VZCZCXRO2202
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0482/01 0980635
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080635Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3477
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000482 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID PEACEKEEPERS NEED A PEACE TO KEEP, JSR ADADA TELLS 
SE GRATION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID, the joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur, "needs a peace to keep," Joint Special Representative (JSR) 
Adada told Presidential Special Envoy Gration in a meeting at UNAMID 
Headquarters in El Fasher, North Darfur on April 4.  UNAMID has now 
deployed 67 percent of its forces to Darfur.  The challenge it now 
faces is to complete this deployment and achieve the fully 
authorized level of 20,000-plus troops on the ground.  Adada said 
that UNAMID has been criticized for standing helplessly at the edge 
of an "intractable conflict," but he added that its plan for a 
mobile monitoring team (MMT) requires a ceasefire.   With the region 
facing a humanitarian crisis, UNAMID asked for greater US support 
with UN New York.  As one senior administrator put it, "If anything 
goes wrong, we will be blamed." End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) With the heads of UNAMID offices assembled at UNAMID HQ's 
modest conference room, JSR Adada told Special Envoy Gration that 
the US plays a crucial role in UNAMID, not only as member of the 
Security Council, but also as the leader of the Friends of UNAMID. 
Fourteen months since taking over from the AU mission in Darfur, 
Adada said that the main challenges continue to be deployment and 
the lack of a peace agreement.  With deployment standing at 67 
percent, UNAMID will face significant challenges bringing deployment 
up to the authorized 20,000-plus troop strength.  Reducing violence 
will require the full implementation of a cessation of hostilities 
among all parties in Darfur.  Adada announced that UNAMID's plan for 
a mobile monitoring team (MMT) is ready when needed.  Expressing 
hope for more opportunities to work together, Adada said that the 
"primary interest" of all parties involved in Darfur should be 
pushing Darfuris and their representatives to negotations in Doha. 
"A real peacekeeping mission needs a peace to keep," he said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Abdul Mohammed, UNAMID political chief and head of the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC - created by the 
Darfur Peace Agreement,) told SE Gration and his delegation that 
politics in Sudan have been overwhelmed by the March 4 announcement 
of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.  The ruling National Congress 
Party (NCP) has forced all political actors to take a stance on the 
issue, impeding opposition rebel movements from engaging in peace 
talks, while simultaneously stifling political discourse.  The 
"low-intensity war" that pervades Darfur results from the same 
"politics of drift" that hold hostage the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, and with a regime unable to make any significant 
decisions, Mohammed ticked off a list of forboding concerns.  "If 
the Sudanese government intends to unleash the Arab militias again, 
then we will see a situation similar to that of 2004.  We should not 
rule out an IDP uprising in response to deteriorating conditions in 
the camps.  At present, Darfur is showing all the signs of becoming 
an intractable conflict which will not be susceptible to mediation." 
   Now more than in the previous three years, according to Mohammed, 
Darfur requires an international strategic approach to "manage the 
unmanageable." 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNAMID Civil Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Human 
Rights officials all expressed similar concerns that recent 
developments threaten to undo previous positive changes that took 
place prior to the March 4 expulsion by the regime of 13 
international NGOs.  With the recent arrival of approximately 40,000 
IDPs to Zam Zam IDP camp, UN partners and the remaining NGOs have 
taken measures that are capable of patching over the humanitarian 
gap caused by the expulsions only until the end of April.  A UNAMID 
Humanitarian Affairs officer noted no improvements in food security 
in Darfur had occurred since the beginning of the year.  UNAMID 
Human Rights and Rule of Law officers noted ongoing problems in 
Darfur, including: pervasive impunity for organized violence; lack 
of criminalization of sexual violence; ineffective justice 
accountability mechanisms; and intermittent access to courts and 
lawyers for victims.  Regarding the GOS Special Prosecutor for 
Crimes in Darfur, appointed in September 2008 with much fanfare by 
the GOS, director of UNAMID Human Rights Maria Therese-Kelte noted, 
"We don't know much about the special prosecutor or what he does." 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNAMID Chief of J5 Plans Col. Noddy Stafford told  SE 
Gration that while UNAMID has now deployed 67 percent of its planned 
troop strength, it does not yet operate at 67 percent capacity due 
to shortages in contingent-owned equipment and an eight-percent 
shortfall in pledged contributions to the entire mission.  However, 
he said that UNAMID's coverage in Darfur is increasing, as 
peacekeepers are conducting over 100 patrols of more than 70 
peacekeepers per day, and Formed Police Units (FPUs), currently 
operating at only 31 percent capacity, will achieve their full 
2900-officer capacity by November 2009.  Although UNAMID 
peacekeepers will continue to deploy in April and May, Stafford 
believed that Darfur's rainy season will bog down major new 
 
KHARTOUM 00000482  002 OF 002 
 
 
deployments until late summer. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Drafted with suggestions from the US in mind, UNAMID's plan 
for a Mobile Monitoring Team (MMT) envisions one team of 15-20 
personnel for each Darfuri state.  Party representatives to a 
ceasefire will be invited at the discretion of the Force Commander 
and Sector Commanders, and the investigation and verification of 
violations to the ceasefire would be conducted within 24 hours.  In 
addition to requiring dedicated helicopter transport, extensive 
training and non-military logistic support, a successful MMT can 
operate only with full cessation of hostilities, something UNAMID 
officers admitted will remain a challenge in the short- and 
medium-terms. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Thanking the assembled officers for their briefing, SE 
Gration asked if there was anything he could do to assist their work 
and the implementation of UNAMID's mandate.  JSR Adada reiterated 
that the US has a major role to play in bringing partners to the 
negotiating table, and in following up on UNAMID's plan to implement 
the MMT with UNHQ.  D/JSR Henry Anyidoho said that the newest crisis 
to address in Darfur is humanitarian in nature.  While UNAMID does 
not have a humanitarian mandate, it clearly sees the possibility of 
a major humanitarian crisis.  If the latter should occur, Aniydoho 
said that UNAMID would be blamed regardless of its mandate.  He 
asked that the US assist UNAMID by raising this concern in 
Washington and New York. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The meeting ended with an extended discussion on deployment 
issues.  The deployment method of the 2nd Ethiopian battalion 
(scheduled to arrive in Darfur in April after traveling in a massive 
self-contained convoy by road from Addis Ababa) is yet to be decided 
because UNHQ cannot reimburse Ethiopia for more than it would cost 
to pay a contractor for such a move.  Such an operation would speed 
deployment and all agreed that despite the dispute over costs 
currently underway at UNHQ, such an immediate deployment would be 
well-worth whatever Addis Ababa has asked.  Additionally, several 
officers asked that the US discuss infrastructure problems in Darfur 
with the GOS as a way to improve deployment - for example Sudanese 
railroad trains carrying contingent-owned equipment (COE) from El 
Obeid generally will derail 20 times before reaching its destination 
in Nyala. Parts for these trains are detained in Germany because of 
US sanctions (the train also carries equipment for SAF in Darfur in 
addition to UNAMID). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: As Darfur continues in an extended phase of "an 
almost intractable conflict," UNAMID requires tools and weapons not 
currently in its arsenal - namely attack and transport helicopters. 
For an MMT to become fully operational, a cessation of hostilities 
must be negotiated.  However, UNAMID could begin more rapidly to 
monitor violence and fighting through negotiating a protocol with 
the government to start such monitoring.  This could be done even in 
the absence of a formal ceasefire. However, UNAMID will likely need 
a request from the US to do so.  A creative solution to allow the 
2nd Ethiopian Battalion to deploy rapidly overland is urgently 
required. Such a solution might entail the US paying the extra cost 
of the deployment on a non-reimbursable basis, after negotiating the 
total cost with Ethiopia. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ