VZCZCXRO0218
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0322/01 0960806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060806Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9424
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000322 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG
SUBJECT:  FARDC INTEGRATION PROCEEDS, HALTINGLY 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Father Apollinaire Malu Malu recently shared data 
(as of March 30) with the International Facilitation on North Kivu 
integration activities.  According to his data, around 11,000 of the 
approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of 
military integration since January are as yet "unidentified."  Malu 
Malu insists that government officials have accelerated their 
efforts to complete identification as soon as possible.  For the 
moment, however, a large number of armed men present in North Kivu 
in FARDC uniforms are essentially behaving as bandits.  Malu Malu 
has not yet secured GDRC funding necessary to undertake 
corresponding integration activities in South Kivu.  The Hutu 
(Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings of PARECO remain 
dissatisfied with the overall state of affairs.  They have been 
expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking: the process is 
stacked in favor of the CNDP and against the other armed groups. 
End Summary. 
 
Haphazard North Kivu Integration 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, the GDRC's point person for 
integration issues, shared with us what appear to be the most 
up-to-date (as of March 30) figures on North Kivu FARDC integration 
activities.  According to the data, around 11,000 of the 
approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of 
military integration since January are as yet "unidentified."  There 
is no formal record of who they are, to what unit they are assigned, 
of what force they previously were part, and whether or not they are 
indeed Congolese or otherwise eligible to be FARDC members.  This 
means that there is no way for them to show up on any payroll, 
though commanders are believed to be collecting pay based on gross 
numbers.  The result of all this is predictable:  a large increase 
in acts of banditry committed both in the countryside and in towns 
(including Goma itself), threats of systematic looting by FARDC in 
the northern and central parts of the province, and confusion over 
rank and command structures. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Malu Malu insists that government officials have 
accelerated their efforts to complete identification as soon as 
possible.  Currently, however, a large number of armed men are 
present in North Kivu in FARDC uniforms who are essentially behaving 
as bandits, while the better-structured (though of course nominally 
no longer extant) armed groups, particularly CNDP and the Hutu wing 
of PARECO, retain much of their identity, cohesion, and command 
structure within a vague FARDC framework. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) However, even the CNDP was unable to adhere to the 
requisite one fighter/one weapon rule: 4,611 CNDP fighters entered 
"accelerated" integration (for which having a weapon in working 
order was supposed to be a requirement), presenting 2,352 weapons. 
Those without a weapon were all supposed to go into "classical" 
integration, where only three CNDP fighters actually ended up, along 
with one FARDC soldier  (Comment:  North Kivu integration has 
therefore been carried out with no reference to any criteria, with 
virtually all CNDP and PARECO comers directed into accelerated 
integration.  End Comment).  There are also rumors among the other 
armed groups of concealed CNDP units and hidden arms caches, 
including heavy weapons. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Malu Malu said the question of military payrolls should be 
dealt with rationally.  As he pointed out, the Independent Electoral 
Commission managed a huge payroll nationwide with few problems, 
mostly by taking advantage of the cash-transfer facilities afforded 
by the mobile-phone service providers, which ensured that funds went 
directly to the employees. 
 
... And No South Kivu Integration 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Malu Malu, however, has not yet secured the GDRC funding 
necessary to undertake corresponding integration activities in South 
Kivu.  On February 28, the South Kivu armed groups (with the notable 
exception of the FRF) undertook to complete integration and cease to 
exist as armed groups within 34 days, i.e., by April 4.  To date, 
nothing specific has happened. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) South Kivu integration, once it starts, will differ 
considerably from the process in North Kivu, partly because the CNDP 
has to a large extent been the motor of integration in the latter 
and has no real equivalent in South Kivu.  At 35,000, the declared 
strength of all the South Kivu armed groups (not including the FRF) 
is a gross exaggeration, and those who will come in with weapons are 
likely to be far fewer in relation to the total than in North Kivu. 
This means that, if things are handled with at least a bit more 
rigor than in North Kivu, most South Kivu armed group elements will 
go into classical integration: barracks, training, and assignment to 
 
KINSHASA 00000322  002 OF 002 
 
 
recognizable units.  MONUC is preparing to support the four proposed 
regroupment centers, which will include the already well-equipped 
Luberizi complex. 
 
Armed Group Mutterings 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Hutu (Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings 
of PARECO are dissatisfied with the state of affairs, and they have 
been expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking:  the 
process is stacked in favor of CNDP and against the other armed 
groups.  The GDRC-CNDP agreement calls, for example, for automatic 
transfer of rank upon joining the FARDC.  The armed group agreements 
are more equivocal:  rank transfers will be considered (though Malu 
Malu insists they will be granted anyway).  Moreover, CNDP rank 
transfers have in fact already been recognized: CNDP colonels are 
deployed as "Sector" or "Axis" commanders, whereas others, including 
La Fontaine who claims to be a Colonel, are still waiting. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Comment:  The issue of rank is important, of course, to 
the individuals concerned and to those under their direct command, 
who will assume that their needs will be better attended to if they 
can enter FARDC attached to a senior commander.  But it goes beyond 
these concerns:  what PARECO (and doubtless others) are saying is 
that to get respect, you have to be a successful rebel.  Loyalty to 
the GRDC is not enough, many believe.  The current 
pro-"Rwandophonie" trend in North Kivu is evidence of this, they 
say.  The CNDP, which declared itself outside of GDRC control, is 
now receiving benefits and patronage, while other groups and their 
communities have received far less attention.  This trend has not 
yet led to an open rebellion among the armed groups and their 
constituents, but there are mutterings and portents that the GDRC 
would do well to heed this tendency. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment continued:  As Malu Malu well understands, a key 
prerequisite for sorting out this situation is for all units to be 
regrouped in barracks, identified, and assigned to recognizable, 
stable units under a clear command structure.  We are a long way 
from accomplishing this.  Consolidation of military command and 
control, which is admittedly showing some signs of progress in 
certain parts of North Kivu, needs to accelerate, otherwise some 
kind of new and hard-to-control fragmentation could occur. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment continued:  For now, PARECO and others are eager 
to be viewed (however implausibly, based on their past history) as 
capable and savvy allies in the campaign against the FDLR.  However, 
their links and affinities with the latter cannot have been swept 
away so easily.  This does not signal an imminent collapse of the 
nascent peace.  Nevertheless, as certain armed groups begin to 
perceive that they have been marginalized, serious obstacles to 
durable stability could re-emerge.  End Comment. 
 
GARVELINK