VZCZCXRO2171
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0963/01 1070613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170613Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8438
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000963 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: Zabul residents say "Show us the COIN!" 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The expansion of Forward Operating 
Base Wolverine in Zabul is at the heart of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.  To mitigate the 
negative effects of building a massive International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military installation 
within the center of an insurgent area in an already 
unstable province, coalition forces are using a variety 
of tools to win the support of local communities, promote 
the Afghan government, and blunt the impact for a handful 
of landowners who lost their fields.  Zabul presents a 
tough environment: low levels of literacy and high levels 
of poverty (even by Afghan standards), and a stream of 
insurgents flowing through its border from Pakistan. 
ISAF management of the construction and operations of an 
enormous base, with Strykers and helicopters and 
eventually a C-17 airstrip, will directly impact COIN 
efforts in the province.  End Summary. 
 
A tough sell in a tough environment 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) FOB Wolverine lies in the middle of Suri, a 
sub-district in the middle of Zabul, 17 km from Highway 
One, and two hours down a dirt road in a highly kinetic 
area.  It hosts a variety of tribes, but the dominant are 
the Khotaks.  Many local villages passively or actively 
support the Taliban, or are coerced into helping them. 
In the last three months, Wolverine has received more 
enemy fire than any other FOB in the province.  U.S. 
troops mentoring the local Afghan Army Battalion (Kandak) 
as an Embedded Training Team (ETT) note that some areas 
are effectively "no-go zones" for the Afghan National 
Army (ANA).  The Afghan government has historically made 
minimal efforts to extend government control and security 
in the area beyond a major supply route running through 
the center of the area.  A Suri man, Bismillah Khan, 
received international attention in September 2008 when 
the Taliban cut off his ears because he worked for the 
Afghan government as a teacher at the sole local school, 
which is now closed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The decision to expand FOB Wolverine, which 
currently houses a small U.S. ETT team and the 4th 
Kandak, to a facility to house elements of a Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), supporting aviation assets, 
and a C-17 capable airfield, initially terrified the 
local population, who feared an increase in conflicts 
between security forces and resident Taliban.  In January 
and February, many Suri elders repeatedly made the 
journey to the provincial capital Qalat in an attempt to 
dissuade U.S. Forces from the proposed expansion.  In 
addition to attracting insurgents, elders argued that the 
base expansion would result in the loss of their lands 
and destroy their underground irrigation systems, and 
that noise from the airfield would disrupt their daily 
life and frighten their families.  They petitioned then- 
Governor Arman to stop the base expansion, not realizing 
that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) had approved the plans 
in December 2008 and was unlikely to change its decision. 
 
Winning them over, one cup of tea at a time 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Over a series of individual meetings and 
Afghan-style style town hall "shuras" held in Suri and in 
Qalat, coalition forces ranging from the ETT to the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to engineers and 
contracting officers from the construction Task Force 
Remagen in Kandahar worked with the ANA and the Afghan 
government (GIRoA) to assuage local fears and emphasize 
the security and development benefits the expanded base 
would bring.  Coalition forces also rallied the support 
of the provincial authorities to work on land titling 
issues.  RC-South Deputy Commander for Stabilization 
(DCOM STAB) Brigadier General Nicholson personally 
briefed former Governor Arman in January to ensure that 
the provincial government would help address community 
concerns. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In addition to the very real threat of more 
Taliban coming to their communities and demanding shelter 
while they plan or execute their attacks, elders 
expressed two main concerns about the base: 1) on an 
individual level it confiscated the fields from a handful 
of families who may not be compensated by the MOD; and 2) 
on a community level the construction would disrupt the 
"karez" irrigation system and potentially ruin watersheds 
and water tables and add airplane noise to the area. 
 
KABUL 00000963  002 OF 003 
 
 
They also asked that contractors and laborers from Suri 
be given preference over outsiders from "Kandahar or 
Ghazni." 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to residents' concerns, coalition 
forces have used a number of initiatives to build trust, 
push quick-impact development projects and promote the 
Afghan government and ANA presence in Suri.  The result 
has been to change firm opposition to resignation towards 
the inevitable and recognition of the tangible employment 
and development benefits available.  These initiatives 
include: 
 
-- Local Stability Initiatives (LSI):  The Wolverine- 
based ETT has used the small grants mechanism of 
USAID/LGCD Local Stability Initiatives (LSI) to conduct 
seven quick impact projects in key villages around Suri. 
Working closely with their ANA counterparts, LSI allows 
the coalition forces at the site to respond immediately 
to community needs and concerns, and deliver some basic 
services, like cleaning clogged irrigation channels.  An 
ANA officer in Suri noted the success at winning public 
opinion: "Many years ago the United States gave money to 
the Mujahaddin.  Then you gave it to contractors, not 
even the Afghan government.  Now, finally, you are giving 
it to the people." 
 
-- Land Titling Economic Restructuring Activities 
(LTERA):  The USAID/LTERA field visit March 26-30 visit 
culminated in a March 29 provincial government-led 
meeting with Suri elders, provincial officials, LTERA, as 
well as Zabul PRT engineering and civil affairs staff and 
Task Force Remagen to conduct public outreach about the 
expansion, as well as collect documentation from 
communities and individuals.   LTERA recommended 
designing a pilot-project model methodology for 
quantifying the impacts.  This analysis could be provided 
to the appropriate GIRoA officials as deliverables to use 
in the decision process for land compensation packages. 
LTERA also recommended engaging the Ministries of Defense 
and Agriculture on behalf of the provincial government 
and the people.  PRT will help develop some next steps 
for helping the handful of individual landowners seeking 
compensation for their lost production and lands. 
 
-- PRT Commanders' Emergency Response Programs (CERP): 
The PRT distributed humanitarian assistance and 
winter/spring wheat seeds and will continue to monitor 
for opportunities for quick-impact assistance.  CERP 
funding will construct at least three wells, and provide 
a veterinarianQs visit for herders, as well as introduce 
water sanitation and malnutrition rehabilitation programs 
in partnership with the local medical clinic.  Coalition 
forces will continue to propose new projects that benefit 
the communities--schools, mosques, clinic, and wells--in 
conjunction with local authorities. 
 
--  TF Remagen has made several visits to Suri to explain 
the construction process and better understand the 
residents' engineering concerns. The lead airfield 
engineer even accompanied several ANA community 
engagement missions to meet with local tribal leaders, 
gaining a first-hand awareness of local concerns and 
demonstrating a sincere U.S. and GIROA commitment to 
addressing them.  The contracting officer, in 
collaboration with the PRT, met several times with local 
businessmen about the process to bid on various contracts 
connected with the new base.  Additionally, larger 
contractors have been advised to hire local workers and 
the communities have confirmed that more and more jobs on 
the construction site have been made available to them. 
 
-- USACE Hydrology study:  A comprehensive look at the 
water issues at the base site identified areas where base 
expansion, to include a concrete plant and construction 
wells, undermines the counterinsurgency efforts and 
supports Taliban claims that the base will destroy the 
water supply to fields.  The study will help the U.S. 
engineers to make adjustments, and allow the PRT and 
others to tailor their development projects to 
compensating for any damage or disruption. 
 
-- The resident ANA Kandak seized the base expansion as a 
window of opportunity to execute Operation Suri Embrase, 
a COIN-based strategy to win the support of local leaders 
by extending GIROA presence into key villages to address 
village needs, including those created by the expansion 
itself. 
 
KABUL 00000963  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  While no single act will determine 
the success of failure of the new base, taken together, 
the coordinated development projects and public outreach 
represent a wide-ranging interagency approach to COIN in 
the region.  A few unresolved issues could still tip the 
balance of public opinion--including how individual 
compensation is handled by the Afghan government and 
coalition forces, how the procurement process is 
perceived by those who feel entitled to a contract, and 
the base expansion's perceived impact on water resources. 
Despite starting as an unhappy population who threatened 
to take to the hills and "fight like we fought the 
Soviets," the Suri residents are starting to feel the 
benefits of a more engaged Afghan government and a 
coalition serious about local development. 
 
¶8. (U) PRT, ETT, USAID and TF-Remagen all coordinated in 
preparing this cable. 
 
RICCIARDONE