VZCZCXRO7897
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0466/01 0921555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021555Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3443
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000466 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN AND DONORS MEET TO DISCUSS TRACK 3 AND NEW ROLES 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 428 
B) KHARTOUM 421 
C) KHARTOUM 405 
D) KHARTOUM 318 
E) KHARTOUM 313 
F) KHARTOUM 311 
G) KHARTOUM 306 
H) KHARTOUM 299 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) BEGIN SUMMARY.  On April 1, USAID Mission Director 
attended, on behalf of the CDA, a small donors- group meeting with 
Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General (DSRSG) 
Ameerah Haq, to discuss UN thinking and planning on Track 3, as well 
as steps that donors could take to support the expelled 
organizations and implementing partners remaining in Sudan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
DISCUSSION OF THE STATUS OF EXPELLED NGOS AND AID STAFF 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DSRSG Haq chaired the meeting with donors and other UN 
agencies, providing an update on the current situation and potential 
donor roles in the coming days.  According to Haq, during the week 
of March 25, 18 expatriates from expelled NGOs were not in 
possession of their passports.  By April 1, only one expatriate 
staff member lacked his passport.  (NOTE: When the State Minister 
for Humanitarian Affairs Haroun met with DSRSG Haq on March 26, he 
committed to return all expatriate passports by March 29.  Thus far, 
the Sudanese government appears to be abiding by that commitment. 
Following the meeting, USAID confirmed that at least one staff 
member from PADCO-AECOM remains without an exit visa.  USAID will 
follow up with other implementing partners to verify that all have 
received passports and exit visas.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) OCHA continues to meet with the expelled NGOs regularly. 
The key message from the UN is that the staff should depart Sudan as 
soon as possible, and NGO headquarters should assume responsibility 
to complete program close-up, including questions of assets and 
severance pay.  The UN requested that donors encourage expelled 
implementing-partners staff to leave Sudan as soon as possible. 
(NOTE: Currently, the Sudanese government maintains that certain NGO 
staff members cannot leave Sudan until all outstanding issues, 
including the question of severance pay, are resolved.  Sudanese 
officials also have denied a few NGO requests to bring in 
headquarters-level staff to complete close-out procedures and 
provide relief for Sudan-based staff.  Despite denials to some 
organizations, two expelled NGOs report successfully replacing 
Sudan-based expatriates with headquarters-level staff.  END NOTE.) 
Overall, the UN would like to draw a distinction between individuals 
and organizations. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The UN is asking all NGOs to submit the paperwork required 
for closeout and submit copies of the documents to the HAC, donors, 
and UN, with a letter asking the HAC to cancel registration of the 
NGO.  OCHA noted that the Government of National Unity (GNU) 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the expelled NGOs already have 
agreed on the list of actions needed for NGOs to close out.  The UN 
suggested that the NGOs do not need to wait for a "closeout" letter, 
recognizing the March 4 and 5 expulsion documents as closeout 
letters, to avoid further delay.  After an organization officially 
departs Sudan, the UN feels the GNU HAC should be responsible for 
receiving requests and issues related to the departed NGO, and 
forward them appropriately, as designated by the departed NGO. 
¶6.  (SBU) When completing program close-out, the final issue for 
most expelled NGOs is payment of salaries.  The UN is working with 
NGOs and the GNU HAC to establish a system to ensure all employees 
are paid salaries, and plans to solicit help from international 
donors as well.  Payment modalities being considered include the 
transfer of funds from the NGO to employees' individual accounts; 
issuance of a check to the local staff member that can be cashed at 
a local bank; and/or designation of a senior field staff member to 
oversee the payout process.  Although the UN remains reluctant to 
take a significant role in the process of paying staff severance, 
USAID noted that the UN is the only organization with the capacity 
and staff to assist in this crucial process.  In addition, the GNU 
HAC seems anxious to involve the UN in the severance-pay process. 
The UN also discussed a potential role for international donors, 
including possibly having a delegate present in Darfur during the 
field payments.  Some donor participants questioned whether having 
heightened donor involvement would imply donor endorsement of the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000466  002 OF 004 
 
 
expulsion and severance pay requirements. 
¶7.  (SBU) The amount of severance pay that NGOs will pay employees 
differs by organization; some NGOs already have agreed to pay a 
six-month severance payment on top of the one month severance 
required by law.  Others have only agreed to pay what is legally 
required by law, while some have not yet agreed to pay anything. 
The UN has provided all of the expelled NGOs with a template to use 
to appeal the expulsion.  As of April 1, at least two organizations, 
Save the Children/United Kingdom (SC/UK) and local NGO SUDAO, have 
decided to appeal.  According to the UN, the reasons for appeal vary 
from organizations wishing to continue programs in Sudan, to others 
wanting to demonstrate accountability to donors, and finally to 
still others appealing the expulsion based on principle. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Even if an organization pays the GNU-ordered severance, 
the UN is encouraging NGOs to de-link any six-month payment from the 
labor decree as the labor decree assumes guilt.  Therefore, the UN 
is preparing a letter to the GNU HAC, asking the office to formally 
de-link guilt and the severance pay issue.  (NOTE:  Despite this 
valiant effort, any delinking appears to be an insurmountable task 
in an environment of heightened intimidation, fear, and 
government-controlled media.  END NOTE).  As of April 1, the 
estimated additional cost for the NGOs of the extralegal six-month 
severance pay is $12 million. 
 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -- 
TRACK TWO: GAPS TOO LARGE TO ADEQUATELY FILL 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------- -- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Meeting participants also discussed the current status of 
Track 2, or efforts by the international donors, remaining NGOs, and 
Sudanese officials and organizations to fill gaps.  Participants 
agreed on the enormous current burden on the technical ministries 
and that despite the GNU commitment to fill the humanitarian gaps, 
the international community knows that the GNU will be unable to 
deliver.  Furthermore, other donors and NGOs also are unable to fill 
the gap.  UN recently met with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
which posted staff in Khartoum to help Darfur programs.  According 
to IDB officials, the bank has a total of $10 million, of which only 
$1 million is earmarked for humanitarian assistance.  In addition, 
the Sudanese Red Crescent Society cannot maintain a significant 
expansion of programming and already has asked the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for assistance. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) To address near-term gaps in life-saving sectors, UN 
agencies such as UNICEF, WHO and WFP plan to become much more 
operational.  UN agencies will examine critical actions needed to 
maintain services during the next two months for each sector, 
including fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies.  While the UN 
becomes more operational, several key issues remain.  Of great 
concern is the Sudanese government's prohibiting four UN agencies 
from deploying international staff to South Darfur.  Since early 
February, the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), U.N. Mine 
Action Organization (UNMAO), International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) have encountered bureaucratic impediments to 
international staff travel, preventing international personnel from 
visiting South Darfur.  (NOTE: UNMAO has argued successfully that 
their staff is part of the African Union-U.N. Hybrid Operations in 
Darfur (UNAMID) and as such cannot be prohibited from working in 
South Darfur.  END NOTE.)  In two separate incidents, GNU security 
officials at the Nyala airport in South Darfur detained and ordered 
IOM and UNHCR staff to return to Khartoum, despite their 
presentation of required travel documentation.  (NOTE: In one 
incident, a UNHCR staff member arrived on the last flight into 
Nyala, and the GNU security officials guarded the expatriate all 
night and prohibited him from communicating with anyone until he 
boarded the next morning's flight back to Khartoum.  END NOTE.)  IOM 
staff in South Darfur provide critical monitoring and verification 
of camp populations and returns. 
 
¶11.  (U) Based on recent meetings, the UN reports that the GNU 
realizes that Sudanese authorities lack the needed surge capacity 
and depend on the UN for that extra boost.  In preparation for 
paying for additional operations, the DSRSG has asked the CERF for 
funding.  CERF funds requested include $2 million for meningitis 
vaccines, $400,000 for UNHAS and $960,000 for the Joint Logisitics 
Center.  Following the NGO expulsions, the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), put out a three-month funding request to donors for $22 
million to cover gaps in health, water and nutrition.  DSRSG Haq 
asked UN agencies to develop new appeals based on the recently 
expanded work during the next two to three months.  DSRSG Haq plans 
to have a larger donor meeting by the end of the week of April 5 to 
present updated UN funding needs for the current crisis. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000466  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ - 
TRACK 3: OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND STREAMLINED 
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 
------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ - 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The senior UN OCHA Representative from New York, 
Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, provided an in-depth discussion of the 
proposed Track 3 to establish a new humanitarian assistance 
architecture for aid programs in Sudan.  Drawing on broad 
consultations, including discussions in Khartoum between OCHA and 
the international donors, NGO groups, UN agencies; conversations 
with CEOs of expelled NGOs in capitals; and the Humanitarian Liaison 
Working Group in New York City, OCHA noted that it has yet to 
discuss any element of a Track 3 approach with the GNU. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The UN Track 3 approach has three parts: the operating 
environment, accountability, and a streamlined aid machinery or 
cluster approach.  According to Strohmeyer, for Track 3 to be 
feasible, the operating environment must move to a rule- or 
procedures-based approach, use the Joint Communique in a more 
effective manner, and show improvement in areas needing change. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Regarding accountability, UN staff noted that the 
High-Level Committee (HLC) has not worked in the past and must be 
strengthened to be more effective.  One option would be to draw upon 
the participation of additional GNU officials, including National 
Security, the Ministry for International Cooperation, as well as the 
GNU HAC and others.  From the donor perspective, the HLC also needs 
stronger and regular donor representation, not just one rotating 
donor representative.  In addition, the UN suggested including 
non-traditional donors, using the People's Republic of China as an 
example.  Noting that a strengthened HLC may not be enough, OCHA 
suggested additional efforts to decentralize the HLC and have an HLC 
equivalent group in each Darfur state, allowing issues to be 
addressed at the state-level rather than the federal- level in 
Khartoum.  For a final note on accountability, Strohmeyer proposed 
that an international entity be established that would meet at least 
twice a year to examine operations and compliance in Sudan.  The 
not-yet-formed entity would provide some international "political" 
heft, but should not be politicized.  The HLC could shift some 
difficult issues to the international body, which would include 
senior GNU officials. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Underscorig the importance of a more streamlined aid 
machinery or cluster approach, the UN proposed including all 
implementers, including NGOs and line ministries, under the cluster 
approach.  The cluster approach could include, for example, pooled 
or joint asset management for each cluster.  Each cluster would be 
its own sector program.  Recalling current issues with the GNU HAC 
and NGO technical agreements, the UN proposed that each cluster for 
individual Darfur states could have a technical agreement which 
would include all implementing partners.  The proposed arrangement 
may provide more protective and shielding elements, particularly for 
individual NGOs.  In addition, UN agencies would be designated as 
the lead partners for each cluster, perhaps in partnership with the 
appropriate GNU line ministry. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  According to the UN, it is urgent to develop the 
framework and implement the basic elements of Track 3 in order to 
prevent Track 2 from becoming the new approach by default.  Meeting 
participants questioned whether the Three Areas should be kept 
separate from the new architecture for assistance in Sudan. Donors 
and UN staff concluded that the Three Areas enjoys a special status, 
thanks to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Three 
Areas' role for Southern Sudan, and as such, should remain separate 
from the proposed new architecture, which will focus on northern 
Sudan. 
 
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COMMENTS 
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¶17.  (SBU) If the UN agencies and international donors continue to 
pursue a possible Track 3 approach with the GNU, the international 
community must outline and enforce greater checks and balances with 
the Sudanese government.  After all, it is certainly unusual that 
the Sudanese government, which is a party to the conflict, and its 
President, who is wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
now are providing aid to the victims of the conflict.  Indeed, this 
situation undermines key elements of humanitarian assistance 
neutrality and integrity.  During the last six years, the Sudanese 
government has repeatedly used internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
to further its political agenda, and there is no reason to think 
that this will change given the new operating environment. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000466  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU) With fewer organizations on the ground, and increased 
limitations for those humanitarian NGOs remaining, monitoring 
capacity is significantly diminished and IDPs are increasingly 
vulnerable to manipulation and abuse.  This is of particular concern 
given the current situation in South Darfur.  There key UN agencies 
charged with monitoring population movements and verifying camp 
populations and voluntary returns remain unable to deploy 
international staff and carry out their essential mission,  which 
consists of helping  aid agencies target beneficiaries and confirm 
the integrity of humanitarian assistance. 
 
¶19.  (U) Moving forward, international donors must recognize and 
adapt to a new and evolving role in the landscape of humanitarian 
assistance in Sudan.  In addition, all parties need to understand 
that the relationship between the Sudanese government and the 
international donors must change if any of the proposed tracks stand 
a chance of success.  Post believes that much of the proposed new 
architecture as presented by OCHA makes sense, is important, and 
should be supported.  However,  we realize that the history of new 
architecture agreements in Sudan leading to rule based and more 
efficient humanitarian services is not positive or encouraging. 
 
FERNANDEZ