VZCZCXRO9811
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0474/01 0950645
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 050645Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3460
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000474 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: Mbeki Meets with Khartoum Dip Corps to Solicit Suggestions 
for AU Darfur Fact-Finding Mission 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a Khartoum meeting on April 2, Former 
President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki surprised an unprepared 
Khartoum diplomatic corps by soliciting suggestions from them on how 
the African Union might best help resolve the Darfur crisis.  The 
diplomats thought Mbeki had called the gathering to brief them on 
his AU Darfur Fact Finding Mission. Before turning the tables on the 
diplomats, Mbeki briefly described to them his mission as one of 
assessing and recommending by July how the AU might best help 
resolve the conflict.  Mbeki plans discussions with the Government 
of National Unity (GNU)in Khartoum, Darfur rebel groups, neighboring 
countries, as well as civil society in Darfur.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Former President Thabo Mbeki met with about 30 members of 
the Khartoum Diplomatic Corps on April 2 for what they thought was a 
briefing on his upcoming mission for the AU on resolving the 
conflict in Darfur.  The audience consisted mostly of Chiefs of 
Mission from resident African embassies, also included the Chinese 
and French Ambassadors plus the Italian and Russian DCMs.  U.S. 
Embassy DCM Asquino, accompanied by poloff, represented  CDA 
Fernandez.  Mbeki briefly explained his mandate as one of assessing 
the Darfur situation and advising the AU by July on how it could 
best accelerate a resolution to the conflict. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Mbeki noted that he sees any resolution as having three 
components.  First, a negotiated peace settlement.  Second, 
reconciling the various combatants.  Finally, identifying and 
punishing any war crimes that might have been committed.  Mbeki said 
he plans to listen to the views of all concerned with the conflict, 
in Sudan and in the neighboring countries.  As part of this process, 
he wanted to hear the views of Khartoum's foreign diplomats.  He 
then asked the assembled group for their suggestions on how the AU 
might best proceed.  The audience, which had been told that they 
would be briefed by Mbeki, was clearly unprepared to provide input 
and taken somewhat aback by his unanticipated request. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) After an awkward silence, members of the Diplomatic Corps 
pressed Mbeki for more information on his mission and then offered 
some preliminary thoughts.  The Nigerian Ambassador noted the 
fragmentation of the Darfur rebel groups was an obstacle to 
negotiations. He added that JEM had said it would boycott the 
ongoing Doha peace process unless the GoS rescinded its order 
expelling 13 international humanitarian NGOs from the country in 
retaliation for the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of 
President Bashir.  The Nigerian wondered if Mbeki would press the 
GOS for the return of these NGOs.  He also asked if Mbeki's 
engagement with the GoS included meetings with the SPLM, or only 
with the NCP. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) President Mbeki replied that his mandate is not to 
supplant Doha or other existing processes, but to generate ideas on 
how the AU might usefully support them, as well as explore 
complementary new initiatives it might launch.  He said that UN-AU 
negotiator Bassole will assist in securing meetings with the various 
Darfur rebel factions.  He noted that during April 3-4, he would 
travel to Darfur to meet with UNAMID, internally-displaced persons 
(IDPs), civil society groups and tribal leaders.  Once he is back in 
Khartoum, he said he would have a meeting with  President Bashir. 
He added that he would return to Darfur at a later date to meet with 
rebel leaders.  Mbeki said  that he also plans to travel to 
N'djemena and Tripoli for talks with Chad and Libya.  He noted he 
already had met with President Bashir and VP Taha, and hopes to meet 
later with First VP (and SPLM leader) Salva Kiir and SLM/MM leader 
and Senior Assistant to the President Mini Manawi, although these 
meetings appear more tentative. In addition, he said he planned to 
meet with ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo as well as with 
representatives from the UNHCR before issuing his report to the AU 
in July. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Chinese Ambassador commented that resolving the Darfur 
conflict will require a comprehensive strategy and needs to involve 
all of the parties in Sudan.  The Ugandan Ambassador urged Mbeki to 
engage with the "silent majority" of women and children who have 
been affected by the war in Darfur, and to encourage their honest 
views by protecting them from retaliation.  The Kenyan Ambassador 
said that his government believes that establishing peace in Darfur 
is the immediate need, and that reconciliation and justice should 
come after.  The Italian DCM said that the EU stood ready to work 
with the AU to address problems in Darfur.  DCM Asquino noted U.S. 
concern that the GoS decision to expel the humanitarian INGOs 
threatens to create a major humanitarian crisis in Darfur.  Mbeki 
replied that he too shared the latter concern. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT: The large meeting was poorly organized  from the 
start.  After arriving 45 minutes late, a somewhat-flustered Mbeki 
 
KHARTOUM 00000474  002 OF 002 
 
 
apologized repeatedly to the assembled "excellencies," saying his 
staff had not informed him the meeting had been added to his 
schedule.  In addition,  those invited were not informed in advance 
that they would be asked for their views on Darfur.  For this 
reason, the meeting was not conducive to a frank exchange of views 
on the sources of the conflict there, or how the AU might best help 
end it.  It is to be hoped that the rest of Mbeki's mission goes 
better than his meeting here with diplomats.   The Darfur conflict 
is only one component of Sudan's larger crisis, and any solution to 
it must be part of a broader resolution of the whole.  Whether Mbeki 
and his large delegation (whom, unfortunately, he never introduced) 
are willing or capable of tackling the root causes of Sudan's larger 
conflicts remains to be seen.  It was interesting that during the 
meeting in Khartoum, the toughest, most skeptical questions on 
Mbeki's AU mission to Darfur came from fellow Africans.  For its 
part, the SPLM also appears deeply suspicious of Mbeki.  It is 
worried that Mbeki's current mission is intended more to lend 
support to Bashir than to resolve Darfur's or Sudan's problems. 
 
FERNANDEZ