VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0473/01 0941352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041352Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3458

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000473 
 
DEPT FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF MANAGEMENT FROM CHARGE 
INFO SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/EX TOY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT AEMR CASC KFLO ASEC SU
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE STATUS 
 
REF: A) STATE 22076 
B) KHARTOUM 343 
C) KHARTOUM 305 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Per reftel A (Para 1 B,) I have re-evaluated the 
conditions at Embassy Khartoum that led on March 9 to your approval 
of Authorized Departure (AD) status.  Based on this re-evaluation, I 
ask that Khartoum now be taken off of AD on April 9, at the end of 
the 30 day AD period. I believe that conditions here have changed in 
a manner sufficiently significant to permit the return to Khartoum 
of all EFMs and non-emergency staff who voluntarily departed post 
under AD provisions. A detailed justification follows.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SECURITY SITUATION REMAINS STABLE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Preceding the March 4, 2009 International Criminal Court's 
(ICC) issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar al Bashir, 
the Government of Sudan (GOS) assured me that it would enhance 
security at all U.S. Embassy facilities and residences, and would 
also be responsive to  all requests for increased security from the 
Mission.  The GOS has fully complied with these commitments.  They 
provided riot police and additional protection for the Chancery, 
other Embassy facilities and designated residences in the days 
following the ICC announcement.  The GOS also has been responsive to 
RSO requests for security assistance and cooperation since then. 
There have been no violent demonstrations at or near our facilities 
connected with the March 4 ICC announcement or March 5 expulsion by 
the GOS of 13 Western NGOs (in retaliation for the ICC action) doing 
humanitarian work in Darfur. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Similarly, there were no demonstrations or any other 
threats against Embassy staff or facilities following the March 26 
announcement by U.S. and international media that there had been 
January and February attacks by foreign aircraft in Eastern Sudan. 
These reports indicated that 39 people were killed when jet fighters 
attacked alleged weapons convoys bound for Gaza via Egypt.  When the 
GOS Minister of Transportation, himself from Eastern Sudan, 
initially charged that these attacks had been carried out by the 
U.S., the GOS immediately tamped-down his allegations. 
Government-controlled media prominently featured USG denials of any 
U.S. involvement in the attacks.  The GOS also made statements in 
the media that it was investigating who had staged the January and 
February attacks.  The GOS emphasized that it had no evidence of any 
U.S. involvement.   Regarding Darfur, we recognize that the security 
situation there remains dangerous and volatile.  For this reason, we 
will continue to limit the duration of TDY visits to this region. 
In addition, we will move forward with plans to build a secure 
office/housing platform in El Fasher to permit eventual, longer-term 
TDYs to Darfur. 
 
----------------------------- 
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IMPROVES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In response to the ICC indictment and subsequent NGO 
expulsions, President Bashir, other senior GOS officials and 
government-controlled media used strong rhetoric to blast both the 
U.S. and West as having "colluded" with the ICC in a "conspiracy" 
against Sudan.  However, as reported (reftel B,) such rhetoric has 
decreased markedly in recent weeks, with the result that the 
atmosphere here is less politically-charged.  Similarly, the GOS has 
now returned the passports initially seized from U.S. citizens and 
other nationals who directed the expelled NGOs.  Other harassment of 
the NGOs and their staffs has also declined somewhat in recent 
weeks, although GOS demands that the NGOs provide exorbitant 
severance pay for their local staffs remain a source of tension. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Having initially somewhat restricted U.S. Embassy access 
to senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials in the Government 
of National Unity (GNU) following the March 4 announcement 
(restricted in relative terms, as we routinely meet with numerous 
high-level officials despite our rocky relationship with Sudan,) the 
regime in recent weeks has done an abrupt about-face.  It has not 
only facilitated high-level NCP meetings for the April 2-11 visit of 
new U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, but 
also has agreed to unprecedented meetings for him with senior Sudan 
Armed Forces officers and the NCP Shura Council.  In addition, the 
regime is allowing him access to previously-off-limits rebel 
commanders in Darfur.  The GOS has also agreed to a CODEL coming 
here later this month.  This will be the first such CODEL visit to 
Khartoum in the past two years.  It too marks a change in the GOS's 
reticence to engage politically at senior levels with the USG 
following the ICC indictment and NGO expulsions. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOS OPERATIONAL "SLOW DOWN" SPEEDS UP 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In early March, the Post reported (reftel C) that the GOS 
had become increasingly less-cooperative on a range of 
normally-resolvable, operational issues in the lead up to the March 
4 announcement of the ICC arrest warrant.  These included GOS 
insistence on screening all outbound U.S. Embassy diplomatic 
pouches, a "slow down" in issuance of non-diplomatic license plates 
for official vehicles, the confiscation at Khartoum International 
Airport of a shipment of unclassified E+E radios and equipment 
intended for Consulate General Juba, and the refusal of visas for 
U.S. military officers assigned to UNAMID. During the past month, 
the Mission has been able to resolve all of these operational issues 
with the exception of the final one.    Mission engagement with the 
MFA on the pouch issue, supported by discussions between S/USSES 
staff and the Embassy of Sudan in Washington, resulted in GOS 
agreement on April 2 to exempt all U.S. diplomatic pouches from 
scanning.  This agreement was based on assurances of "reciprocity" 
for Sudanese diplomatic shipments from the U.S.  In mid-March, 
following my direct intervention with the MFA Director of Protocol, 
the GOS agreed to provide non-diplomatic plates for 40 motor pool 
vehicles.  We had made this urgent request in January 2008 following 
the terrorist assassinations of two of our staff members while they 
were traveling in an official vehicle.  This re-plating will 
decrease the identification with the U.S. Embassy of U.S. staff 
traveling in such vehicles.  Finally, following prolonged discussion 
with various GOS agencies, the shipment of official radios for Juba 
was released on March 31. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  None of these changes in and of itself  indicates 
a dramatic shift for the better in U.S. bilateral relations with 
Sudan.  Serious problems and differences with the regime remain. 
Clearly, though, there has been significant improvement on a large 
number of security, political and operational issues that caused 
concern in early March and led to our going on AD on March 9.  In 
addition, it is worth nothing that despite initial concerns 
following March 4 that the GOS could halt incoming containers 
urgently needed for the completion of the New Embassy Complex (NEC) 
as happened last year, this did not occur.  We need only 50 more 
containers to have all the needed materials to complete the NEC on 
schedule in late 2009.  In the meantime, we will continue carefully 
to monitor all developments that affect the safety and security of 
our staff.  We will also work to reduce the number of American staff 
at Embassy Khartoum by severely limiting those coming here on TDY 
and exploring other ways to reduce our in-country footprint.  At 
this time, however, there is no longer a need for Embassy Khartoum 
to remain on AD. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment Cont'd: Remaining in AD status for another 30 days 
will negatively affect both the Mission's operational capabilities 
as well as morale here at a crucial time.  Staffing levels need to 
return to normal to allow this Mission the ability to take advantage 
of what may be limited opportunities for the new administration to 
engage the GOS on issues of vital importance to U.S. national 
security.  These include addressing Darfur's looming humanitarian 
crisis, establishing a new road map for peace in Darfur, and 
ensuring full implementation of the U.S.-brokered, 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Africa's longest civil war. 
For all of these reasons, I request that AD be terminated in 
Khartoum on April 9. 
 
FERNANDEZ