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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1021/01 1111122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211122Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2988
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4479
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4248
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2782
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0482

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001021 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT:  CODEL LEVIN MEETS MARGELOV -- MD, Iran, Afghanistan, DPRK, 
NPT, Sudan 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In an April 14 meeting with CODEL Levin, Russian 
Federation Council International Relations Committee Chair Mikhail 
Margelov said momentum on missile defense had been lost when the 
U.S. did not take up Russia on its offer on using the Gabala and 
Armavir radar stations, but stated that Russia's military experts 
were ready to propose some "realistic options" for the creation of a 
joint missile defense shield.  He described Russia's suspension of 
the transfer of S-300 missiles to Iran as a "strong signal" to 
Teheran, but urged that the U.S. could make it stronger by 
responding positively to the Russian overture.  Arguing that 
sanctions were ineffective, Margelov suggested that jointly 
developing a "Marshall Plan" to revive Afghanistan's economy could 
serve as an example to Iran to seek Western integration, while 
reiterating Russia's position that Iran could develop a civil 
nuclear program, as long as it accepted to "play by the IAEA's 
rules."  Margelov criticized the DPRK for "not understanding Russia 
and China's charitable approach" in preventing a UN Security Council 
Resolution condemning the recent North Korean missile launch, and 
urged the U.S. to press China to share its intelligence on the 
DPRK's nuclear weapons program.  In order to improve U.S.-Russia 
relations, Margelov advocated for an intensified meeting schedule, 
the renewal of the START and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties, the 
reduction of anti-Russian tendencies in "New Europe," and 
cooperation in Sudan and Somalia.  End summary. 
 
--------------- 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In an April 14 meeting with Russian Federation Council 
Internal Relations Committee Chair Mikhail Margelov, Senators Carl 
Levin (D-Mi) and Bill Nelson (D-Fl) noted the U.S. interest in 
cooperating with Russia on missile defense (MD), but cautioned 
Margelov that Bush administration commitments to the Czech Republic 
and Poland could not simply be laid aside.  Margelov responded that 
momentum on MD had been lost when the U.S. did not take Russia up on 
its offer to include the Gabala and Armavir radar stations in the MD 
effort.  However, he said working together on MD was "a must," and 
stated that Russia's military experts were now ready to propose new 
options for a joint missile shield. 
 
-------------------- 
Iran nuclear program 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Margelov underscored that Russia agreed with the U.S. on 
the substance of rejecting a nuclear-armed Iran, even though the GOR 
differed on the method of achieving that goal.  He said Russia had 
made an important political decision to work with the U.S. when it 
sent the Iranian Defense Minister home without S-300 missiles, even 
though it was a defensive system.  This had sent a strong signal to 
the U.S.  Margelov confirmed that the suspension of the S-300 sale 
was "firm," but said it could be firmer still if the U.S. made a 
positive response.  Otherwise, it would be viewed in Moscow as 
another example of Russia "moving one step forward," with no 
corresponding acknowledgment by Washington. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Noting articles reporting President Medvedev's "surprise" 
at the progress of Iran's nuclear program, as expressed to President 
Obama and Henry Kissinger, Senator Levin asked why the U.S. had to 
persuade Russia to adopt a stronger position in the UN even though 
Iran posed a greater threat to Russia, due to its proximity. 
Margelov responded that both Prime Minister Putin and Medvedev had 
repeatedly stated they "would not accept", "not be happy with," and 
"not allow" a nuclear-armed Iran, but argued that sanctions were 
ineffective. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Responding to Senator Nelson's question how the 
U.S.-Russia cooperation could dissuade Iran from developing nuclear 
weapons, Margelov suggested that jointly solving the problems in 
Afghanistan and developing a "Marshall Plan" to revive that 
country's economy could serve as an example to Iran to seek Western 
integration. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In reaction to Senator Nelson's comment on President 
Obama's possible acceptance of Iran's civil nuclear program under 
the condition that international inspections could verify no 
weaponization was taking place, Margelov said it had been Russia's 
policy for the past eight years that Iran could develop civil 
nuclear plants such as Bushehr, as long as it "played by the IAEA's 
rules." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Noting his background in oriental studies and recent trips 
 
MOSCOW 00001021  002 OF 002 
 
 
to Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar, Margelov said the Iraq war had 
deprived Iran of a counterbalance, allowing it to "do what it wanted 
to" with the Shia and even Hizbollah in the Middle East in its 
attempt to "dominate" the region.  Iran was even actively supporting 
the Tashnak political party in Armenia.  This, Margelov said, was 
seen by many in Russia as "an insult," since Moscow considered 
Armenia to be "in Russia's back yard." 
 
------------------- 
DPRK Missile Launch 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Margelov criticized the DPRK for "not understanding Russia 
and China's charitable approach" in preventing a UN Security Council 
Resolution condemning the recent North Korean missile launch. 
Margelov said the missile launch was "more painful" for Russia due 
to its common border with the DPRK and memories of the last Taepo 
Dong launch, when the missile flew toward the coast of Russia. 
Margelov agreed with Senator Levin's assessment that North Korea 
took the international attention as a sign it could "manipulate us," 
and  suggested the GOR should request immediate consultations with 
all Six-Party members and press China to share its intelligence on 
where the DPRK was storing its suspected nuclear warheads.  However, 
he stated the U.S. had more levers it could apply to China than 
Russia.  Margelov considered the South Korean government "too 
scared" to play a significant role. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
U.S.-Russia relations: post-START, Sudan 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Margelov expressed "cautious optimism" that the change in 
administration in the U.S. would benefit "pragmatic" U.S.-Russia 
relations, and called for the development of a substantive bilateral 
agenda to back up the good intentions on each side.  In this context 
he noted the upcoming visit of Senator Ben Nelson to Moscow to 
co-chair the next U.S.-Russian Federation Parliamentary Council 
meeting.  Margelov advocated for the speedy resumption of "2 plus 2" 
talks, and underscored the need to renew the START and Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaties.  He urged the U.S. to work with the EU 
on convincing countries in "New Europe" that pro-Americanism was not 
equal to being anti-Russia, and commented that "while the Soviet 
Union made mistakes, if we always insist on recalling history, we 
will come to sad conclusions."  Noting his appointment as the GOR's 
special representative for Sudan, Margelov suggested that the U.S. 
and Russia work together on "failed states and continents."  In 
addition to Sudan issues, he proposed developing a joint mechanism 
for maritime security to combat phenomena such as the piracy off the 
coast of Somalia, and suggested the U.S. and Russia should work 
together more on Africa issues, including Somalia generally, not 
just piracy. 
 
¶10.  (U) Codel Levin cleared this cable. 
 
RUBIN