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Viewing cable 09KINSHASA316, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF CODEL INHOFE TO THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KINSHASA316 2009-04-02 11:22 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0316/01 0921122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021122Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9413
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000316 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV MARR MOPS CG
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF CODEL INHOFE TO THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (APRIL 9) 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
continues to grapple with fundamental security challenges, 
particularly in the eastern part of the country, making it one of 
the most fragile and volatile states in the world.  Armed groups, 
including the infamous Lord's Resistance Army, continue to terrorize 
the Congolese population in the east.  At the same time, there have 
been a number of recent breakthroughs that, over time, could help to 
bring at least a modicum of stability and security to the DRC.  Most 
important of these is a recent rapprochement between the DRC and its 
regional rival Rwanda, which in turn has led to newfound cooperation 
between the two governments to address the problems posed by two of 
the principal armed groups operating on Congolese soil - one 
traditionally supported (or at least tolerated) by Kinshasa which 
operated against Rwanda's interests, and the other supported by 
Kigali which operated against the DRC's interests.  Separately, a 
recent high-profile power struggle between the President and the 
Speaker of the National Assembly, which ran the risk of igniting 
conflict here in Kinshasa, was resolved according to established, 
democratic procedures, with the Speaker resigning his post. 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary continued:  Nevertheless, the problems faced by 
the Congolese state and population remain rife: endemic government 
corruption, rampant government abuse of human rights, economic 
crisis, and wrenching poverty and destitution.   Your visit here can 
reinforce the point that, while the USG stands ready to assist the 
DRC with its many challenges, it is vitally important that the 
elites of this country make the commitment to build a transparent, 
modern, liberal state which is focused on the delivery of services - 
as opposed to what exists now, which is a situation in which the 
state is used almost exclusively as a means by which a few people 
can enrich themselves and their families.  End Summary. 
 
Peace and Security 
------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) The issues surrounding the well-publicized and 
now-concluded Operation Lightning Thunder - a joint effort between 
the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), the Ugandan armed forces (UPDF), 
and the armed forces of South Sudan to combat the scourge of the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) - remain in focus for us.  The LRA, 
lodged in a remote and largely inaccessible region of northeastern 
DRC, has long terrorized the local population; the numbers of 
Congolese killed, tortured, kidnapped, and forced into slavery by 
this group stagger the imagination.  While this joint operation was 
successful in degrading some of the LRA's capability, the group 
remains intact and viable, and continues to carry out 
well-publicized attacks against the population.  The responsibility 
now lies with the FARDC, supported by the peacekeepers of the UN 
mission in the DRC (MONUC), to finish the job - but there are 
serious doubts as to whether these two entities have the capability 
or will to do so. 
 
4.  (SBU) News of a more positive nature is coming out of the Kivu 
provinces, site of long-simmering ethnic tensions and the 
battleground for both direct and proxy battles between the DRC and 
Rwanda.  A recent diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries 
allowed for two important agreements, both of which were, frankly, 
staggering in terms of their impact. 
 
5.  (SBU) The first of these agreements was that the DRC permitted 
Rwandan armed forces (which had previously invaded and occupied 
large parts of the DRC) to enter its territory to fight the armed 
group known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR), an outfit comprised in part of those complicit in the 1994 
genocide and to which Kinshasa had given tacit and direct support at 
various times over the years.  The second agreement was clearly 
(though it was never publicly stated as such) that Rwanda allowed 
for the collapse of a group called the National Congress for the 
Defense of the People (CNDP), a Rwandan proxy which had terrorized 
North Kivu for a number of years.  These developments are 
remarkable, particularly when seen against the backdrop of the 
DRC-Rwandan relationship of just three months ago, when many 
observers believed the two countries appeared to be headed towards 
war.  At a meeting in Kinshasa last weekend, the Rwandans and 
Congolese even announced their intention to reestablish diplomatic 
relations immediately. 
 
6.  (SBU) Like the operation against the LRA, the operation against 
the FDLR succeeded in weakening the group's capability to a certain 
extent, but it remains active and continues to terrorize the local 
civilian population.  The FARDC and MONUC also now have the task to 
finish the job but, as with the LRA, there are doubts as to their 
ability to do so.  Concerning the CNDP, its fighters are being 
integrated into the FARDC and the Congolese police force as part of 
the agreement that dismantled the group as a fighting force.  While 
a positive step, significant work remains to be done to ensure that 
this process of integration succeeds in permanently ending the 
status of the CNDP as an armed group. 
 
Assistance Efforts 
7.  (SBU) The Congolese military, which must play a key role in 
solving the security challenges faced by the DRC, itself faces 
severe internal and external challenges.  The USG and other partners 
are committed to seeing through progress in this area, though the 
pace of reform has been slow.  Alongside our ongoing programs to 
provide capacity to military investigators to investigate sex crimes 
and to enhance the leadership ability of FARDC officers, actions to 
begin training a light infantry battalion are continuing apace. 
 
8.  (SBU) In general, the Mission's overriding goals focus on 
reinforcing Congolese political will and capacity for robust and 
effective leadership and oversight at all levels of government, 
while promoting broad economic development.  Together with 
Washington and other diplomatic missions, we will identify and 
engage key decision-makers and implement results-oriented 
initiatives to support transparent governance, legislative 
accountability, judicial independence, political pluralism and 
provincial and local autonomy.  Our assistance programs focus on 
enhancing security, fighting poverty, and supporting democratic 
reforms. 
 
Human Rights and Gender-Based Violence 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) A large part of the problem resides in the fact that 
security forces and armed groups remain responsible for most human 
rights violations in the DRC, including unlawful killings, 
disappearances, torture, rape and arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Human rights advocates have extensively documented the involvement 
of these elements in such abuses.  Constitutionally-protected 
freedoms of association, speech, and protest are increasingly 
disregarded by security and administrative authorities using vague 
Mobutu and colonial-era laws to arrest and detain perceived critics. 
 The Embassy is working with NGOs and other diplomatic missions to 
encourage Parliament to bring these laws into line with the 2006 
constitution. 
 
10.  (SBU) Sexual violence against women and girls in eastern DRC is 
pervasive.  While most of the recorded attacks have been by armed 
groups and the FARDC, reports of rape by civilians is increasingly 
prevalent.  A general climate of impunity does nothing to discourage 
these acts.  In a recent report, the UN Human Rights Integrated 
Office in the DRC (UNHRO) stated that, despite strengthened laws on 
sexual violence, "law enforcement personnel and magistrates continue 
to treat rape and sexual violence in general with a marked lack of 
seriousness.  Consequently, men accused of rape are often granted 
bail or given relatively light sentences, and out-of-court 
settlements of sexual violence cases are widespread."  In fact, 
relatively few cases are reported to the police, and fewer still 
result in prosecution. 
 
11.  (SBU) USAID and the Departments of State and Defense support 
activities to respond to and prevent gender-based violence through a 
variety of interventions in the eastern provinces.  Since 2002, 
USAID has allocated more than $10 million for activities to combat 
gender-based violence in the Eastern DRC.  The Defense Institute for 
International Legal Studies (DIILS) has provided training sessions 
on the investigation of sex crimes to nearly all 350 of the FARDC 
military magistrates and police investigators with investigatory and 
adjudicatory roles.  The program, funded through PKO monies, 
sponsored sessions across the country, and received laudatory 
comments from the international community. 
 
Economic Issues 
--------------- 
12.  (SBU) The DRC has been significantly and negatively impacted by 
the global financial crisis due to its heavy reliance on natural 
resources for foreign exchange and limited capacity to protect 
against external shocks. Reduced demand for and lower prices of 
minerals have resulted in a significant contraction of the DRC's 
mining sector, the driver of the DRC's recent economic growth and a 
major source of formal sector employment and investment.  The IMF 
has projected GDP growth for 2009 at 4.4 percent, less than half of 
projection before the global financial crisis.  International 
reserves have fallen to the lowest level in five years and the 
exchange rate has depreciated by more than 25 percent over the last 
four months.  At the same time, continuing conflict in eastern DRC 
is having an adverse impact on the fiscal balance through public 
expenditures.  To help support the continuation of basic services 
and augment international reserve levels, the World Bank approved 
$100 million in emergency assistance under its Fast Track Assistance 
Program in February and the IMF approved $200 million in emergency 
assistance under its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) in March.  The 
EU also plans to provide emergency assistance. 
13.  (SBU) The DRC's development framework includes implementation 
of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), approved in mid-2006 
by the IMF and World Bank boards, and the government's five-year 
program, approved by the National Assembly in February 2007.  The 
five-year program, known as the five pillars, or "cinq chantiers" in 
French, is based on the PRSP and focuses heavily on President 
Kabila's five priority areas:  infrastructure; employment; 
education; water/electricity; and health.  The DRC currently 
 
participates in a non-disbursing IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP) 
and continues discussions with the IMF on the re-establishment of an 
IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  A new IMF PRGF 
will help pave the way for external debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  The DRC's external debt 
totals approximately $11 billion.  In early 2008, the DRC concluded 
an agreement with a consortium of Chinese companies to create a 
joint venture to exploit mining resources and develop Congolese 
infrastructure.  The project will be financed by a $9 billion loan 
arranged by the consortium.  To ensure debt sustainability, some of 
the loan agreement's provisions must be clarified in order to 
qualify the DRC for a PRGF program and receive debt relief under 
HIPC. 
The Scene Today 
--------------- 
 
14.  (SBU) The problems faced by the DRC are overwhelming, but your 
visit will reinforce the point that the USG stands ready and willing 
to assist the country with its security, economic, and governmental 
challenges.  At the same time, we have high expectations of the 
Kabila government and there will be no blank check issued to his 
regime.  Post believes that it is particularly important that the 
following points be reinforced during your visit:  1) those in power 
must first and foremost truly commit to the creation of a modern 
state, focused on the rational and just delivery of services to all 
its citizens (not just individual constituencies), and to address 
the endemic corruption that renders progress in this area 
impossible; 2) the appalling human rights record of the government 
and its security services must be corrected - not by empty rhetoric 
but with concrete action; and 3) we expect the full engagement of 
the FARDC to fight the LRA and FDLR, in cooperation with MONUC and 
keeping in mind first and foremost the need to protect civilians. 
 
GARVELINK