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Viewing cable 09KAMPALA430, UGANDA/DRC: CAPTURED LRA OFFICER TELLS HIS STORY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KAMPALA430 2009-04-28 10:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kampala
VZCZCXRO0765
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0430/01 1181043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281043Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1360
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0795
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0056
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0534
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3565
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 000430 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USAID AND OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PREF MOPS MARR UG SU CG CT
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: CAPTURED LRA OFFICER TELLS HIS STORY 
 
KAMPALA 00000430  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. Summary:  The following is the account of Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA) Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo, who was injured and captured by the 
Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) on February 3 during a 
firefight.  Kwoyelo had been a senior officer until LRA leader 
Joseph Kony decided to execute LRA deputy leader, Vincent Otti, and 
arrest other LRA members who supported the peace process in October 
2007.  Though Kwoyelo's account does not offer much new information, 
he confirms that the UPDF-led regional military action called 
Operation Lightening Thunder (now called Rudia II) has disrupted the 
LRA's communications and command and control because of fears on the 
part of Kony of using satellite telephones.  Kwoyelo detailed 
Sudanese training and equipment received prior to the signing the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in January 2005.  Kwyolo also said 
that Kony is not interested in making a peace deal.  Finally, 
Kwoyelo's story corroborates other accounts of humane treatment of 
captured and rescued escapees by the UPDF.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - 
BACKGROUND 
- - - - - - 
 
2.  Els De Temmerman, an internationally recognized journalist 
interviewed captured LRA Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo.  The following is 
the majority of the New Vision interview of Kwoyelo, the former 
commander of the Sinia Brigade of the LRA that ran on April 26 
entitled "I May Have Been Shot By My Own Brother".  Begin text: 
"Colonel" Thomas Kwoyelo, the former commander of the Sinia Brigade 
of the Lord's Resistance Army, was injured and captured on February 
3 by the joint forces of Uganda, Congo and Southern Sudan.  He 
talked to Els De Temmerman. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
SUDANESE SUPPORT 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  Q:  When did you first go to Sudan? 
 
A:  I went there in 1997.  But other groups had gone earlier.  There 
was a brief cease-fire in 1993 when the first peace talks took place 
in Cwero Sub-county.  That is when a group, led by Second-in-Command 
Komakech, started going to Sudan.  Komakech later died in a Khartoum 
hospital. 
 
4.  Q:  What kind of support did you get from the Government of 
Khartoum? 
 
A:  We received three trucks of food every month.  Later it was 
reduced to two trucks.  As for weapons and ammunition, but the time 
I arrived, there were already a lot of supplies.  The Khartoum 
government trained us on how to use the big guns.  We were taught 
how to use SPG9 and B10 bombs.  The training took place in an open 
space in Juba.  We also received a SAM7 anti-aircraft gun and 12.7mm 
guns.  As for ammunition, they would bring us one or two trucks of 
cartridges and bullets on a regular basis.  Contacts with the 
Khartoum Government passed through the LRA ambassador, called Lt. 
Col. Kayeng, who was based in Juba. 
 
5.  Q:  Up to when did you receive supplies from Khartoum? 
 
A:  When Southern Sudan got autonomy (in January 2005), the supply 
line was cut off. 
 
6.  Q:  There are reports that units went to collect arms from the 
Central African Republic and that there were airdrops in Congo. 
 
A:  I cannot confirm those reports.  At least I did not witness any 
of that. 
 
7.  Q:  How do you explain the new uniforms and arms Kony displayed 
during the peace talks? 
 
A:  I was still held up in southern Sudan when the talks started.  I 
found the new uniforms and guns upon arrival in Garamba.  When I 
asked where they came from, I was told they had been seized during a 
clash with the UN forces. 
 
8.  Q:  Many people wonder how Kony was able to sustain his 
rebellion for all this time.  Apart from Khartoum, where else did he 
get support from? 
 
A:  When the rift between Kony and (his deputy, Vincent) Otti 
occurred and Otti was killed, Kony ordered his troops to go back to 
 
KAMPALA 00000430  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sudan and unearth ammunition we had buried there.  Although part of 
it had been removed by the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF), 
some was brought back to the camp.  Kony also received money and 
phones from delegations who visited him in Garamba.  Some of the 
money was used to buy tents, gumboots, soap and other things. 
 
9.  Q:  Did you hear the name Olara Otunnu (former UN Deputy 
Secretary-General) mentioned in the LRA? 
 
A:  I heard that name around 1996, when our relations with the 
Khartoum Government were still intact and Otti Lagony was still 
alive.  I was told he came and met Kony.  We were living in 
homesteads in southern Sudan at the time.  But I don't know who he 
was or why he came. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
KONY EXECUTES DEPUTY, ARRESTS KWOYELO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  Q:  Did you witness the execution of Vincent Otti? 
 
A:  I did not see it because I was arrested just before Otti's 
arrest.  But I heard the gunshots.  Otti was killed together with 
Ben Accelam and Otim Record.  All of us were accused of being in 
favor of the peace talks and wanting to surrender to the Government 
of Uganda.  Kony believed the talks were a way to get him out and 
have him arrested.  He considered all those who were for peace talks 
as enemies. 
 
11.  Q:  What exactly happened to you? 
 
A:  I was disarmed, blindfolded and tied for one week.  All my 
escorts were disarmed, tied and put in different camps.  Later, they 
were distributed to different units.  I spent about one year in 
detention in First Brigade in Garamba and was then kept as a 
prisoner in Kony's Central Brigade.  Up to the day I got shot, on 
February 3, 2009, I was under arrest. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
12.  Q:  What did you do on December 14, 2008, when your camp was 
attacked by the joint forces of Congo, Uganda and Southern Sudan? 
 
A:  I was taken along with Kony's group.  They would give me a gun 
before we started marching and take it away from me every evening. 
We had been prepared for the joint offensive.  A day earlier, Kony 
called all his officers and addressed them.  "Everybody should know 
that there will be war," he told us.  The Congolese, Ugandan and 
Southern Sudanese forces would jointly attack.  He also said the war 
would be from the air. 
 
13.  Q:  How did Kony know? 
 
A:  He told us God had spoken to him.  He insisted he had received a 
vision of what was going to happen.  When one of the commanders 
asked whether we should not leave the camp, he said "God had told 
him we would be punished if we vacated the camp."  "Everybody should 
stay," he said. "The planes will come and bomb but nobody will die." 
 The next morning, at around 9:00 a.m., four gunships came.  They 
bombed until around midday.  In all those bombings, I never saw a 
dead body. 
 
14.  Q:  How did you survive that attack? 
 
A:  Kony mobilized everybody and we moved northwards in a big group. 
 After two days, he addressed us in the wilderness.  He ordered us 
to abduct as many as possible since the Congolese and Sudanese had 
agreed to fight him together with Uganda.  "If even Jesus abducted 
his disciples, why not me?" he said.  He then mixed all the units, 
separated them into small groups of 5, 10 up to 25 and sent them in 
all directions.  Kony, together with his wives and about 50 escorts, 
set off following the trail we had come from.  I have not seen him 
since. 
 
15. Q:  When did you last see Kony's deputy, Okot Odhiambo? 
 
A:  I last saw him the day Vincent Otti was killed, on October 2, 
2007.  I don't know where he is. 
 
16.  Q:  How did Operation Lightning Thunder affect the LRA? 
 
KAMPALA 00000430  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
A:  All military assemblies were suspended.  There were no more 
fixed camps.  Every small group was mobile all the time.  The 
communication among the groups was also disrupted.  Kony no longer 
used Thuraya satellite phones.  If he did, he said, he would be shot 
within seconds by a MIG jet fighter.  He is only using radio calls 
these days but very irregularly.  He could switch off for three 
weeks.  As a result, the control and command structures were 
disorganized.  It had become difficult for Kony to give orders. 
 
17.  Q:  Why did the commanders of those small units not seize this 
opportunity to escape? 
 
A:  They fear the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Kony told us 
every LRA commander was on the ICC list.  Reports that only three 
commanders were indicted were propaganda, he said. "If you leave, 
the ICC will be waiting for you," he kept telling us.  We believed 
him.  Kony is very convincing.  Only now that I am out do I realize 
that the reality is very different. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
KWOYELO CAPTURED 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
18.  Q:  How did you come out? 
 
A:  I was in a smaller unit belonging to Central Brigade.  We were 
only 20 members, including four women.  The brigade commander had 
told us we were going to meet Kony's head of security.  We slept in 
the bush near Duru (a Congolese village) the night before.  When we 
started walking the next morning, we ran into the combined forces. 
I was the second in line.  The first, a young boy was shot dead.  As 
I tried to run away, I got a bullet in the back which came out 
through my belly.  Two boys tried to carry me but they could not 
cross the river.  They removed my gun and left me behind.  I felt 
like my soul had left my body.  I must have passed out.  At around 
11:00 a.m. I heard voices, followed by three gunshots.  A group of 
UPDF soldiers was following the trail of blood.  I waited until one 
of them was very close.  Then I called out to him.  He ran away and 
returned with the rest of his unit.  They surrounded me.  One 
soldier who spoke Acholi asked my name.  I said I was Kwoyelo.  He 
then asked where I was from.  They ordered me to come forward with 
my hands up.  I crawled towards them, trying to raise my hands. 
 
When they saw the blood oozing from my wound, they said: "Wait, we 
shall come for you." They asked where my gun was and I told them it 
had been taken away.  They spread an army fatigue on the ground and 
carried me onto it.  At that moment, I saw my older cousin-brother, 
Aranja, who is a soldier in UPDF.  He had not recognized me since I 
had been abducted when I was very young.  I told him the names of 
his father and sister and we hugged.  It was a very emotional 
moment.  They took me to their camp, put me on a drip and gave me 
porridge and tea.  All along, I have been treated well by the UPDF. 
 
19.  Q:  Reports say you were in charge of the killing of 10 
students of Jimmy SSekasi hotel school in 2001. 
 
A:  This is not true.  Accelam Smart, who was then a major, was the 
commander of the operation.  Some LRA members had gone to loot food 
in Koch Sub-county.  The civilians had captured them and killed one 
of them.  Smart then ordered massive killings of civilians.  I was 
in Palaro when it happened. 
 
20.  Q:  How do you feel about the atrocities committed by the LRA? 
 
A:  I feel bad.  My own uncle and his three children were killed by 
the LRA.  My situation in the bush was like that of a dog and his 
master.  When you tell a dog to do something, it will act as 
instructed.  All orders came from Kony.  He was the chairman.  He 
ordered attacks, abductions, ambushes.  It was upon the individual 
commander to show restraint or exaggerate.  When you were ordered to 
ambush a vehicle and return with money and goods, it was up to the 
commander to kill all the passengers or to keep some alive.  But it 
was impossible to question any of Kony's orders.  He would believe 
you were against him and kill you. 
 
21.  Q:  What do you want to do now? 
 
A:  I want to join the UPDF. 
 
- - - - - 
COMMENT 
 
KAMPALA 00000430  004 OF 004 
 
 
- - - - - 
 
22.  Kwoyelo's fate remains uncertain.  Our political contacts tell 
us that he will receive amnesty, but some military officers say they 
want Kwoyelo tried because he was fighting when he was captured. 
Kwoyelo's humane treatment confirms other accounts of the UPDF's 
respect for human rights during the operation. 
HOOVER