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DE RUEHLP #0631/01 1191942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291942Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0635
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8960
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0316
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RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6256
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7190
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1954
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1764
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000631 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LIMA: FOR D. SHORTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA SCENESETTER FOR FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER 
VISIT 
 
¶1. Embassy La Paz offers a warm welcome to Former President 
Carter and accompanying team to Bolivia April 30-May 3. The 
information in this cable on U.S. government engagement in 
Bolivia is designed to complement the background paper 
provided by the Department of State, which summarized 
political and economic developments.  Bolivia is an 
increasingly polarized country, both geographically and 
politically. A new constitution supported by President Evo 
Morales and his Movement Towards Socialism party was voted on 
and approved by the Bolivian people January 25, 2009. The 
opposition continues to oppose parts of Morales, agenda and 
push for increased regional autonomy. The disagreements have 
caused occasional violent conflicts, leading to deaths on 
both sides.  President Morales and national representatives 
will face re-election December 6, 2009. 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶2. President Morales, anti-U.S. rhetoric and actions reflect 
a concerted effort to misconstrue U.S. government objectives 
and activities in Bolivia.  Despite efforts to engage with 
Morales on areas of mutual interest, he has gradually 
distanced Bolivia from the United States and dismantled 
cooperation programs, much to the detriment of our mutual 
goals to alleviate poverty, combat illegal narcotics, and 
facilitate social/political inclusiveness for Bolivia,s 
marginalized populations. 
 
¶3. The Embassy always aims to engage the Bolivian government 
and be responsive to its questions and concerns, particularly 
concerning our development programs, counternarcotics 
cooperation, and military-to-military relations. Despite this 
outreach, the Embassy and the United States government are 
constantly targeted for a wide range of baseless public 
accusations by the Bolivian government. Relations have been 
at a nadir since last summer.  Since then the Morales 
Administration expelled Ambassador Goldberg in mid-September 
2008 and the Drug Enforcement Agency November 1, 2008 and 
expelled USAID from a coca-growing region known as &the 
Chapare8 in June of 2008. 
 
¶4. After the election of President Obama, Morales made a 
number of public statements expressing his desire to improve 
relations with the United States.  However, his inflammatory 
rhetoric against the United States has continued. President 
Morales continues to mischaracterize U.S. government 
intentions,  making frequent comments about holdover Bush 
appointees that continue to &plot8 against Morales, 
government.  The bilateral relationship remains strained, 
although there is a new hope for diplomatic breakthroughs 
following brief presidential and Secretary of State exchanges 
with the Bolivians at the Summit of the Americas April 17-19. 
Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister David 
Choquehuanca discussed convening a high-level meeting 
sometime in the next several months to move forward on a 
bilateral agenda. 
 
USG FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
 
¶5. Since FY05, the United States Government has provided 
nearly $700 million dollars to Bolivia in development and 
counter-narcotics assistance, though assistance has been 
gradually declining consistent with budget restrictions in 
Washington.  Total assistance in FY07 was approximately $124 
million and in FY08 $103 million. 
 
¶6. Morales, administration has made several changes to 
development and cooperation procedures that have made it 
difficult for USG agencies to cooperate while adhering to 
their own congressional obligations. Despite our best 
efforts, including a month long audit by the GOB of our USAID 
program, the Bolivian government continues to suspect and 
 
accuse our assistance programs of bolstering the opposition 
and undermining the Morales administration. 
 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
 
¶7. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) provided approximately $69 million in FY08 to support 
Bolivia,s National Development Plan.  Programs cover child 
survival and health, alternative development, expansion of 
financial services to under-served areas, improved 
agricultural technology and market access, support for small 
and medium enterprises, sustainable management of tropical 
forests, biodiversity, food security, decentralization, 
improved civil society participation in democratic processes, 
leadership training, and increased justice services for the 
poor. 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAMS 
 
¶8. Our Public Affairs section provided over $1 million in 
FY08 programs to support English scholarships, an Embassy 
intern program targeting indigenous students, Fulbright and 
International Visitors, and an educational program for 
Indigenous Youth Leaders to visit the United States. 
 
COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION 
 
¶9. Bilateral cooperation deteriorated significantly in 2008 
with the expulsions of USAID from the Chapare in June, the 
U.S. Ambassador in September, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) in November.  Despite these setbacks, 
the U.S. remains committed to working with Government of 
Bolivia in the fight against drugs. Our counternarcotics 
program seeks to reduce coca cultivation, to provide 
logistical support for interdiction activities,  fight money 
laundering, and increase awareness about the effects of drug 
use in Bolivian society. 
 
¶10. The U.S. government contributed approximately $56 million 
toward Bolivia,s counter-narcotics efforts in FY 07, 
implemented by the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and USAID: 
eradication $4.2 million; interdiction $13.8 million, demand 
reduction $172,000; program support $3.8 million; alternative 
development $18.6 million. NAS recently agreed to $26.3 
million in CN assistance for FY 2008. 
 
¶11. The U.S. Military Group also provided $500,000 for 
Bolivia,s counter-narcotics efforts in FY09. The MILGP 
trained 62 students in FY08 and still have 42 students 
programmed for training in FY09. 
 
 
ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCES AND DRUG ERADICATION ACT (ATPDEA) 
 
¶12. After several years of being narrowly certified on 
counternarcotics cooperation and warned about needed areas to 
improve, Bolivia was decertified in 2008. This 
decertification led to a suspension of their trade benefits 
under the Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA) by President Bush. The U.S. Congress voted to keep 
Bolivia in the program through June 2009, but only if 
President Obama re-certifies Bolivia on counter-narcotics 
cooperation by that time. 
 
MILITARY-MILITARY COORDINATION & HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
 
¶13. The four pillars of the USMILGP Country Security 
Cooperation Plan (CSCP) are Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), 
Humanitarian Assistance (HAP), Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT), 
and Transformation & Modernization, in that order of 
priority.  The primary objective is to reinforce 
institutional values and respect for democratic principles 
 
within the Bolivian Military under the four pillars of 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Humanitarian Assistance (HAP), 
Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT), and Transformation & 
Modernization. 
 
¶14. Due to new Bolivian government restrictions and attacks 
against the U.S. government, SOUTHCOM directed that only 
Humanitarian Assistance Projects (HAP) that had been started 
would be completed and new projects should not be started. 
Originally MILGP planned to complete 13 humanitarian 
assistance projects in FY08 valued at a total of $3M, but 
instead ultimately only four projects were funded valued at 
$1.5M.  Humanitarian Assistance has been canceled for FY09 
and FY2010. MILGP had historically worked well with the 
Bolivian government to provide funding for renovating 
schools, providing disaster relief services, medical 
assistance, and much more, benefitting the poorest of 
Bolivians. 
 
 
PEACE CORPS 
 
¶15. The U.S. Peace Corps program in Bolivia was temporarily 
suspended in September 2008 after several accusations were 
made against it by the Morales administration. Top Morales 
advisor, Minister of the Presidency Juan Quintana, publicly 
accused the organization of being infiltrated by United 
States intelligence agents. Following that accusation, the 
USG determined it could not guarantee the safety of its Peace 
Corps volunteers and removed all volunteers from the country. 
The Bolivian government would need to publicly acknowledge 
that the Peace Corps program is not used for intelligence 
purposes before volunteers could return to Bolivia. 
URS