VZCZCXRO8855
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0507/01 1040533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140533Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3515
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000507 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION IN EL FASHER: A PESSIMISTIC MINNAWI, A MYOPIC 
WALI, A DETERIORATING SITUATION AT ZAM ZAM IDP CAMP 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Presidential Special Envoy Scott Gration and 
delegation traveled to El Fasher on Saturday, April 4, meeting with 
the Wali of North Darfur, who strongly denied serious humanitarian 
gaps but still desires bilateral cooperation, telling the delegation 
"We put our hand in your hand to solve Darfur."  At Zam Zam IDP 
camp, leaders voiced frustrations with the departure of NGOs which 
provided vital services to the camp, and a tour of the camp provided 
a firsthand view of precarious situation faced by the estimated 
95,000 IDPs living there (over 40,000 arrived within the last month 
as a result of fighting instigated by the JEM rebel group in 
Muhajaria).  SLM leader Minni Minnawi remains pessimistic on the 
prospect of peace talks in Doha, refusing to confirm his 
participation, and noted that he expects more displacements this 
year in Darfur. End summary. 
 
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NORTH DARFUR WALI: "NO GAPS EXIST" 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Welcoming the SE and delegation to the newly constructed 
seat of the government in El Fasher, the Wali (governor) of North 
Darfur Osman Mohammed Kibir said that Sudanese authorities in North 
Darfur have a genuine interest in moving relations with the U.S. 
forward in a mutually beneficial direction.  He assured the 
delegation of his "complete faith" in previous agreements, and 
reminded them that the international community needs to utilize the 
government of North Darfur in order to completely fulfill any new 
peace agreement with rebel movements in Darfur.  "We announce our 
readiness to sit with any party, just to listen, and then begin 
deliberations," he said.  "We wish to start a new beginning." 
 
¶3. (SBU)  After a short PR presentation celebrating the North Darfur 
government for "progress" on security and livelihood issues, Wali 
Kibir immediately turned to a lecture on the humanitarian situation, 
particularly at Zam Zam IDP camp.  "The UN claims that there are 
39,000 IDPs in Zam Zam, but we doubt these figures," Kibir said. 
"We think they are not true.  The situation in the camps is good. 
There is no health epidemic, and there are improvements in terms of 
mortality rates." (Note: The UN has estimated that approximately 
95,000 IDPs are currently living in Zam Zam.  Over over 40,000 
arrived within the last month as a result of fighting instigated by 
JEM in Muhajaria in January 2009.  The Zaghawa inhabitants of 
Muhajaria left when the government took over this area that had 
previously been controlled by SLM/Minnawi (Zaghawa) but was forced 
out following attacks by JEM (also Zaghawa). End note.)  Criticizing 
the expelled INGOs that worked in North Darfur, Kibir told the crowd 
the INGOs "humiliate their donors," adding, "All Sudanese NGOs have 
moved to fill the gap.  The situation here is normal and good and no 
gaps exist."  The largely clueless (but mostly benign) regime PR 
agent Kibir urged that the U.S. lift sanctions on Sudan - "IDPs are 
being directly affected by the sanctions," he claimed - and closed 
his presentation with echoes of President Obama's inaugural address 
by saying, "We put our hand in your hand to solve the problem of 
Darfur." After the meeting he criticized CDA Fernandez to the local 
press for directing the Special Envoy to Zam Zam camp rather than 
other, "better" camps in the area. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
ZAM ZAM CAMP: NEW ARRIVALS, CLOSED CLINICS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) A full GOS police escort escorted the SE and delegation 
through the final checkpoint in El Fasher, past the deep trench dug 
to protect the town, and down the crumbling Darfur highway to 
sprawling Zam Zam IDP camp.  At the border of the camp, red-capped 
security officers from SLM/Minnawi shooed away the GOS police and 
ushered the group through the sandy lanes of the labyrinthine camp. 
As the delegation approached to meet Minnawi and camp leaders, 
hundreds of IDPs sent out a cheer and unfurled protest banners.  "We 
welcome the representative of President Barack Obama for the first 
time in Sudan," Minnawi began.  "The Special Envoy is here to listen 
to our problems.  The government said there are no problems, but he 
is here to see and give an opportunity for camp leaders to speak for 
themselves."  Zam Zam Sheikh Ali Ishaq Hamid, speaking next, 
smilingly thanked the delegation for their visit, and warmly 
welcomed officials from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Abakar Idris, leader of the older and more established 
section of the camp, forthrightly praised the work of the NGOs that 
once operated there (including CARE, a USAID partner, and SUDO, an 
independent Sudanese NGO), and called the expulsion of the NGOs "the 
most serious problem which has added to all our other problems. 
They came here to put an end to our suffering, to not allow us to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000507  002 OF 003 
 
 
die," he said.  Idris criticized the Khartoum regime for not 
implementing the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, an agreement that he 
said had led IDPs to believe that the conflict and displacements in 
Darfur would soon be resolved.  "Now we have a situation where women 
and children are dying, with no way to provide for basic needs.  We 
will not accept the situation, we ask for the international 
community to put an end to these violations." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sadig Saleh, leader of the new IDPs who fled fighting in 
South Darfur in January/February 2009 and had recently arrived in 
Zam Zam, told the delegation that the humanitarian situation in the 
new part of the camp has deteriorated rapidly as new arrivals have 
no access to health facilities.  Estimating that 42,000 Zaghawa IDPs 
have arrived there in the last three months, Saleh bemoaned the lack 
of security and humanitarian assistance at the site.  "We need food. 
 We are facing danger when we collect wood for charcoal.  There are 
land mines, and the police nearby are there only to dismantle the 
camp," he said, receiving sustained applause in reaction to his last 
point.  In addition to asking the U.S. and the international 
community to find an immediate solution to return the expelled NGOs, 
Saleh said all IDPs support international justice, and he thanked 
the U.S. for what he called a "strong and daring" stance on Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the next stop of the tour of Zam Zam, surprised IDPs 
greeted the delegation when it paused to observe a large working 
water bladder, recently installed in the camp with assistance from 
UNICEF and the Sudanese NGO, WES.  The delegation paused at the 
locked gates of an empty clinic formerly run by SUDO, and a 
vocational education facility run by CHF, both operations shuttered 
following the GOS decision to expel 13 international NGOs and 
dissolve 3 Sudanese NGOs.  Ishaq, the sheikh of Zam Zam, told the 
delegation that since the beginning of March, two other sites 
(including a veterinary center) and 20 kindergartens are no longer 
operating for a total of 25 NGO-supported activities closed down and 
hundreds of camp dwellers unemployed as a result. 
 
-------------------------- 
MINNI MINNAWI: DOHA, MAYBE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a meeting on the evening of April 4 in an 
Embassy-operated house in El Fasher, Minnawi was pessimistic as he 
discussed with the SE the prospects for the future in Darfur.  In 
response to SE's observation that "No one will think of peace if 
Darfur enters the disaster phase," Minnawi criticized the National 
Congress Party's (NCP) policy in Darfur, saying it engenders support 
for the rebel movements and Arab militias, which in turn leads to 
the deterioration of the security situation.  "The NGOs must come 
back to resume work," Minnawi said, insisting that he personally has 
been pressuring the ruling regime to bring back the NGOs, as he 
believes the move to "Sudanize" humanitarian relief in Darfur will 
lead to disaster.  Minnawi said he had attempted to organize a 
commission with the three Walis of the three Darfur states to push 
NCP authorities for a return of the NGOs, but Minnawi said the Walis 
crumbled at the last minute and did not press their counterparts in 
Khartoum to address the yawning gap. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Minnawi was cautiously optimistic on the subject of the 
Doha negotiations, calling it a "good and wide process."  He 
remarked that the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Gibril Bassole should 
support total inclusion of all movements in the process, but that 
Libya, Chad and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim are not interested in 
peace the way that Minnawi and his movement have proven to be. 
Referencing his group's conduct in South Darfur in January, he said, 
"We know when to fight, and we know when to leave."  But given that 
he expects increased displacements and increased fighting in the 
short term, Minnawi was skeptical that negotiations would bear fruit 
within the coming months, and he said that his experience with the 
DPA still weighs heavily on his decision to engage in further peace 
talks.  "Maybe I will meet you in Doha, but can I go? Maybe they 
won't invite me." Minnawi said that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is 
using recent Chadian financial largesse to "buy" as many rebel 
groups as possible and incorporate them into JEM but "their loyalty 
is not strong, they are only doing it for money." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: Although not as tense as Nyala (the capital of 
South Darfur) the North Darfur capital El Fasher still remains a 
divided city through which the stinking aroma of acrimony pervades. 
The Wali of North Darfur's observation that the situation in the 
camps is "good" is correct only in that the situation in the camps 
 
KHARTOUM 00000507  003 OF 003 
 
 
is not catastrophic. .  Given the slowly deteriorating situation in 
Zam Zam, the Wali's comments show how out of touch he is with 
reality.  As the delegation observed on April 4, the situation in 
Zam Zam was deteriorating daily with increased population pressures 
on the camp. .  Now numbering more than 95,000, Zam Zam is Darfur's 
third largest IDP camp, and its highly politicized IDPs there are 
well organized, articulate in their criticism of Sudanese 
authorities, and desperately ready for increased humanitarian 
assistance. One fear of the NCP and North Darfur Wali Kibir is that 
Zam Zam will become another rebel stronghold and no-go area for 
government forces, much like Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur. That 
process seems well underway. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment, continued: The fighting in Muhajeriya in January 
that swelled Zam Zam also displaced significant numbers of Minnawi's 
supporters, and his presence in Darfur in now limited exclusively to 
North Darfur, in areas directly south of El Fasher, and then far to 
the northwest in arid North Darfur.  As his territory has shrunk but 
the concentration of his constituency has increased, politics in 
North Darfur may distract Minnawi's attention from the vital role he 
has reluctantly played on the national stage since signing the DPA. 
His "maybe" in response to whether he will go to Doha shows in stark 
relief the problem facing Bassole and the current international 
effort to bring peace to Darfur: while all parties support the 
concept of peace talks in Doha, they overburden their positions with 
preconditions and in the end often refuse to travel.  The SE's 
initiative to hold security discussions may break this log-jam and 
if progress can be made in Addis on security arrangements (for 
example formalizing some aspects of the de-facto ceasefire between 
SLA/AW commanders in Jebel Marra and the government) then UNAMID 
will finally have something to monitor.  Getting JEM to agree to any 
security arrangements will be much more difficult, as JEM does not 
actually hold any territory - the only leverage it has to extract 
political concessions from the government is its ability to make 
long-range attacks into Sudan with support from Chad.  Seen in this 
light, if Abdel Wahid's commanders are willing to negotiate there 
may be more hope for progress on security arrangements with SLA/AW 
than with any of the Zaghawa movements.  This won't reduce the level 
of conflict in Darfur, however.  As Chief Mediator Bassole pointed 
out to SE Gration in their second meeting April 10, the key to 
reducing conflict over the long term is to engage with the two most 
violent and aggressive groups in Darfur - the Zaghawa (JEM, SLA/U, 
and SLA/MM) and the janjaweed (Arab) militias.  End comment. 
 
¶7. (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission. 
FERNANDEZ