VZCZCXRO8086
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0403/01 1141008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241008Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9522
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000403 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  EASTERN DRC NOTES - APRIL 24 
 
¶1.  The items contained in this report consist rincipally of spot 
information from various soures.  This report is not exhaustive, 
nor can all te information contained therein be confirmed at ths 
time. 
 
Security Situation 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Based on movements of LRA cadre, MOUC believes the rebels 
are regrouping near Farade and Bitima.  Another group of 
approximately 130 which could include Kony, is reportedly encamped 
on the eastern fringes of Garamba Park. 
 
¶3.  (SU) In Ituri, FPJC troops killed 7 FARDC soldiers i an ambush 
near Tchomia on the western shore of ake Edward.  There were no 
reports of FPJC casualies.  (Comment: although a sideshow to the 
anti-DLR and anti-LRA operations, the campaign against rmed groups 
in Ituri frequently involves combat nd casualties.  End comment.) 
 
 
South Kivu Integation 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The pac of integration in South Kivu remains slow, but 
ai Mai groups continue to trickle in to regroupmen centers.  At 
the Luberizi camp, a total of 319 cadres have arrived, incluing 93 
Zaboloni Mai Mai and 226 Shikito Mai Mai. Twenty-four child 
soldiers were among the combaants.  MONUC intends to open another 
regroupmentcenter at Kalehe on April 28.  The FRF still refuse to 
join the integration process, delaying the panned opening of a camp 
at Mwenge. 
 
SRSG Doss n the FDLR, Human Rights, the CNDP, and SSR 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Following an April 23 visit to Lufuo, RSG Alan Doss 
reported to Goma-based diplomats tat the FARDC had pushed the FDLR 
out of the townand that most residents had returned home. 
(Commnt: it is doubtful that the FDLR ever intended to ccupy 
Lufuo, a town with a population of 14,000. End comment.)  Doss 
noted that the FDLR practice "tactics of fear" in the region, 
telegraphing is retribution intentions ahead of attacks in an 
ffort to terrorize the population.  MONUC had recetly moved its 
base out of Lufuo to Kurumba (popultion of 60,000), which has also 
been threatened by the FDLR, but has now moved a contingent back 
into Lufuo.  Doss and other observers speculate that some of the 
FDLR fighters may have commercial motivations.  They dominated 
commerce in the area until they were pushed back into the forests; 
many local residents owe them money, and the FDLR may be reminding 
them that payment is still due. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) While the FDLR remains capable of raids and terror, Doss 
said it has not reoccupied many of the areas it dominated before 
Operation Umoja Wetu.  (Comment:  this may not apply to the more 
remote areas north of Walikale.  End comment.)  Doss believes there 
will be more reprisals and acknowledges that the FDLR will not 
disappear as a result of Kimia II.  Nevertheless, action against the 
rebels is essential to break their hold on large parts of the Kivus 
and to cement improved DRC-Rwanda relations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Doss said he had spoken with FARDC General Amuli about 
FARDC abuses against the population.  Amuli, according to Doss, 
recognized that the GDRC is fighting a counter-insurgency, which 
would not succeed without the support of the local population.  Some 
commanders (probably a reference to Colonel Delphin) are notorious 
for perpetrating abuses. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  According to Doss, non-payment of salaries remains the 
most pressing problem in the FARDC.  Doss suggested that EUSEC might 
encourage distribution of pay at the company or battalion level.  In 
Doss' opinion, the current practice of disbursing the entire payroll 
to brigade commanders allows for too many opportunities for graft 
and delay.  The next priority should be to encourage the FARDC to 
return to barracks, with weapons locked up except when deployed. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) CHOD General Etumba told Doss that he was prepared to 
restart training for the FARDC in July, and was prepared for a 
six-month training cycle for many of the recently integrated troops. 
 Doss agreed that continuing operations against the FDLR should not 
divert the FARDC from the need to implement Security Sector Reform 
(SSR).  Doss said he would seek trainers from Swahili-speaking 
countries, as it is the most common language for troops in the 
Eastern DRC.  He noted that the UNSC has provided funding and 
authorization to immediately begin SSR.  (Comment:  SSR came off 
track when the CNDP emerged as a threat, and donors should not allow 
the GDRC to use the FDLR as an excuse for further procrastination. 
 
KINSHASA 00000403  002 OF 002 
 
 
End comment.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Reporting on his recent meeting with local CNDP 
leadership, Doss said they were committed to a political role.  They 
have grievances, notably the failure of the GDRC to convene the 
Steering Committee to implement recent agreements, but none of these 
concerns were "dealbreakers," in Doss' view.  The CNDP has, however, 
contacted Obasanjo to express its concerns; Obsananjo's aide, 
General Sumbeiywo, will travel to Goma on April 27 to follow up on 
implementation.  Doss recommended a "light structure" for tracking 
implementation, rather than the multi-tiered structure of the Amani 
program.  The CNDP would keep its political grievances separate from 
its military grievances.  (Comment: although CNDP officers have done 
well in the division of commands in the FARDC, we estimate that up 
to 10% of the rank and file have already deserted the FARDC.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Doss said he would soon return to New York to brief the 
Security Council on his findings.  He intends to report progress, 
but note the many areas where problems could derail the process.  He 
is encouraged that the UNSC is relatively united in its view of the 
conflict. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment:  The SRSG has a solid understanding of recent 
dynamics in the east, and does not appear overly concerned that the 
UN has been frequently sidelined in negotiating agreements.  He may 
be a bit optimistic about Kimia II's ability to weaken FDLR 
capabilities.  He is correct in understanding that further action 
against the FDLR is key to maintaining momentum in DRC-Rwanda 
relations.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK