VZCZCXRO1150
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0478/01 0970603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070603Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3469
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000478 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SHURA COUNCIL REITERATES PLEDGE TO UNITE THE FUR, BUT 
LAMENTS GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 153 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an April 3 meeting with SE Gration, Shura 
('Consultative') Council representatives from the Fur, Tunjur and 
Birgid tribes expressed frustration with the refusal of 
leader-in-exile Abdul Wahid to participate in peace talks. They 
posited that the Fur could instead be represented in Doha by a 
composite of civilian leadership and SLA military commanders. But 
they cautioned that due  to the divisive tactics of the NCP regime, 
the Fur people are far from unified. It will be difficult to ensure 
that any such group is truly representative and has the popular 
backing of the Fur people, they said, because the government is 
constantly seeking to co-opt genuine civil society with 
pro-government actors. However, the Shura Council promised to 
continue working towards uniting through a shared vision for the 
Fur, and said they will travel to Doha themselves if necessary. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)On April 3, SE Gration, USSES Shortley and CDA Fernandez met 
with Shura Council members from several of Darfur's indigenous 
African tribes, including El Amin Mahmoud Mohamed Osman (Fur), 
Ibrahim Ahmed Adam (Tunjur), Tag Eldeen Siddig Ahmed (Birgit). 
(Note: Tribal 'Shura Councils' are consultative councils comprised 
of respected intellectuals that constitute an important part of 
Darfuri civil society. Unlike most all of Darfur's rebel factions, 
these civil society figures possess a degree of political 
sophistication and capacity, as well as substantive ideas for 
resolving the conflict. Unfortunately, like Darfur's rebel factions, 
they are also often characterized by disunity, overlapping efforts, 
political ambition and personal rivalries. End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Shura Council told SE Gration that following their last 
meeting with USSES Shortley (reftel), they have been working hard to 
initiate consultations with Fur civil society leaders, IDPs and 
military commanders to achieve consensus on the destiny of the Fur 
people and explore alternatives to Abdul Wahid's leadership. But 
they lamented that they were short on resources, and that an open 
exchange of ideas was obstructed by the repressive regime, which 
works diligently to keep the Fur divided. "If you want to engage 
with Darfurian civil society, you have to make sure you are working 
with the right people," explained Mahmoud, who continued, "because 
there are many people who are in the hands of the government." From 
the GOS-sponsored Sudan People's Initiative in Kenana all the way 
back to the Abuja talks, he said, the government has always 
succeeded at co-opting civil society representation by ensuring 
participation of its own agents and stooges, whom it empowers with 
money and resources. "Doha is an even more favorable venue than 
Abuja" for the government to do this, said Mahmoud, citing close 
ties between Sudan and the Arab League. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Noting that there was a window of opportunity for 
progression of the peace talks in the coming weeks, USSES Shortley 
asked what it would take to get a group of representative Fur 
leaders to Doha for peace talks. Mahmoud stated that should Abdul 
Wahid continue to refuse any attempts at dialogue, it was 
conceivable that a group comprised of Fur civilian leadership 
(native administration and civil society) and SLA/Abdul 
Wahid-aligned field commanders could attempt to represent the Fur at 
talks. But he noted that such an undertaking was fraught with 
challenges, because the government could prevent anyone it 
distrusted from leaving the country, or otherwise co-opt such a 
delegation by filling it with pro-government actors. Such is the 
dilemma, he said, because most of the Fur are located inside Sudan 
and thus subjected to the controls of an autocratic regime. On the 
other hand, Fur diaspora leaders such as Ahmed Diraije and Tijane 
Sese are largely out of touch with the realities on the ground and 
carry little weight among IDPs, he said. (Note: Tag Eldeen Siddig 
Ahmed also suggested that rebel leaders prominent in the early years 
of the conflict, such as Ahmed Abdulshafie and Khamis Abdalla, could 
also assume the mantle of leadership, although such leaders have 
significantly diminished instrength and relevance over the years. 
End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) SE Gration expressed an appreciation for the difficult task 
of bringing people together in such an environment, but asserted 
that if the Shura Council wanted USG support and assistance, it had 
to take the lead in uniting the Fur people. "We want to help you, 
but you have to create an environment that allows us to do so," he 
said. "If you come with a unified voice, we'll make sure you have a 
seat at the table."  The Shura Council members promised to continue 
their work to unite the Fur people, and accepted "the historic 
challenge" of going to Doha themselves if necessary. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000478  002 OF 002 
 
 
intransigence of Abdul Wahid among Fur elite, it is a testament to 
the effectiveness of GOS machinations (and, perhaps, the 
consultative nature of the Fur psyche) that they have been able to 
do absolutely nothing about it. By many accounts, Abdul Wahid 
maintains the fervent allegiance of most IDPs.  Given this reality, 
no Fur leaders have shown a willingness to try to supplant him. 
Though the USG can and should encourage alternatives, any attempt to 
anoint someone in Abdul Wahid's place would be both ill-advised and 
likely met with extreme skepticism.  However, developing a network 
of credible Fur leaders that could contribute to peace efforts and 
provide an alternative to Abdul Wahid's intransigence remains a 
valid objective. End comment. 
 
¶7. (U) SE Gration and USSES Shortley cleared on this cable prior to 
transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ