VZCZCXRO4966
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1016/01 1111059
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211059Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2983
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001016 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OREP IR RS
SUBJECT:  RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON IRAN, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND RUSSIAN 
TOUGH LOVE TOWARD THE U.S. - CODEL LEVIN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Analysts told visiting Senators Carl Levin and 
Bill Nelson that Russia did not consider Iran a threat, and warned 
the U.S. against isolating Tehran or countenancing a military option 
to halt the Iranian nuclear program, which would lead to instability 
in the Middle East.  Russia considered Iran a rational actor and not 
a terrorist state, despite its support for Hizbollah and Hamas. 
They argued that although missile defense could not threaten 
Russia's nuclear arsenal, placing the system in Eastern Europe was 
intended to deter Russia by having American boots on the ground. 
The analysts advised Washington to consult Moscow on developing 
joint MD to help build Russian confidence in the U.S., and overcome 
the impact of short-sighted U.S. policies that have fueled 
anti-Americanism.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Senior Russian analysts Dmitri Trenin, Director of the 
Carnegie Moscow Center, Vitaly Naumkin, President of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Sergey Oznobishchev, Director 
of the Institute of Strategic Assessments, and Georgiy Mirsky, 
Middle East expert at the Institute of Higher Economics, provided 
Senators Carl Levin and Bill Nelson their assessments of the Russian 
view of the Iranian nuclear program, missile defense, and state of 
U.S.-Russia relations during an April 14 event hosted by the DCM. 
 
Iran Does Not Threaten Russia 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The analysts made a familiar argument that the Russian 
experience with Iran, a neighbor and regional power, is markedly 
different than that of the geographically distant U.S.  Russia 
feared the destabilizing impact of the Iranian Revolution, but did 
not see Iran push its influence in a detrimental way into the former 
Soviet space.  Iran even played a helpful role in Tajikistan, a 
Persian-speaking Central Asian state, by helping quell unrest that 
could have sparked a civil war.  Russia maintained a pragmatic 
political and economic relationship with Iran, which Moscow 
understood would be undermined if Iran fully opened with the West. 
From Russia's perspective, Pakistan's nuclear weapons were a greater 
threat considering the country's history of political instability. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Trenin explained that Moscow would prefer that Tehran not 
pursue its nuclear ambitions, but did not consider Iran hostile 
toward Russia.  He explained, however, that Russians did not have a 
particularly "rosy view" of Iran after the entire Russian Embassy in 
Tehran was massacred in 1829, an event that is still taught in 
schools and is a far cry worse than the American experience of 
diplomats being held hostage.  Naumkin agreed that Russia did not 
see Iran as a threat, but added that Iranians were not particularly 
warm to Russians, who had a history of meddling in Persian affairs, 
which precipitated the 1829 massacre.  As a frequent visitor to 
Iran, Naumkin did not detect genuine warmth toward Russians, but did 
toward Americans, with whom the Iranian people hoped to have a real 
relationship. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Naumkin argued that no country had the ability to stop the 
Iranians from developing nuclear weapons now that they had the 
capacity to carry out a full nuclear cycle.  Isolating Iran would be 
counterproductive since it was needed to help stabilize Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Trenin explained the Russian fear of an extreme 
reaction to Iran, such as an Israeli strike, which would unleash 
Muslim extremists in the broader Middle East and destabilize a key 
region on Russia's southern border. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mirsky argued that only Israel was truly afraid of a 
nuclear Iran, and would launch a military strike if Iran came close 
to completing a weapon.  Trenin agreed, adding that this scenario 
was foremost on the mind of Russian leaders.  The Russian military 
advised the Kremlin that Israel could only strike Iran with U.S. 
assistance, and envisioned an Israeli leader placing tremendous 
pressure on Washington for help.  Oznobishchev added that since it 
was commonly assumed that Israel would attack Iran to prevent it 
from developing nuclear weapons, this added to Russian suspicions of 
MD. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both Trenin and Naumkin stressed that Russia saw Iran as a 
"rational actor" and not an al-Qaeda type threat.  Even if Iran 
supported terrorism, it did so in a limited manner to achieve 
influence in the Middle East.  Trenin explained that the prevailing 
view in Moscow of Hamas and Hizbollah was considerably different 
than in Washington, and Russians understood that the Middle East 
"plays by different rules" than the West.  Trenin argued that in the 
end, Moscow's position was not all that crucial to the equation as 
the U.S. did not need Russia to make peace with Iran. 
 
Missile Defense Aimed at Iran and Russia 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The experts agreed that part of the problem in dealing with 
missile defense, or just about any point of friction between 
 
MOSCOW 00001016  002 OF 002 
 
 
Washington and Moscow, was the existence of an "asymmetrical mental 
relationship" in which the U.S. figured prominently in Russian 
thinking, and whatever actions Washington took were interpreted by 
Moscow as somehow directed toward Russia.  Therefore, MD might be 
intended to defend against Iranian missiles, but was also understood 
to be aimed at Russia. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Trenin argued that the Bush Administration wanted to build 
MD for the strategic purpose of defending against Iranian missiles, 
and the parochial purpose of offering insurance to new U.S. allies 
in Eastern Europe by having "American boots on the ground" to serve 
as a deterrent against Russia, a country that the U.S. still does 
not quite trust.  Naumkin agreed MD has two purposes, to address the 
Iranian threat, and to contribute to U.S. "leverage" over Russia 
that came from expanding its influence into former Soviet space. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The analysts were in agreement that Russia would not 
object to MD if the system was deployed somewhere other than Poland 
and the Czech Republic.  Naumkin thought Russia could accept MD in 
these countries if there was agreement to limit it to a few radars 
and interceptors, and provide Russian officials the opportunity to 
inspect these sites. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The analysts recommended conducting intensive 
consultations on joint MD development to help remove what 
Oznobishchev called the "phobias we have about each other."  They 
pointed to a Russian proposal made to the Europeans to jointly 
develop MD before the U.S. plan was floated.  Putin's 2007 proposal 
to President Bush at Kennebunkport to jointly deploy MD was an 
adaption of this earlier plan.  Trenin added that Putin was also 
calculating that if his proposal was rejected, this would indicate a 
great deal about whether MD really was directed at Russia. 
 
Russia's Identity Problem 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Trenin explained that Russia had a serious identity 
problem caused by too many changes coming too quickly with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Post-Soviet Russia developed into an 
authoritarian state with the "consent of the governed."  In this 
atmosphere, the U.S. was conveniently used as "the other" to help 
the government maintain the Russian people's consent.  Mirsky said 
that Russia was still struggling to overcome 70 years of Soviet 
"sickness" and become a "normal society."  The Russian leadership 
was actually better disposed toward the U.S. than the Russian 
people, and the leaders' anti-American rhetoric reflected a need to 
use the public mood for domestic political goals.  Mirsky, an ardent 
critic of the current Russian leadership, was resigned to the fact 
that Russia had the best government it could under the 
circumstances. 
 
Russian "Tough Love" 
-------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The experts sought to explain to the Senators the real 
lack of confidence, if not distrust, Russia had of the U.S.  Trenin 
said that the Russian leadership saw the 2008 conflict in Georgia as 
a U.S. proxy war waged against Russia.  At the time of the fighting, 
Medvedev and Putin honestly believed this was the start of a U.S. 
effort to "roll back" Russia.  If Washington wanted to build a 
productive relationship with Moscow, it must also build Russian 
confidence in the U.S. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Oznobishchev argued that "short-sighted" U.S. policies 
were to blame for anti-American sentiment in Russia.  NATO 
enlargement and MD were pursued without taking into account the 
reaction in Russia.  Anti-Americanism could be overcome if the 
Russian people saw the U.S. and Russia reach a post-START treaty or 
other useful agreements, as Reagan and Gorbachev did in the 1980s. 
Trenin agreed that the Russian leadership desired the "prestige" 
that would come with reaching a strategic agreement with the U.S., 
but also wanted Washington to recognize Moscow's parochial concern 
that the U.S. was expanding into the former Soviet space. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Trenin predicted that Moscow would continue attempting to 
"coerce" Washington into recognizing it as a co-equal by sending 
ships to Venezuela and bombers near NATO allies, which constituted 
the "Russian version of tough-love." 
 
Jackson-Vanik an Embarrassment 
------------------------------ 
¶16. (SBU) The analysts said that Jackson-Vanik was not a problem in 
bilateral relations as much as it was an embarrassment for the U.S. 
They concluded that the U.S. should rescind the amendment without 
Russia having to raise the issue. 
 
¶17. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. 
RUBIN