VZCZCXRO8355
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #0952/01 1141253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241253Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2087
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000952 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/USSES 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KPKO PHUM SU UK
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: LONDON-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS 
DISMAYED BY JEM, BASSOLE AND DOHA TALKS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Two prominent Darfuris in exile in the UK, 
one Fur and one Zaghawa, see the situation in Darfur as 
increasingly fractured and the path to peace littered with 
hazards and potential spoilers. Mohamed Dousa, a Zaghawa 
leader in the Sudanese Constitutional Party, said his 
constituency remains focused on pushing for the return of the 
expelled NGOs and a legitimate ceasefire.  Critical of 
Bassole and the Doha peace talks, Dousa his party support the 
ICC arrest warrant against the Sudanese president, and 
supports the establishment of a single unified Darfuri 
position prior to any negotiations of Darfuris with the 
Khartoum regime.  Mohamed Baraka, one-time NCP candidate for 
Governor of North Darfur, said that with the Fur rebel 
movements weakened beyond resuscitation, Fur leaders are in a 
position to negotiate a separate peace with the GoS, and Doha 
may prove successful in that outcome if the U.S. can persuade 
Libya to push for peace in Darfur as well. End summary. 
 
 
Zaghawa Leader: Negotiations Marginalize Non-JEM Darfuris 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Mohamed Dousa, Zaghawa leader-in-exile and political 
chief of the Sudanese Constitutional Party (SCP), told 
Embassies London and Khartoum poloffs on April 21 that 
SCP-aligned Darfuris in the UK support the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Sudanese 
President Omar Al-Bashir and demand the return of the 13 
expelled INGOs.  Claiming that the SCP maintains a network of 
7,000 "soldiers" who stand ready in the UK and Israel, Dousa 
said the party, aligned with Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni 
Minnawi (SLA/MM) rebels in Darfur, will push for a 
federal-style governing system for Darfur within the larger 
context of what remains of Sudan following the 2011 Southern 
Sudan referendum on independence.  Agreeing with his Darfuri 
opposition colleagues elsewhere in the world, Dousa ticked 
off a laundry list of demands to which the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) must agree before the SCP would take part in 
negotiations, including: a fully implemented ceasefire 
between GoS forces and rebel movements; complete deployment 
of UNAMID peacekeeping troops; and a return of the 13 
expelled international NGOs.  Contrary to some observers in 
and out of Khartoum, Dousa and the SCP believe the ICC's 
investigations in Darfur have lessened the violence there, 
and a push now for an Article 16 deferral of the indictment 
and arrest warrant would lead to increased levels of 
GOS-supported janjaweed activities. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Dousa detailed the reasons for which the SCP, and 
Darfuris in the UK, were unenthusiastic towards the Doha 
negotiations led by Joint UN/AU Chief Mediator Gibril 
Bassole.  "The majority of Darfuris and the rebel movements 
believe Bassole is ignorant of the situation in Darfur," 
Dousa said, adding that the process so far has favored the 
GoS and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
at the expense of IDPs, civil society and members of the 
Zaghawa tribe not aligned with JEM (including SLA/MM).  For 
Dousa and the SCP, complete negotiations on the fate of 
Darfur should begin with wide-ranging "talks" among Darfuris 
and the movements in Darfur, with participation by civil 
society, IDP and tribal leaders, and then move on to formal 
"negotiations" between Darfuris and the GoS.  Pointing out 
that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) faces an 
uncertain future because of mandated deadlines neither party 
seems eager to meet, Dousa said that while deadlines move the 
situation forward at a pace acceptable to the international 
community, they also tend to undermine the fragile internal 
agreements that bind negotiating parties when they come to 
the table. 
 
Fur Leader: Rebels Weak, Libya Can Play a Positive Role 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mohamed Baraka, former Darfuri parliamentarian with 
the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and a 
Fur politician now living in asylum in London, was more 
optimistic than his Zaghawa counterpart on the prospect of 
peace talks in Doha, as he believes both Fur leaders and the 
NCP are more amenable to talks than during previous rounds. 
Still in regular contact with his former colleagues and 
exiled SLA leaders Abdel Shafie and Abdul Wahid, Baraka views 
the SLA Fur factions as weaker than every before, a situation 
which has increased the chances that the Fur can unite to 
move forward in negotiations with the GoS.  Besides 
strengthening the position of prominent Fur civil society 
actors such El Tigani Sesei and Ahmed Adam Rijal, the 
dissolution of the Fur rebel movements has also increased the 
importance of traditional Fur leaders, and Baraka recommended 
 
LONDON 00000952  002 OF 002 
 
 
that the U.S. reach out to El Tayeb Kokora Ahmedein, Shartai 
of Kebkabiya, North Darfur, and Suleiman Hassanbaro, Shartai 
of Kass, South Darfur.  Regarding Abdul Wahid, Baraka was 
unsympathetic, saying, "He is only interested in 
self-promotion.  His visit to Israel was destructive.  Now he 
is weak and has nothing." 
 
¶5. (SBU) More amenable to the Doha talks than SLA/AW 
representatives in London, Baraka said that international 
players can assist in pushing the NCP for full implementation 
of any peace accords.  "Who will make sure this is not just 
the second phase of Abuja?" he asked rhetorically.  Formerly 
resident in Libya for ten years, Baraka believes that an 
agreement at Doha will succeed only if the international 
community can translate its achievements into full Libyan 
cooperation in Darfur.  With no solid connection between the 
Qataris and Darfur, and also with many Darfuris doubting 
Qatari intentions in bringing peace and development to 
Darfur, Libyan acquiescence to a Doha agreement will factor 
strongly into whether positive outcomes result in Darfur 
post-Doha.  Claiming that the NCP offered that he succeed 
Ibrahim Suleiman as governor of North Darfur in 2004, Baraka 
received asylum in Britain in 2005 but remains in contact 
with his former classmates from Khartoum, including NCP 
Minister of Defense Abdulraheem.  Calling him the 
"mastermind" of the current political climate in Sudan, 
Baraka sees the reclusive minister as "very interested" in 
the Doha negotiations, willing to negotiate to achieve a 
ceasefire in Darfur.  Baraka pointed out that while the 
Sudanese military could attack rebel-held positions in 
Darfur, proof of the GoS's good faith in Doha can be found in 
the reality of the tense ceasefire on the ground. 
 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom 
 
LEBARON