VZCZCXRO2184
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0481/01 0980629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080629Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3474
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000481 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: RECLUSIVE SLA/AW COMMANDERS WELCOME SE GRATION IN JEBEL 
MARRA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On April 5 rebel commanders from SLA/Abdul Wahid 
and an enthusiastic local population warmly welcomed Presidential 
Special Envoy Scott Gration and his delegation to Darfur's most 
inaccessible area, the mountainous rebel enclave of Jebel Marra. 
Praising the US and hoping for strong cooperation in the future, the 
commanders concurred that any future security agreement must bind 
together all Darfuri factions, but they scoffed at the prospect of 
traveling to Doha to negotiate with Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for 
Darfur Bassole, as they consider the Qataris and JEM to be Islamist 
proxies for the NCP.  The commanders emphasized  they would accept 
only high-level US involvement in any negotiations, and alluded to 
discussions with other movements and Fur leaders that are currently 
ongoing.  The unscheduled, last-minute arrival of the reclusive 
commander Gaddura, second-in-command of SLA/AW, was the highlight of 
this unprecedented USG visit to Jebel Marra.  Gaddura and the other 
commanders welcomed SE Gration's direct engagement in the Darfur 
peace process. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
THOUSANDS CHANTING "UP, UP, USA!" GREET SE GRATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Arriving by UNAMID helicopter from El Fasher, Presidential 
Special Envoy Scott Gration, USSES Shortley, CDA Fernandez and 
emboffs landed on April 5 in the forbidding mountainous terrain 
around Deribat, the de-facto capital of east Jebel Marra's rebel 
"liberated zone".  Rebel commanders from the Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), clad in full battle fatigues and draped 
with bandoliers and magic amulets, plus several civilian 
administrators of Deribat, and thousands of children and 
well-wishers huddled as the descending helicopter kicked-up a storm 
of dust over the hilltop landing site.  Emerging from the helicopter 
to chants of "Up, up, USA!" and "Go, go, Obama", SE Gration was 
greeted by: Mohammed Adam Abdulsalem (Terada) and Jaber Hasballah 
(Jaber), SLA/AW's chief field commanders in East Jebel Marra; 
Abdulla Khalil, SLA/AW's English-speaking administrator for Deribat; 
and Mohamed Mahmoud, an SLA/AW commander and brother to prominent 
Khartoum-based civil society activists. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Abdalla Khalil ushered the group into Deribat's unlit, 
spartan town hall, as excited rebels and local tribal leaders 
crowded in to the standing-room-only meeting alongside NGO and 
UNAMID representatives.  Praising US involvement in Darfur, Khalil 
said, "The American people have played a great role in assisting the 
people of Darfur.  In the beginning of the conflict, the United 
States was on the side of the Darfuris.  We have great respect for 
the US, and we hope to have strong cooperation in the future." 
Enumerating problems similar to those brought up in Zam Zam IDP camp 
the previous day (septel), Khalil linked the marginalization of Fur 
living in the Jebel Marra region to what he described as 
transgressions of the Khartoum regime, and accused Sudanese 
President Omar Al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) of 
committing war crimes and genocide, and obstructing humanitarian aid 
to the region. He pointed out that rebel commanders present had come 
from throughout Darfur to attend the meeting and that, after years 
of American focus on the Zaghawa minority-based rebel movements 
(Minnawi, SLA/Unity and JEM), "you are finally reaching out to the 
right people". SE Gration thanked the group for the honor of 
addressing them in their homeland, and the assembled commanders and 
leaders broke out in celebratory chants when SE Gration added, 
"There can be no peace in Darfur without the Fur." 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
"ABDUL WAHID IS BEING WISE," TERADA TELLS SE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Assembled in a smaller, roundtable meeting with the 
delegation, commanders Terada, Jaber and Majib al Rahman responded 
positively but cautiously to SE Gration's suggestions on a common 
security ceasefire in Darfur among the movements.  "We agree that 
complete solidarity is the way to go, as local arrangements won't 
work," Jaber said.  "The problem is the process - we have a hard 
time organizing with other movements, because there is no trust, no 
mediator."  However, the group was dismissive when asked if they 
considered going to Qatar to participate in the Darfur peace 
process, implying that the Gulf Arab state could not act as an 
impartial mediator.  "Khalil Ibrahim, the Islamists in Doha, Turabi, 
the NCP - they are all the same," Abdalla Khalil rejoined.  Jaber 
was more amenable to the suggestion, saying, "In principle, we agree 
to go to Doha, but we know about their relationship with the regime 
here.  The US could change the rules to push the process," he added, 
in a way to encourage the distrusting movements to participate. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Responding to CDA's query on how the US should approach 
 
KHARTOUM 00000481  002 OF 003 
 
 
Abdul Wahid, Jaber was steadfast in his support of the 
Parisian-exile, Fur leader, but also  acknowledged his shortcomings. 
 "He is our president, our brother, and our leader, but he must 
respond to what people want, and interact with the international 
community."  Majib al Rahman, the elder within the group, voiced 
similar concerns, hinting that the movement has wavered as its 
leader has remained in Paris.  "He must act in the interests of his 
people, not in the interests of one man." They suggested that the 
USG should double-track any discussion with Abdul Wahid with them so 
they can track that their leader is acting "in the interests of the 
people". 
 
¶6. (SBU) All members of the group were quick to find fault with the 
role played by the international community at the 2007 Abuja 
negotiations for the still-unimplemented Darfur Peace Agreement.  "I 
was at Abuja, and we were all surprised when Minni Minnawi was 
chosen.  He is a problem," said Abdalla Khalil, who criticized the 
international community for making what he said were hasty 
agreements as a solution the problem of Darfur (Khalil also noted 
that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is worse than Minni).  "We would like 
to see the problem of Darfur solved during the term of Barack 
Obama," said El Sadig Rokero, the vocal humanitarian coordinator for 
SLA/AW, "but the NCP has signed 11 different peace agreements with 
the Darfur movements, and has broken all of them.  What is the 
position of the US government to the signing of agreements that the 
NCP will break?"  Rokero was skeptical that any country could wring 
agreements out of the ruling regime, adding, "President Bashir 
doesn't want peace.  If you support a deal that they break, then 
what will happen to us?" 
 
¶7. (SBU) Still wearing his green battle scarf even indoors, the 
terse commander Terada spoke last in support of Abdul Wahid's 
refusal to go to Doha.  "Abdul Wahid is not being stubborn, he is 
being wise.  I trust him.  I saw him last in Geneva in December, and 
we are very close."  He was insistent that the movement holds only 
defensive positions in Jebel Marra to maintain a buffer against GOS 
aggression.  "We continue to obey the 2004 N'Djamena ceasefire, but 
the NCP does not.  Their attacks during Ramadan last year were 
against all movements.  We want to open a new page, but they are 
supporting the militias against us."  He pressed the US not to 
dismiss Abdul Wahid, but alluded to an upcoming meeting of Fur rebel 
commanders in and out of SLA/AW that will work to resolve 
differences among the tribes.  "In a few days, we will have a big 
meeting.  You will be surprised.  We need to solve the problem with 
all the tribes." 
 
¶8. (SBU) SLA/AW commanders and representatives presented SE Gration 
with a formal letter addressed to President Obama  that listed their 
concerns in Darfur and pressed the US to directly support their 
movement. A full translation of the letter will be transmitted 
septel. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DERIBAT: UNDEVELOPED, REMOTE, IN THE DARK 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following the meeting, local representatives of Samaritan's 
Purse (SP) drove SE Gration, CDA and accompanying delegation on a 
tour of Deribat, an undeveloped town of un-mortared stone houses 
without electricity.  At a dilapidated local school, the teachers 
and schoolchildren eagerly welcomed SE Gration and his delegation in 
unlit rooms.  SE Gration presented the school with two boxes of 
Arabic-language textbooks supplied by Post's Public Affairs Section. 
 Representatives from SP and Medecines Du Monde briefed the 
delegation on their projects, which include a small medical clinic 
and agricultural terracing projects in the surrounding hillsides. 
Not surprisingly, despite the NCP's accusations that international 
NGOs are not welcome in Sudan, residents of Deribat are highly 
supportive of these NGOs' efforts to address the humanitarian gaps 
in the community. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
THE ELUSIVE GADDURA ARRIVES AT THE LAST MINUTE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Once the delegation returned to the hilltop landing pad to 
depart for El Fasher, word quickly spread that the notoriously 
elusive rebel commander Abdelgadir Abdelrahman Ibrahim (Gaddura) was 
approaching Deribat.  Gaddura, second in command of SLA/AW and Abdul 
Wahid's direct deputy within Jebel Marra, had not confirmed in 
advance he would be present at the meeting, and even Terada had said 
earlier in the day that Gaddura would not attend.  A ululating 
clamor arose from the hillside and within minutes, seven technicals 
crammed with weaponry and battle-ready rebels climbed the hill, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000481  003 OF 003 
 
 
charged past the cheering villagers and stopped short of the 
helicopter.  Disembarking his technical with his dreadlocked chief 
of staff Yusuf in tow, Gaddura strode to SE Gration, placed his 
right hand on the SE's right shoulder in a traditional sign of 
respect, and then firmly shook his hand as hundreds of fighters and 
onlookers shouted their approval. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Apologizing for his tardiness, the powerfully-built 
Gaddura explained that he and his troops had driven ten hours, were 
held up at the last minute by a broken axle, but were elated that 
they had a chance to meet the direct representative of President 
Obama.  "This is the right way to achieve peace in Darfur, and we 
are sure you will succeed."  Yusuf pledged SLA/AW's full support of 
US initiatives, but added that much more needed to be done.  "It is 
important to bring the Fur people protection against the government. 
 UNAMID is functionless, they can't even protect themselves.  We 
need US and European troops in Darfur to protect civilians, and we 
welcome all international organizations to Darfur." 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment: The first visit of any USG official to Jebel 
Marra in recent memory revealed a surprisingly resilient but 
marginalized community that is eager for peace, for American support 
and justifiably distrustful of the NCP-controlled government.  As 
USG efforts to bring peace to Darfur are revitalized under the new 
Special Envoy, the strategic blessing of the very same rebels who 
launched the Darfur uprising will prove essential to any security 
agreement.  Unlike Khalil Ibrahim's ethnically-Zaghawa, Chad-based 
Justice and Equality Movement and the marginalized SLA/Minni Minnawi 
and the bandits of SLA/Unity, SLA/AW holds significant territory and 
popular support in the heart of Darfur.  Convincing the 
unpredictable and recalcitrant Abdul Wahid to participate in the 
Doha peace talks will be very difficult, and if nothing else this 
visit to Jebel Marra showed that replacing Abdul Wahid with others 
or convincing his commanders to attend talks in Doha independent 
from Abdul Wahid will not be easy.  However,  there is already 
something of a virtual non-aggression pact in place between the GOS 
and SLA/AW since the latter are only defending the people and 
territory.  For this reason, it may be possible to formalize the 
latter arrangement while negotiating similar non-aggression accords 
between the Zaghawa movements (JEM and SLA/U) and the government 
(however since JEM holds almost no territory in Darfur, they have 
the most to lose from a ceasefire).  In addition to supporting a 
longer-term political framework, such short-term arrangements would 
be conducive to addressing the root causes of the conflict. The 
visit to Jebel Marra, which was years in the making (CDA Fernandez 
has been trying to get there for two years), graphically underscored 
the importance of outreach to Darfur's eponymous Fur people as an 
essential part of any solution to the conflict in Darfur. End 
comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ