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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM583, JEM AND SLA/U ALLEGEDLY SKIRMISH AS JEM OVERHAULS ITS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM583 2009-04-30 13:34 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3350
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0583/01 1201334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301334Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3680
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000583 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JEM AND SLA/U ALLEGEDLY SKIRMISH AS JEM OVERHAULS ITS 
POLITICAL ARM 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Amid several high-profile defections from SLA/U to 
JEM, a minor skirmish in North Darfur earlier this week between 
rival SLA/Unity commanders has not yet spread to direct conflict 
between JEM and SLA/U, contrary to some early reports.  JEM's 
political wing evolved further this week as it announced the 
creation of a new executive secretariat that incorporates former 
movement dissidents, SLA rebel commanders and senior JEM leadership 
into a consolidated leadership structure.  Meanwhile, Sudanese 
authorities sentenced 11 more detainees to death for participation 
in the May 10 JEM assault on Khartoum, and JEM's spokesman vowed 
that their fighters currently in GOS custody will remain a vital 
issue in negotiations expected to occur in Doha, Qatar next week. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Fighting between remnants of the now-depleted Sudanese 
Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction was reported on April 27 near 
Birmaza in North Darfur, but UNAMID sources described it to poloff 
as a "minor skirmish."  In an event somewhat reminiscent of the 
incident that sparked the January 2009 fighting in Muhajeriya, 
former SLA/U commanders Suleiman Jamous and Salih Jarbo traveled to 
Um Rai (close to Bir Maza) to collect several of their commanders 
who had refused to switch allegiances to the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM).  Fasil Hassaballah and Yousif Nureen refused to join 
Khalil Ibrahim's ascending movement, and when the newly JEM-allied 
commanders insisted they disarm, a minor skirmish erupted.  A senior 
UNAMID official reported on April 28 that concerns about the 
incident appear to be overblown and noted that there has been no 
fighting in Darfur among any parties to the conflict since the ICC. 
 
3. (SBU) Speaking to poloff on April 29 by telephone from Doha, JEM 
Spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam played down the incident, saying JEM 
commanders had not notified JEM senior leadership of the skirmish, 
leading him to conclude it was Government of Sudan (GOS) propaganda. 
 He was doubtful that different Darfuri rebels would fight each 
other at this time, and alluding to the Khartoum regime, he added, 
"We need to focus on the real enemy."  Speaking with CDA Fernandez 
on April 28 by phone, Minni Minnawi claimed that a 40-car JEM column 
yesterday attacked Abdallah Yahya at a place called Amarye (which we 
assume is the same place as "Um Rai") near Bir Maza.  After taking 
some vehicles, they broke off and returned to the JEM main force at 
the border in Wadi Hawar in a place called Budieye.  Minni remarked 
that JEM continues to avoid GOS forces while it tries to 
destroy/absorb the other rebel movements. 
 
4. (SBU) As part of a major movement overhaul to coordinate its 
political message, JEM announced a rebel "shadow cabinet" on April 
27 through its website, naming JEM dignitaries, former SLA rebel 
commanders and former movement dissidents to posts of executive 
secretaries, regional secretaries, and state secretaries.  Notably, 
Suleiman Jamous, formerly of SLA/U, was named JEM Secretary for 
Humanitarian Affairs, and Adam Ali Shogar, also formerly of SLA/U, 
was named Secretary for Political Affairs.  Senior commanders within 
JEM retained positions similar to the ones they held before, as 
illustrated by the appointment of JEM senior commander Suleiman 
Sandal to the post of Secretary for Security and Intelligence. 
Osman Wash, a former Ibrahim family confidant who fled to Asmara, 
Eritrea in 2008 following conflict within the movement, has since 
returned to the movement as Secretary for Legal Affairs. (Note: An 
English translation of the full Arabic list is available by unclass 
email. End note.) 
 
5. (SBU) Spokesman Ahmed Adam, now also JEM's Secretary for Media, 
told poloff that the new structure represents the reconciliation of 
different factions within the movement.  Proud that the new 
positions include tribes and ethnicities outside the Kobe Zaghawa 
sub-clan which has formed the core of JEM since its inception, Adam 
insisted that JEM leadership had "made some concessions" to former 
rivals, including Osman Wash and Suleiman Jamous, for the sake of 
movement cohesiveness and internal unity.  Although Adam was not 
able to explain how the new leadership structure would affect the 
movement's political objectives, he said that JEM intends to use 
this structure in future negotiations at Doha. 
 
6. (SBU) According to the UN and press reports, on April 26 Sudanese 
authorities sentenced an additional 11 JEM combatants to death for 
participating in the May 10, 2008 JEM assault on Omdurman.  While 
none of the 81 JEM prisoners have yet been executed, Adam said that 
their release will continue to be of vital importance to the 
movement as it moves forward in negotiations with the GOS, 
especially given that Osher Ibrahim, half brother to Khalil Ibrahim, 
remains in detention.  "They are trying to blackmail us," Adam said. 
 "Bashir thinks this will bring him safety, preventing us from 
launching another attack."  Adam said that JEM views Sudanese 
Presidential Advisor and Darfur negotiator Nafie Ali Nafie is 
 
KHARTOUM 00000583  002 OF 002 
 
 
amenable to a GOS-JEM prisoner exchange, but believes that Nafie's 
efforts are stymied by a cautious and anxious President Bashir. 
"They don't care about their soldiers and offiers," he said, 
referring to the unknown number of GOS troops currently detained by 
JEM in their territory in Eastern Chad.  "But we care about our 
people - it's important to our struggle." 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: While SLA/AW is largely isolated in Jebel Marra 
holding defensive positions, and SLA/MM shows little real capacity 
for organization or strategy, JEM's senior leadership is light-years 
ahead in terms of sophistication.  This week's announcement of a 
"shadow cabinet" and delineated positions for its newest 
acquisitions mark another step in the empowerment of the movement on 
a political level, one which has taken place over the larger 
backdrop of a leadership vacuum among the Darfuri movements. 
Although JEM holds little to no territory within Sudan, is still an 
overwhelmingly Zaghawa movement, and JEM essentially was beaten back 
from Muhajaria and chased out of Darfur by Minnawi, the Ibrahim 
family and associates cast a long shadow as they travel to talks in 
Doha.  Sudanese authorities recently hanged a number of 
(non-Zaghawa) Darfuris on trumped-up murder charges unrelated to the 
conflict in Darfur.  Should the GOS go ahead with the executions of 
the JEM combatants at a time when the movement is regaining momentum 
in the field, the regime would certainly set back the prospects for 
a limited ceasefire with JEM.  While we have no sympathy for JEM 
armed combatants who are in custody given their reckless behavior, 
and we have little information regarding the status of the Sudanese 
prisoners held by JEM, senior Sudanese officials will not relinquish 
this valuable bargaining chip in a fit of spite but will seek to 
exact maximum political benefit from them. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ