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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM479, KHARTOUM EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS REVERSE TRIPWIRES AND AD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM479 2009-04-07 09:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0479/01 0970958
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070958Z APR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3471
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000479 
 
DEPT FOR M, DS, DS/IP, DS/TIA, AF, AF/EX, AND S/ES-0/CMS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AEMR CASC PGOV PREL PTER SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS REVERSE TRIPWIRES AND AD 
STATUS 
 
REF: A) STATE 22076 
B) KHARTOUM 473 
C) KHARTOUM 343 
D) KHARTOUM 305 
 
1. (SBU) DCM Mark Asquino convened an Emergency Action Committee 
(EAC) meeting on Sunday, April 5, to review  reverse tripwires for 
the Mission's (reftel B) lifting of authorized departure (AD) 
status.  The DCM, POL, MGT, DLO, RAO, USAID, RMO, PAO, CONS, and RSO 
were in attendance. 
 
2. (SBU) The EAC unanimously agreed that conditions leading to 
Washington's approval of AD status for Embassy Khartoum have changed 
in a manner sufficiently significant to end AD and permit the return 
to Khartoum of EFMs and non-emergency staff. Based on this 
re-evaluation, the EAC unanimously supports Khartoum's being taken 
off AD status on April 9, at the end of the 30 day AD period. 
 
3. (SBU) The EAC reviewed each of Post's ICC-specific tripwires 
carefully and identified the current status of each as outlined 
below: 
 
a. (SBU) "Cessation of Non-Violent/Violent Demonstrations": There 
were no violent demonstrations at or near US Government facilities 
following the March 4 International Criminal Court (ICC) 
announcement or March 5 expulsion by the Government of Sudan (GOS) 
of 13 Western NGOs (in retaliation for the ICC action) doing 
humanitarian work in Darfur.  Additionally, there have been no 
large, non-violent demonstrations at US Government facilities since 
March 7.  Similarly, there were no demonstrations of any sort or 
other anti-U.S. threats against Embassy staff or facilities 
following the March 26 announcement by U.S. and international media 
of attacks in eastern Sudan by foreign aircraft against alleged, 
Gaza-bound weapons convoys. 
 
b. (SBU) "GOS police support is sufficient and reliable":  Since ICC 
issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar al Bashir, the GOS 
has fully complied with its pledges to enhance security at all U.S. 
Embassy facilities and residences.  The GOS has  provided riot 
police and additional protection for the Chancery, other Embassy 
facilities and designated residences in the days following the ICC 
announcement.  The GOS also has been responsive to RSO requests for 
security assistance and cooperation since then. 
 
c. (SBU) "Media become less negative and inciting":  In response to 
the ICC indictment and subsequent NGO expulsions, President Bashir, 
other senior GOS officials and government-controlled media used 
strong rhetoric to blast both the U.S. and West as having "colluded" 
with the ICC in a "conspiracy" against Sudan.  However, as reported 
(reftel C), such rhetoric has decreased markedly in recent weeks, 
with the result that the political atmosphere is less 
politically-charged. 
 
d. (SBU) "Decrease in NGO harassment":  The GOS has now returned the 
passports initially seized from U.S. citizens and other nationals 
working for the expelled NGOs.  Other harassment of the NGOs and 
their staffs has also declined somewhat in recent weeks.  However, 
GOS demands that the NGOs provide exorbitant severance pay for their 
local staffs remain a source of tension. 
 
e. (SBU)" Increased access to GOS officials":  The GOS  not only 
facilitated high-level NCP government appointments for the April 
2-11 visit of new U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to Sudan Scott 
Gration, but also agreed to unprecedented meetings for him with 
senior Sudan Armed Forces officers and the NCP Shura Council.  In 
addition, the regime is allowing him access to previously-off-limits 
rebel commanders in Darfur.  The GOS has also agreed to a CODEL 
visit later this month.  This will be the first such CODEL visit to 
Khartoum in the past two years. 
 
f. (SBU) "Removal of most operational restrictions":  In early 
March, the Post reported (reftel D) that the GOS had become 
increasingly less-cooperative on a range of normally-resolvable, 
operational issues in the lead-up to the March 4 announcement of the 
ICC arrest warrant.  These included GOS insistence on screening all 
outbound U.S. Embassy diplomatic pouches, a "slow down" in issuance 
of non-diplomatic license plates for official vehicles, the 
confiscation and impounding at Khartoum International Airport of a 
shipment of unclassified E+E radios and equipment intended for 
Consulate General Juba, and the refusal of visas for U.S. military 
officers assigned to UNAMID. During the past month, the Mission has 
been able to resolve all of these operational issues, each involving 
GOS-imposed restrictions, with the exception of the final one. 
 
g. (SBU) "Diminished vitriolic rhetoric from religious leaders":  In 
recent weeks there has been a marked decrease in anti-U.S. rhetoric 
during Friday afternoon prayers. 
 
 
3. (SBU) Comment:  The EAC believes, and the COM concurs, that there 
 
has been a reversal in a sufficient number of security, political 
and operational tripwires to warrant the lifting of authorized 
departure at the end of the present 30 day period.  The Mission will 
continue to remain on high alert for terrorist-related and other 
threats against its personnel and facilities.  The EAC will 
carefully monitor the overall security situation and periodically 
review and report on Mission tripwires. 
 
FERNANDEZ