VZCZCXRO4145
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0996/01 1101331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201331Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8538
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000996 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL, INL/AP, SCA, AF 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS:   DRUG USE IN THE ANP 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Pervasive illicit drug use remains a serious 
impediment to building an effective Afghan National Police (ANP) 
force.  Testing of incoming recruits at ANP Regional Training 
Centers (RTC) show an average 17% positive return (primarily THC, 
but also opiates), comparable to national levels of drug use by the 
Afghan adult population.  In response, several Regional Training 
Centers recently initiated a pilot program to provide medical 
assistance for physically addicted police students during the most 
recent classes; results are still pending.  End Summary. 
 
TESTING THE TRAINEES: 
--------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Drug testing at the Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for 
Afghan National Police (ANP) students began in May 2008.   All 
students are tested by the U.S. in-processing teams for THC, opiates 
and amphetamines during in-processing.  While individual class rates 
vary from 4% to 38%, on average roughly 17% test positive. There is 
a general trend for students from the southern and western regions 
to test positive at higher rates than their northern counterparts, 
and the rates are considerably lower for students in the classes 
that have a literacy requirement.   THC is by far the most commonly 
abused drug; opiate use accounts for approximately 5% of the 
positive test results. 
 
¶3. (SBU) There is general agreement within the GIROA that all 
students testing positive for any illegal drugs should be summarily 
dismissed from the RTCs and the police force.  As with most things 
in Afghanistan, however, the manner in which this problem is 
addressed is more nuanced. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), which 
oversees the ANP, currently admits students into police training who 
test positive only for THC, but rejects those who test positive for 
opiates.  Any member of the ANP who fails a second drug test of any 
kind is supposed to be dismissed automatically.   Effectively 
implementing even this policy is problematic, however, as 
responsibility for dismissing police staff rests with regional 
Afghan commanders.    In many cases, test results are either ignored 
by the Afghan police commanders at the RTC and the students remain 
in training, or they're sent home, but remain untrained members of 
their district's police unit. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition, obtaining accurate testing results is 
complicated by the rapid metabolism rate of opium-based drugs.  Many 
students who are addicted to opium reportedly quit taking the drugs 
a few days before reporting to the RTCs.  Even though they're 
clearly experiencing excruciating withdrawal symptoms, they may not 
test positive, so there's no objective basis on for  dismissal. 
 
WHY SO HIGH?: 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Several factors contribute to the high rate of illegal drug 
use among police recruits.   In much of Afghanistan, for example, 
smoking hash is as socially accepted as drinking tea.  Also, 
opium-based drugs are widely used in Afghanistan in place of the 
non-narcotic painkillers available in Western nations.  These often 
traditional medications are extremely easy to obtain, unregulated, 
and can lead quickly to physical addiction.  The addiction starts 
early - mothers quickly learn a teething baby is soothed if given a 
poppy pod to chew on, and a bit of opium in milk or tea calms a 
crying child. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Unsophisticated police recruiting methods are also partly 
responsible for the relatively high drug use rates among trainees. 
In the basic police courses, in which literacy is not a requirement, 
police recruits are more likely to be conscripts than volunteers. 
Village elders are often given a quota to fill for their districts, 
and young men are ordered into the ANP accordingly for a two-year 
contract.   As a rule, the police recruits are vetted through the 
local police districts and the Ministry of Interior before they're 
permitted onto the RTCs for training, but at this point in the 
police development program, there is no central recruiting center 
that can screen the recruits before they're admitted into the ranks 
of the ANP, or provide treatment for them. 
 
REHABILITATION EFFORTS: 
----------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) On a more positive note, there is evidence to suggest that 
rehabilitation efforts in a controlled environment, such as an RTC, 
can be effective.  Positive peer pressure to the effect that "good 
 
KABUL 00000996  002 OF 002 
 
 
Islamists don't do drugs" - a message uneducated recruits may be 
hearing for the first time - has shown to be an effective motivator. 
 Also, the controlled RTC setting provides a good opportunity to 
address physical addiction originating from poor medical treatment 
early in the addict's life (see para 5.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) In February 2009, short-term drug rehabilitation "pilot 
programs" were put in place in four RTCs, with funding provided by 
the British government.  At the same time, in-processing at these 
RTCs was extended from three to seven days to accommodate the 
program, during which  British-trained Afghans provided on-site 
medical care for the students exhibiting withdrawal symptoms, and 
made available education classes for all the police trainees. 
 
¶9. (SBU) There are several advantages to providing on-site care 
programs before classes begin.  Withdrawal symptoms from opium can 
be quite severe, and students going through withdrawal previously 
had disrupted entire classes.  Such students also often required 
hospitalization - hospitalization that was frequently unavailable, 
or exposed the students and RTC staff to the dangers of nighttime 
travel from the RTCs.  Finally, ensuring a student is drug- and 
agony-free before weapons training is always a good thing. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Unfortunately, British funding for the RTC-based medical 
care and education pilot program was limited, and other sources will 
be required to continue the program at the four target RTCs and/or 
to expand it further.  Embassy Kabul and CSTC-A are currently 
exploring other possible funding sources for the program. 
 
RICCIARDONE