iran as an evil empire, but a regional power with an ancient 
history that wanted respect and direct dialogue.  Ambassador 
Bessmertnykh said that should the U.S. decide to engage in such a 
direct dialogue with Iran, Moscow would be supportive of the effort 
and may even be willing to help facilitate it. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001047  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Aleksey Obukhov, in particular, urged for a solution to 
the Iran and North Korea nuclear issues through a focus on ensuring 
global stability rather than on the technical issues of where to 
station missile defense systems.  Providing countries with a sense 
of overall security was the key to preventing nuclear proliferation, 
he asserted, and while the process might be long and required 
patience, it was the responsibility of the two biggest nuclear 
powers to work together to achieve such a goal. 
 
Cooperation on Missile Defense 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The roundtable participants were unanimous in stressing 
the need for further dialogue on missile defense, highlighting the 
emotional nature of this issue to the Russian psyche.  All agreed 
that the proposed MD sites in the Czech Republic and Poland did not 
pose a military threat to Russia, with Obukhov boasting that current 
Russian missile capabilities could penetrate any anti-ballistic 
missile system until 2020.  However, as Alesandr Konovalov asserted, 
this issue had become a "psychological trauma" for Russia, with the 
prevalent perception that Washington did not consult Moscow before 
deciding to deploy a missile defense system right at its front door. 
 Bessmertnykh added that perceptions often were stronger than facts 
and,in this case, Russian officials perceived MD as both a 
psychological trauma and a military threat.  The U.S. should not 
ignore such a reality in its consideration of the MD issue. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Russian interlocutors responded positively to Senator 
Levin's suggestion to work on a joint missile defense system. 
Gorbachev indicated the GOR would be receptive to discussing such a 
possibility, while Konovalov stated that permanently stationing 
military officers from each side at the eventual sites was the only 
way to reassure each other that there was no hidden agenda. 
Vladimir Dvorkin of the Carnegie Center went a step further to link 
cooperation on a joint missile defense system to moving the U.S. and 
Russia beyond the "absurd situation" of mutual nuclear deterrence. 
If the two countries could cooperate on missile defense, he argued, 
both sides would acquire the degree of transparency required to move 
beyond mutual distrust and mutual assured destruction.  In his view, 
while Iran's missile threat was a serious issue, the real value of 
missile defense cooperation was in making the U.S. and Russia 
genuine partners.  Dvorkin also clarified that while Moscow did not 
see the current missile defense system as a threat, it was concerned 
that it was an open system to which many more components could be 
added in the future, including space elements. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Dvorkin also mentioned his previous military experience 
visiting U.S. Strategic Command for a missile defense exercise, and 
urged the Codel to support the resurrection of U.S.-Russian military 
exchanges and contacts as an important element of our relations. 
Senator Levin indicated support for this idea. 
 
Jackson Vanik 
------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Konovalov raised Jackson-Vanik with the Codel.  Calling 
it another irritant in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, he 
asked the U.S. Senate to repeal a law aimed at a state and a problem 
that no longer existed.  Senator Levin agreed with the assessment 
and pledged to work toward the repeal of an amendment that was "an 
insult against Russia." 
 
¶13.  (U) Codel Levin cleared this cable. 
 
RUBIN