VZCZCXRO0222
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0323 0960810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060810Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9426
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000323 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT? 
 
REF:  Kinshasa 306 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  MONUC and the FARDC are ramping up preparation 
for Operation Kimia II with an aggressive campaign to increase 
steadily pressure on the FDLR.  In contrast to Operation Umoja Wetu, 
the new operation will not include DDRRR outreach efforts to 
convince Rwandan rebels to return home peacefully.  FDLR fighters 
can still surrender to DDRRR offices, but "the time for negotiations 
is past," according to sources in MONUC.  End Summary. 
 
More Push, Less Pull 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Bruno Donat, Head of Office for the DDRRR program in the 
eastern DRC, recently told International Facilitation members that 
the Joint Operation Directive for Operation Kimia II against the 
FDLR limits DDRRR activities.  Donat contrasted the directive with 
Operation Umoja Wetu, in which DDRRR representatives were able to 
approach FDLR elements in the field with MONUC escort protection in 
order to encourage them to surrender/repatriate.  Noting threats 
against his personnel (at least two DDRRR staff or support personnel 
were killed while encouraging FDLR combatants to surrender), Donat 
concluded that he could not operate outreach programs to the FDLR 
without protection.  He added that the Force Commander had never 
favored the DDRRR outreach program, but he had been able to convince 
SRSG Alan Doss to overrule Gaye during Operation Umoja Wetu. 
Despite appeals from Donat and evidence that the previous outreach 
had yielded results, Doss declined to overrule Gaye for Operation 
Kimia II. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In a subsequent conversation with the International 
Facilitation, including Goma PolOff, Donat said Gaye wants MONUC to 
adopt a more aggressive stance and avoid sending "confusing" 
messages to the FDLR.  Other MONUC sources confirm that "the time 
for negotiations is past" and FDLR elements must appreciate that a 
decision to resist may be fatal.  They should be dissuaded from the 
mistaken belief that they can negotiate their surrender.  DDRRR 
offices will remain open and able to receive FDLR, who wish to 
surrender, but outreach efforts will no longer be conducted.  In 
Donat's opinion, this approach is a mistake and suggested that 
donors may want to appeal for a continuation of outreach efforts. 
He noted, however, that he would soon be returning to his regular UN 
job (he was seconded to MONUC to fill the gap in the DDRRR office). 
His successor will be Jean-Marc Tafanie. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Another DDRRR official told us that an FDLR corporal who 
has been in the DRC since 1994 had surrendered to DDRRR in recent 
days.  In his debrief, he said he made this decision after 
concluding that the FDLR would not be able to negotiate the terms of 
its return to Rwanda.  Since military victory was not possible, he 
decided to defect rather than spend the rest of his life in a futile 
struggle. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Comment:  We are not sanguine that Operation Kimia II will 
succeed in eliminating or even seriously damaging the FDLR, given 
the relatively light footprint of Operation Kimia I.  It may push 
them deeper into the forest and make their existence less 
comfortable, but experience shows that most rebels will try to wait 
out the operation, and afterwards return to previous areas of 
influence.  DDRRR activities during Operation Umoja Wetu 
demonstrated that sensitization/outreach programs have a role, but 
the number of FDLR who voluntarily entered DDRRR was small relative 
to the estimated FDLR presence. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Comment Continued:  On the other hand, the new 
rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda and the apparent 
willingness on the part of the GDRC to work against the FDLR may 
signal preparation of a more robust and effective operation (Note: 
Press coverage of the recent meeting between the DRC and Rwandan 
Foreign Ministers -- see reftel -- speculated that the two countries 
might prepare a second joint operation against the FDLR.  End note). 
 In these efforts, DDRRR and MIST deployment will still have an 
important role, especially in the longer term as MONUC and the FARDC 
gain a better appreciation of the use of psychological operations. 
End Comment. 
 
GARVELINK