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Viewing cable 09KABUL938, CODEL KYL DISCUSSES SUPPORT FOR 'LEVEL PLAYING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL938 2009-04-15 07:09 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0069
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0938/01 1050709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150709Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8395
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000938 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM OREP AF
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL DISCUSSES SUPPORT FOR 'LEVEL PLAYING 
FIELD' WITH LIKELY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
 
1. (SBU) CODEL Kyl and four likely presidential candidates 
conducted a lively exchange on the upcoming election season, 
focusing on what the international community should do to 
support a level playing field for the August 20 elections. 
The prospective candidates identified the following specific 
concerns: 
 
-- Karzai leveraging the presidency to expand his support and 
undermine opposition candidates 
-- Need for the International Community (IC) to begin 
monitoring election-related irregularities immediately 
-- Need for Karzai to engage in an IC-hosted dialogue with 
the oppposition on level playing field issues 
-- Enactment of Media Law to promote equitable access to media 
-- Security and transportation for candidates 
-- Intimidation of candidates and supporters - either 
directly or through threats of loss of employment 
-- Funding for opposition candidates and scrutiny of foreign 
contributions 
 
CANDIDATES WELCOME STATEMENTS ON NEUTRALITY BUT FEAR THEY ARE 
NOT ENOUGH 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Charge d'Affaires and DCM hosted an April 7th 
lunch between Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Senator Jeff Sessions 
(R-AL), Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), Rep. John Kline, (R-MN), and 
Rep. Chris Carney (D-PA) and likely presidential contenders 
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (United National Front Coalition), Dr. 
Ashraf Ghani (former Finance Minister), Dr. Anwar ul-Haq 
Ahadi (Afghan Social Democrat Party and also former Finance 
Minister) and Mirwais Yaseni, (Deputy Chairman - Lower House 
of Parliament). The candidates raised concerns surrounding 
the August 20 presidential election and the preceding 
campaign season.  Senator Kyl stressed the U.S. did not favor 
any candidate but was committed to an open, credible process 
and, therefore, wanted to do all possible to promote a level 
playing field for candidates. 
 
3. (SBU) The senior Afghan pols welcomed the U.S.'s regular 
reiteration of our neutrality on candidates.  Yaseni observed 
that the U.S. siding with any candidate would threaten the 
credibility of the election and potentially undermine 
Afghanistan's fragile democracy.  Abdullah feared such 
statements would not be enough to convince the Afghan people 
that Karzai was not still the U.S. candidate.  Hope in the 
President had faded, but the people still looked to the U.S. 
for guidance.  Abdullah emphasized the need for the U.S. in 
particular to find a way to convince Afghans, through actions 
as well as words, that Karzai was no longer the West's 
candidate. 
 
IF IC WAITS FOR ELECTION DAY TO ACT, IT WILL BE TOO LATE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
4. (SBU) These potential candidates said the international 
community must begin to move now if it wants to ensure a 
credible election.  They were unanimous in urging the U.S. to 
work with the international community (IC) to focus 
immediately on addressing and deterring campaign 
irregularities and abuse of presidential power. "The time has 
passed," Ahadi said, "for calling for measures to secure a 
free, fair process -- it is time to implement such measures" 
or chances for a credible election could be lost before the 
campaign really begins.  Ghani insisted the IC had to stop 
thinking in terms of "if there were campaign violations" and 
instead decide what measures to take when they did occur. 
Clear guidance would need to be in place to react effectively 
when "campaigners are beaten by members of the national 
security apparatus." 
 
5. (SBU) Ghani worried less about election day than the day 
after, if Afghans did not see the process as credible: "We 
don't want to be another Zimbabwe or Kenya." Ghani added 
that, "The next president of Afghanistan will have one of the 
most difficult jobs on earth.  Without a legitimate mandate, 
his or her ability to govern will be very low." 
 
KARZAI ALREADY MOVING TO OUTFLANK POTENTIAL OPPONENTS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6. (SBU) The potential challengers asserted that President 
Karzai had already begun to leverage his office to promote 
his re-election and undermine his opponents.  They accused 
Karzai of wielding his authority to appoint senior GIRoA 
officials, directing government officials to act on his 
behalf and exploiting the influence of provincial governors 
he had appointed.  The politicians declared: "We have no 
warlords, no weapons, no helicopters, no treasury." 
 
7. (SBU) Ambassador Ricciardone told the group that President 
 
KABUL 00000938  002 OF 003 
 
 
Karzai had informed CODEL Kyl that he would sign a degree 
forbidding interference by government entities, civil 
servants, police, etc. in the election process.   Karzai 
asserted that 14 officials had been warned to stop such 
activities - only one had been a Karzai supporter.  The 
President declared that if any of the 14 were to be 
prosecuted he would want it to be his supporter, to set an 
example.  Karzai's potential opponents dismissed this 
anecdote - questioning the small number mentioned.  Yaseni 
had already received reports of intimidation of MPs and was 
aware of one representative who brought Karzai 25,000 copies 
of voter registration cards from the representative's 
district, 8,000 of which, Yaseni asserted, were clearly 
fraudulent.  Ahadi and Abdullah also claimed Karzai had 
already begun using his office to campaign - with provincial 
Governors talking up Karzai and seeking to block opposition 
organizers and other government officials bringing pressures 
to bear on constituents and employees.  Ahadi insisted 
intimidation had begun, with officials or employers calling 
supporters to question their participation at political 
gatherings, with the implication their jobs were at risk. 
 
MISSING PIECE: IC-HOSTED DIALOGUE BETWEEN KARZAI AND 
OPPOSITION 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (SBU) Abdullah and Ahadi, fully supported by Ghani and 
Yaseni, identified a critical need to establish a dialogue 
between the Palace and the opposition to discuss such level 
playing field measures and reach some IC-brokered agreement. 
The Afghans stressed the IC would need to be an active 
participant to ensure progress and fairness.  Abdullah said 
this dialogue was "the missing piece" that would allow the 
electoral process to move forward by addressing the many 
issues of concern to all candidates.  Ghani added, "We need 
agreement among us now on the rules of the game." 
 
"LOST" MEDIA LAW MUST BE IMPLEMENTED 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Abdullah raised the urgent need to enact the Media 
Law. Parliament had passed it, overriding a Presidential 
veto, and yet the Palace had "shelved" it instead of 
publishing it as law.  Abdullah deemed the government's 
assertion that the law had been "lost" to be absurd.  The 
Media Law, the potential candidates agreed, was critical to 
ensuring equal access to Afghan media for the candidates. 
 
SECURITY AND TRANSPORTATION FOR CANDIDATES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU)  The politicians were concerned about personal 
protection, but saw few good options. The government has said 
the National Directorate for Security (NDS) - Afghanistan's 
intelligence agency - would likely have responsibilty for 
candidate protection, but this offered little comfort to the 
potential challengers.  Abdullah, with the others nodding in 
agreement, said the arrangement was not workable as "we fear 
our own security organizations." 
 
11. (SBU) As for transportation, the politicians were more 
sanguine though they ruefully acknowledge Karzai will likely 
use ANSF helicopters and security to move around Afghanistan 
throughout the campaign season.  Yaseni approaches the 
challenges of getting around from a practical stand point. 
If possible to drive or fly, he would.  If not, he would 
reach out by telephone or through local representatives.  He 
pointed out that all of the candidates could get to the most 
important regional population centers.  He did not intend to 
let transportation challenges stand in his way. 
 
12. (SBU) Rep. Kline said providing security and 
transportation for candidates was extremely important, but 
that it would be logistically difficult, if not impossible, 
to provide such support for a large field of candidates.  He 
suggested that at some point early in the campaign someone - 
whether the UN or NGOs - should develop an authoritative list 
of major contenders and ensure they had the necessary support. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION ORGANIZATIONS CRITICAL TO OVERSIGHT 
AND LEGITIMACY OF ELECTION PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
13. (SBU) Rep. Harman asked about international organizations 
devoted to promoting fair elections, noting these 
organizations had the experience and credibility to provide 
effective guidance to the process.  The Charge informed the 
Codel that the National Democratic Institute and the 
International Republican Institute were both here working on 
elections.  And a series of six debates was being planned 
with the help of the Chamber of Commerce.  Ghani also noted 
 
KABUL 00000938  003 OF 003 
 
 
the IC was helping to identify and encourage the 
participation of international election observers - essential 
to certifying the outcome as legitimate.  He noted the UN was 
helpful but needed more election staff.  The IEC needed more 
staff and more capacity.  The DCM advised the group that the 
U.S. would soon be sending Ambassador Tim Carney, an 
experienced diplomat who had worked on elections in many 
difficult environments.  Ambassador Carney would bring a 
sizeable team to assist with election coordination.  (Amb. 
Carney and team completed an initial assessment visit in late 
March.)  The DCM also noted the EU and OSCE would be sending 
assessment teams very soon, to develop plans for election 
observation missions.  Additionally, local NGO Free and Fair 
Elections Afghanistan (FEFA) had been receiving international 
support to monitor the elections process and field observers. 
 
 
 
THE "INVISIBLE PRIMARY" - WILL THE OPPOSITION UNITE? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
14. (SBU) Rep. Harman asked the four candidates if they 
weren't concerned about splitting the opposition vote.  The 
Afghan leaders laughed and agreed this was a topic of much 
discussion currently. Ghani said there was an "invisible 
primary" taking place, referring to opposition blocs 
negotiating in attempts to gain unified support for their own 
candidates.  Senator Kyl urged the opposition leaders to join 
forces on these issues, specifically in uniting to present 
their concerns publicly - especially regarding voter fraud or 
campaign irregularities - to the international press.  He 
noted international media could bring a greater level of 
pressure on the government than either the Afghans or the 
U.S. alone.  He acknowledged the Afghans' point that local 
media generally did not take an investigative approach, but 
reiterated that the international press, such as BBC and 
Reuters, would investigate - they just needed someone to 
point them towards the story. 
 
15. (U) CODEL Kyl did not clear on this message. 
 
RICCIARDONE