VZCZCXRO3370
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0484/01 0990750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090750Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3480
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000484 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: BASSOLE SEEKS ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING THE DOHA TALKS ALIVE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 372 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole noted 
that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) refused further 
dialogue with the Government of Sudan (GoS) because of the INGO 
expulsion, and proposed that JEM might participate in the Doha talks 
if the opportunity to discuss humanitarian issues was provided. He 
urged SE Gration to help him keep the talks alive by supporting this 
initiative, and maintaining constructive engagement with the GOS. He 
also asked the SE to continue to encourage JEM and other factions to 
commit to Doha, most notably Minni Minnawi, who he believes ought to 
participate in the talks as a member of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU). SE Gration pledged his assistance to Bassole and agreed 
to consider traveling to Doha before the end of the month in a show 
of support, following a series of regional consultations. End 
Summary. 
 
PROPOSAL FOR GOS-JEM MEETING IN DOHA ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On April 3, Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan Scott 
Gration, USSES Shortly, CDA Fernandez and emboffs met with UN/AU 
Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, Deputy Mediator Azouz Ennifar, 
JMST Senior Advisor Kenneth Gluck and other members of the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST) to discuss a way forward in the 
stalled Darfur peace process. Bassole stated that he recognizes an 
urgent need to focus the mediation on humanitarian relief, following 
the March 5 expulsion of the 13 INGOs. As a result, he has proposed 
inviting the GOS and JEM to Doha to discuss humanitarian issues, he 
said, and hoped that such a meeting would in the process re-ignite 
the Doha talks. "We need to keep Doha alive, especially in the wake 
of the Arab League Summit there," he said, noting that the Summit 
was off-putting to JEM, which chafed at the closeness exhibited 
there between President Bashir and the Qatari Emir. "My biggest 
concern is that if JEM refuses to return (to Doha) we will have 
nowhere to turn to as the GNU will refuse to go anywhere else." 
 
NEED FOR BROADER STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN DOHA 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Asked for his impressions on the Doha process, Bassole 
stated that he believed Qatari State Minister Ali Mahmoud was doing 
"a fantastic job" in engaging parties to the mediation, and noted 
the Emir was a positive force as well (he was less enthusiastic 
about Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al Thani.) When asked 
by SE Gration what the USG could do to help keep the Doha process 
alive, Bassole asserted the need to expand the talks from a 
bilateral to a multilateral forum. "Engaging with the other 
movements is critical," he said, though he reported that there has 
been little to no progress on the Libyan-facilitated "Unity plus" 
collection of factions' involvement in the peace process (reftel). 
Bassole also urged the USG leverage its ties to Minni Minnawi to 
encourage him to join the Doha talks as part of the GNU. Such an 
option is "legal, easy and serves the integrity of the DPA," said 
Deputy Mediator Azouz Ennifar. "This would give him a platfrm from 
which to insist on implementation of the DPA," he added. Bassole 
noted that while Minnawi was agitated following the fighting in 
Muhajeriya and subsequent loss of his territories in South Darfur, 
"he may come around now." He urged the USG to advise Minnawi to 
pursue this path. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Bassole and his team told SE Gration that in addition to 
bringing Minnawi and rival rebel factions to the negotiating table 
(most notably SLA Unity and JEM), they recognize the need to expand 
participation in the peace process to a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders. They are currently exploring ways to work with civil 
society groups in the course of the mediation, they said. JMST 
Senior Advisor Kenny Gluck noted that it was unlikely that any 
negotiated settlement between rebels and the GOS "could produce a 
stable and viable peace agreement for Darfur, given the number of 
constituents not at the table." Darfur's Arab communities need a 
voice, he said, as does Darfur's diverse civil society. Deputy 
Mediator Ennifar pointed out that the Sudan People's Initiative 
(SPI) was actually quite positive in convening a broad cross-section 
of Darfurian society together for healthy debate. "It's a shame it 
was not continued," he said. 
 
THOUGHTS ON REGIONAL ACTORS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Bassole told SE Gration that if he was to continue to use 
Doha as a venue, he would need help placating and sustaining the 
(constructive) involvement of regional actors, namely Libya and 
Egypt. If not involved, both have the ability to destabilize the 
talks, he said, recalling how Egypt purposefully scheduled 
 
KHARTOUM 00000484  002 OF 002 
 
 
conflicting meetings for Khalil Ibrahim in Cairo to delay his 
arrival for initial talks in Doha. Recalling the failed peace talks 
in Sirte, Libya in 2007, Bassole noted that the Libyans were not 
nearly as organized as the Qataris, but could still play the role of 
spoiler. Even Eritrea was not without influence, he said, noting 
that "we need [regional actors] to help, not hinder the process." He 
urged SE Gration to convey this message in his regional 
consultations. 
 
LOOKING TO NEXT STEPS IN DOHA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Asked by SE Gration what other messages he could convey to 
be helpful, Bassole stated that he appreciated the SE's pragmatic 
approach of seeking a "technical fix" to  fill the gaps left by the 
NGO expulsions.  He urged the Special Envoy to maintain steady 
engagement with the regime. "The GOS needs to have a feeling that 
the U.S. is not fighting against them" to elicit constructive 
behavior, he said. Bassole noted that he is scheduled to meet Khalil 
Ibrahim in N'Djamena on April 10 and hopes to get the JEM leader to 
agree to return to Doha soon after for meetings. Any future Doha 
talks would benefit greatly from SE Gration's presence, he said. 
"There are so many comments coming out that Doha is dead, so it 
would be a big boost to have you declare your support for the 
process and visit," said Deputy Mediator Ennifar, who noted that an 
announcement of the SE's travel to Doha could spur JEM and other 
rebel factions to jump back into talks. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Asked whether he would be prepared to introduce a draft 
framework at the next iteration of talks in Doha, Bassole noted that 
there was still considerable work to be done to bridge the gap 
between the GOS and JEM. "The draft we prepared was accepted by the 
government but strongly rejected by JEM," he said. When pushed on 
the tabling of a draft agreement on security arrangements leading 
towards a cessation of hostilities and eventual ceasefire, Bassole 
was cautious. "JEM won't agree to this before they agree to a 
framework," he said, noting that because JEM holds no territory in 
Darfur, a cessation of hostilities gives them nothing. JMST Advisor 
Gluck added that "JEM's ace is its ability to launch quick strikes 
and retreat." Bassole and his team agreed to remain in contact with 
SE Gration, USSES Shortly and the Embassy to discuss preparations 
for the next talks in Doha. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The absence of any progress in integrating the 
"Unity Plus" group of rebels' into the Doha process is 
disappointing, given that a potential ceasefire agreement between 
them and the GOS remains the easiest (though by no means easy) way 
to negotiate of present options.  The JMST's stance on Minnawi is 
similarly frustrating, because it fails to recognize the 
non-implementation of the DPA.  In a later meeting with Minnawi, he 
did not rule out going to Doha, but remained skeptical.  For all its 
flaws in dealing with the various rebel factions, however, the JMST 
should be lauded for its recognition of the importance of civil 
society in the peace process, and should be encouraged to leverage 
the work of UNAMID's Civil Affairs as it seeks to broaden 
stakeholder participation. Cooperation between the JMST and UNAMID 
in the course of the mediation should also be demanded, because as 
the eventual monitor of any potential cessation of hostilities or 
ceasefire arrangement, UNAMID's participation in its negotiation 
will be critical to its success. 
 
FERNANDEZ