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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM532, KHARTOUM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AFTER ACTION REOPRT AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM532 2009-04-21 03:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0532/01 1110354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210354Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3568
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000532 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR M, AF/EX, USSES, S/ES-O/CMS, CMT, FLO, DS/IP/AF 
NFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC AEMR KFLO CASC SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AFTER ACTION REOPRT AND 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
REF: (A) STATE 22076, (B) STATE 34500 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  When Authorized Departure was announced on March 
10, 2009,the post had previously prepared for personnel and 
logistical issues associated with a large-scale evacuation of 
Mission personnel.  However, the Embassy had less than one day's 
notice that the Department had decided to put Khartoum on Authorized 
Departure (AD) status.   As a result, the post had virtually no time 
to  plan for AD beyond its contingency  preparations.      After AD 
was announced, COM authority over internal decisions such as 
in-country travel between Khartoum and Juba, had to be clarified. 
Once a system for reporting all travel to and from post was in 
place, it worked well.  However, USG personnel in Sudan include a 
number of TDY staff and others who are not captured in the 
Department's generic personnel tracking applications.  Post had to 
rely on ad-hoc internal tracking and counting mechanisms that were 
time-consuming.  Support from M/FLO, RM, AF/EX, PMO, DS and others 
was outstanding.  Our only suggestion is that  more detailed 
instructions be provided to posts going on AD in areas such as time 
and attendance reporting and HR issues.    END SUMMARY. 
 
BEFORE AD WAS CALLED... 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Post has twice come close to going on AD over the past two 
years and received crisis management training in December 2008. In 
anticipation of the expected early 2009 ICC warrant announcement and 
other ongoing security and safety issues, Mission personnel in 
Khartoum began holding logistical planning meetings in January 2009. 
 In addition, prior to AD, the Community Liaison Office conducted a 
briefing on AD and Ordered Departure (OD) regulations for  Eligible 
Family Members and  MOHs at post.  The CLO briefing was 
well-attended, and several packets of information and reference 
material were provided.  The logistical planning group focused on 
the Emergency Action Plan (EAP), consular issues, the logistics 
involved in evacuations and identified USG personnel located 
throughout Sudan under Chief of Mission authority. 
 
HOW AD WAS CALLED... 
------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) When Ref A was received at post, meetings were called 
quickly to react to the announcement.  The COM had been in contact 
with the Department regarding the security situation in Khartoum 
after the ICC announcement and also had discussed AD with AF prior 
to the Department's announcement on March 9.  The COM held a 
town-hall on March 10 with all American employees and EFMs to 
discuss AD.  He addressed concerns that many staff members had on 
their reluctance to go on AD and the possible impact this might have 
on their career.  Identifying candidates for evacuation was 
sometimes divisive.   In an already stressful environment morale 
suffered as a result of uncertainties over whether all EFMs would be 
ordered to depart (this did not happen,) and if the post would soon 
be required to go on OD status.  Travel within Sudan became an issue 
immediately due to the frequent official TDY back and forth between 
Khartoum and Juba (which was not on AD) required to sustain program 
and logistical management.  An internal procedure was quickly 
instituted and cleared with the Bureau to allow the COM to use his 
authority to approve in-country travel. 
 
AFTER AD WAS CALLED... 
------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) TRACKING PERSONNEL.  The Regional Security Office had 
previously created an effective tracking system to capture the large 
number of post personnel, TDY staff and others at the Mission. This 
RSO "Head Count" was used to follow the movements and whereabouts of 
personnel at post.  TDY staff and USAID personnel in Sudan cannot be 
tracked in the State Department WebPASS Post Personnel or EMS 
applications.  The approval process for allowing employees to travel 
to post under AD was extremely time-consuming.  During the 30-day 
AD, approximately 35 requests for travel to post were approved by M. 
Post received great support from AF/EX, which expedited all the 
necessary clearances and approvals.  Khartoum employees are allowed 
three rest and recuperation trips for a two-year assignment.  For 
those employees who planned to travel with EFMs, leaving on R&R 
became a very difficult choice as in most cases EFMs would not be 
allowed to return.  Some employees were near the limit of being able 
to take the last R&R and were afraid they would lose the chance to 
do if they hesitated. 
 
5. (SBU) REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - FROM US AND FROM YOU.  The 
Embassy often responded to multiple requests from the Department for 
identical information.  An overview of evacuation contacts in the 
Department would be helpful.  Even better might be a central, shared 
location where post could upload and update information on evacuees. 
 For example, post provided detailed information on all evacuees, 
including "wheels up" cables to RM in Charleston.  A few weeks into 
the evacuation, our time and attendance expert in Charleston 
 
informed us that she was unaware we were on AD and did not have 
access to any information or cables previously provided.  Correcting 
evacuee information to Charleston has been time-consuming and has 
inconvenienced employees.  On the flip side, when asking for 
information from Department contacts, post often found our requests 
were sometimes routed to several offices  before someone provided an 
answer.  A stronger HR component in the evacuation process would be 
helpful.  There is a need to authoritatively answer questions from 
employees and family members who wish to know how a decision to 
leave post will affect their career or Tour of Duty. 
 
AFTER AD ENDED... 
--------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) RETURNING TO POST.  USAID and State Department employees 
are still in the process of returning to post.  Two Khartoum 
employees (an EFM working at post and a USDH State Department 
employee) remain at FSI on TDY orders to finish FSI courses started 
during AD.  Employees who had elected to ship UAB during evacuation 
found themselves waiting for it to arrive in Washington or at their 
Official Foreign Safe Haven.  The authorization of an additional 
seven days for transportation issues has been very helpful and most 
appreciated for these employees. 
 
7.  (U) As stated above, post received impressive and consistently 
excellent support from the Department.  We are  deeply grateful for 
all of your assistance. 
 
FERNANDEZ