VZCZCXRO8858
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0508/01 1040541
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140541Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3518
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000508 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MCAP KPKO UNSC AU SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION MEETING WITH SPLA LEADERSHIP 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Minister for SPLA Affairs Nhial Deng Nhial 
briefed SE Gration on the status of SPLA transformation and the 
importance of this process for the Southern military to continue to 
be a credible, and respected, guarantor of the CPA.  He underscored 
SPLM and SPLA willingness to assist in restoring peace to Darfur, 
and reviewed long-tabled and controversial plan for a 10,000-strong 
SPLA peacekeeping force in Darfur, to date strongly rejected by 
Khartoum.  He argued that near-equal forces along the North/South 
border are required to deter Khartoum's machinations towards the 
South, and rejected the NCP's demands that the 2011 Referendum Act 
must include provisions on post-separation arrangements.  He 
welcomed USG initiatives to revive SPLM/NCP dialogue, terming 
present discussions "flat," but cautioned against moving away from 
the CPA's existing implementation time schedule. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Minister for SPLA Affairs Nhial Deng Nhial and Sudan 
Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff MG Oyai Deng Ajak met 
with the President's Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration, USSES Tim 
Shortley, CDA Fernandez, CG Datta, and poloffs on April 6 in Juba. 
Nhial's sentiments reflected his dual leadership role as both 
Chairman of the SPLM ICC Crisis Committee and the minister charged 
within institutional reform of the SPLA three years into the peace. 
Chief of Staff Deng noted the sometimes conflicting USG approach to 
Sudan (in particular, sanctions-driven bars to specific types of 
assistance to the SPLA) and then asserted that the SPLA remains 
Sudan's guarantor of the CPA in the face of "Muslim fundamentalists 
within the NCP."  He noted his belief that the SPLA has evolved 
significantly since 2005, and that its will to defend the CPA 
remains strong, despite continuing and new challenges posed by an 
enlarged force structure and budget short-falls.  Both men thankedthe USG for its ongoing assistance and infrastructure development 
programs. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SPLA TRANSFORMATION AND USG SUPPORT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Nhial reviewed for the Special Envoy the obstacles to rapid 
transformation now facing the SPLA.  The CPA calls for both SAF and 
SPLA force reduction in advance of the 2011 Referendum.  Nhial noted 
"we were compelled by political realities to move in the opposite 
direction."  The SPLA, under GOSS President Salva Kiir's direction, 
has instead absorbed three-tiers of militias and other armed groups 
into the SPLA since 2006, in order to ensure stability in the South. 
 The latest group integrated into the Southern military is an 
amalgamation of Misseriya and Dafuri militias, and is considered the 
last-wave of formerly Khartoum-aligned (now Khartoum-abandoned) 
militias integrated into the SPLA. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Minister then reviewed for the SE that decision's 
impact on the SPLA's 2005 goal of launching a robust, 
skills-training-based DDR program that would expedite wounded and 
redundant soldiers' reintegration into civilian life.  "We have been 
forced to abandon much of that because of resource constraints," he 
stated, noting that transfer of 32,000 SPLA into the care of the 
Southern Sudan Widows, War Wounded, and Orphans Commission was now 
put on hold because of Juba's current budget crisis.  (NOTE: Payroll 
and operating costs absorb approximately 93 percent of the SPLA's 
budget, the largest expense in the GOSS budget. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------- 
SPLA: GUARANTOR OF THE CPA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Nhial reiterated the SPLA's need for continued USG support, 
reminding SE Gration of Khartoum's continued machinations towards 
Juba.  The NCP's oil is made possible by southern Sudanese, he said, 
and Sudan is entering a dangerous period as a result.  "Khartoum's 
strategy is to fight the SPLM politically and militarily by proxy: 
encouraging Southern Sudanese politicians opposed to the SPLM under 
one tent, reviving anti-Southern militia groups, and the integrating 
pro-Khartoum forces into the Joint Integrated Units.  "This is why 
the SPLA exists - to protect the CPA - it is our mission," he 
stressed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Nhial, the Security Arrangements were 
intentionally chosen by the SPLM as the second pillar of the CPA's 
formation during the Navaisha peace process.  "Without these 
security provisions, including the continuation of the SPLA, the 
agreement would not have lasted to today."  The reason there are two 
armies in Sudan is to make sure the CPA is implemented fully.  "We 
can't have a lasting imbalance of power," Nhial continued, "but I 
don't believe the SPLA will ever reach the full strength of the SAF 
anyway."  He asserted that Khartoum has passed Ethiopia as the 
largest military power in the region, and estimated the SAF budget 
 
KHARTOUM 00000508  002 OF 003 
 
 
to be ten-times that of the SPLA.  "We must build up military muscle 
in order to hope that Khartoum would think twice about hitting the 
South," Nhial said, referring to the Special Envoy's earlier 
argument on resource commitments, comparing it to U.S./USSR force 
posture during the Cold War.  "Like America did, we must 
successfully persuade the NCP to believe going back to war is 
unwise." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Turning to political elements of CPA implementation, Nhial 
underscored for the SE the need for NCP movement on reform of the 
National Security Act, full acceptance of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration's pending decision on Abyei boundaries, and urgent 
demarcation of the 1956 North/South border.  Reviewing the status of 
dialogue between the NCP and SPLM, Nhial cautioned that "we are 
discussing with our partners a way forward but we have scored no 
successes.  Hopefully your visit will generate much-needed traction 
- and again make possible Sudan's democratic transformation."   He 
emphasized the monitoring of elections as more essential than the 
outcome of the elections themselves because "monitoring will serve 
to undermine the NCP if they attempt to steal the elections - it 
will expose them, and then the people of Sudan will rise up as one 
to fight."  He agreed with the SE's earlier comments to First VP 
Kiir (septel) that Darfur needs to be resolved immediately.  "If 
Darfur is still in turmoil by elections, violence will 
disenfranchise the people and call into question the entire 
legitimacy of the elections.  We want to avoid that scenario."  He 
differed with recent statements by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
that Darfur is primarily a resource-driven conflict, noting that its 
origins "are largely political and stem from systemic 
marginalization, and for that reason the SPLM really has a role to 
play in the resolution of the crisis." 
 
------------------ 
SPLA PKO IN DARFUR? 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Minister stressed for the Special Envoy that SPLM 
engagement on Darfur need not be limited to the political realm. 
Former SPLM Chairman John Garang had once conceptualized the 
deployment of an integrated SPLA/SAF peacekeeping force in Darfur, 
and Kiir re-tabled the idea within the GNU Presidency in 2007. 
Kiir's commitment, which Nhial supports, was for the following:  a 
30,000-strong peacekeeping force consisting of equal numbers of 
SPLA, SAF, and international peacekeeping forces.  The SPLA would 
command the integrated Sudanese forces in order to boost civilian 
confidence.   Nhial noted that thus far Bashir and the SAF have 
consistently and firmly rejected the SPLA peacekeeping proposal, 
fearing an increase in pro-SPLM sentiments in Western Sudan in the 
run-up to nationwide elections.  Nhial argued that peace in Darfur 
has three-prerequisites:  the NCP actively taking the movements 
seriously, a Cessation of Hostilities, and a defined role for the 
SPLM and SPLA.  On the final point, Nhial conceded that "while we 
could just listen, it should be something more than that if we want 
success." 
 
----------------------------------- 
NHIAL: GUIDANCE FOR THE NCP ON 2011 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Nhial emphasized that the NCP needs to look afresh at its 
relationship with the SPLM, and restore legitimacy to the "CPA 
partnership."  Looking ahead to 2011, Nhial noted that the NCP needs 
to determine how to underscore the concept of voluntary unity, and 
address the issues of religion and state - the underpinning of the 
Machokos Protocol that laid the foundation for greater peace.  "The 
Referendum gives people a choice.  Right now that choice is between 
an Islamic North and a Secular South." 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to Nhial, the NCP has said it would only 
consider enacting the referendum law if the SPLM accepts 
post-referendum guarantees on sharing assets and liabilities.  "But 
that's a problematic position," he continued, "the referendum law 
itself is procedural.  Tying political discussions for post-2011 
arrangements to its drafting and passage almost pre-judges the 
outcome of the Referendum when that is not our role and not our 
choice as politicians - it is a decision for the people of Southern 
Sudan and Abyei."  Southerners as a constituency regard the 
Referendum as the most important thing - if the NCP goes back on it, 
they are renouncing the CPA's cornerstone, laid not at Naivasha but 
Machokos.  "It's almost normal for us as Sudanese to be in conflict 
- NCP respect for the right of referendum gives us a much-needed 
chance to avoid that." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
GRATION ON CPA, WITH MUTED PUSHBACK FROM NHIAL 
 
KHARTOUM 00000508  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (SBU) SE Gration reviewed for the SPLA his mandate as President 
Obama's Special Envoy to Sudan, and noted that despite the 
President's campaign theme of "Change," the USG remains committed to 
the CPA and an enduring peace in Sudan.  "We want to create an 
environment where we can hold all players accountable," the SE 
noted, "we need to get the CPA back on schedule, and use the next 
ninety days to put an appropriate focus on North/South relations and 
push Darfur to the back-burner" once we make progress there.  He 
reiterated earlier points on the need to move quickly on the 
consolidation of key CPA elements essential for the 2011 Referendum. 
 "We have no more time to wait, and we must simultaneously work on 
CPA implementation and "socializing" the Referendum in order that 
its outcome is viewed as legitimate by the international community. 
"We cannot wait until next year. Things like 1956 border demarcation 
must move now," he said. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Special Envoy reviewed his hope for trilateral 
discussions between the USG, Taha, and Kiir, on a reinvigorated 
implementation timeline.  Nhial pushed back slightly on the idea, 
noting that timelines already are provided within the CPA, "but the 
NCP has been allowed to flout them."  He returned to stalled border 
demarcation to underscore his point. "Where the 1956 line lies is 
actually fact - Sudan was formerly under British control, there are 
records.  However, the NCP tries to come up with their own version 
of history.  The people of the South will not accept being told 'you 
can go your own way but minus your resources.'"  In Nhial's opinion, 
the NCP/SPLM dialogue is "flat," reduced to "mere courtesies," but 
"in reality we are talking at cross-purposes."  He agreed that 
inter-party talks need to be reinvigorated, but cautioned that the 
NCP will not like U.S. engagement.  "Their perception of America is 
negative - they view engagement with Washington as a means of 
containing American hostility," the Minster said. "It's ironic," he 
noted, "because really that is an internal sentiment," chuckling 
that the NCP continues to underestimate the SPLM and SPLA, and the 
will of the Sudanese people. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: This first meeting between SE Gration and the 
leadership of the SPLA provided a good look at the main issues that 
continue to plague the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM - a 
lack of trust and a belief by the SPLM (based on experience) that 
the NCP will do anything it can to undermine the CPA to its own 
advantage. It is odd that Nhial raised the old chestnut of SPLA 
troops in Darfur, a total non-starter for the NCP as it would 
essentially open a potential new front in the West for the SPLA in 
case there should be renewed conflict between the two parties. 
Under these tense circumstances, it remains evident that continued 
deeper engagement by the U.S. to ensure adequate preparation for the 
referendum (and elections), border demarcation and to prevent a 
return to war is essential. End comment. 
 
¶14.  (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ