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Viewing cable 09KABUL902, Badghis' New Governor Takes Tough Stance

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL902 2009-04-11 07:53 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5868
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0902/01 1010753
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110753Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8332
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000902 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER AF
SUBJECT:  Badghis' New Governor Takes Tough Stance 
 
Ref:  Kabul 841 
 
1. (U) Summary.  Governor Dilbar Jan Arman, former Zabul governor, 
took up his new position as governor of Badghis on March 28.  During 
his first week in office, Arman met with line ministers, government 
employees, tribal elders and other important actors in the province, 
including the Regional Command and the Spanish-led Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT).  Arman has been forceful in his initial 
round of meetings, placing an emphasis on anti-corruption, 
anti-insurgency, and anti-narcotics activities.  First impressions 
of Governor Arman have been positive despite efforts by those loyal 
to former Governor Mohammad Ashraf Naseri to discredit him. 
Military and civilian elements of the PRT are concerned that 
Governor Arman, who is accustomed to the greater resources of a 
U.S.-led PRT and maneuver unit, has unrealistic expectations of the 
capacities the PRT has available to assist him.  An early test of 
the governor's skills will be his management of the organizational 
and security challenges surrounding the August elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (U) Governor Arman, a Pashtun from Khost, was appointed governor 
of Badghis Province in early March in a governor "swap" with former 
Badghis Governor Mohammad Ashraf Naseri.  During his first week on 
the job, Arman established his agenda with tough talk and clear 
priorities.  He met with his deputy, line ministers, government 
employees, tribal elders, the Spanish-led PRT, and Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF). 
 
3. (U) Arman has set a no-nonsense tone with local officials in the 
course of his meetings.  For example, the governor ended a 
Provincial Development Council (PDC) meeting after only ten minutes, 
when it became obvious line ministers were ill-prepared despite 
prior written instructions.  The governor said he would never again 
tolerate this lack of preparation.  Line ministers were stunned as 
they left the shortest PDC meeting in recent memory.  In a separate 
meeting with tribal elders from Taliban-plagued Bala Murghab 
district, he told officials and elders that he held them accountable 
for their communities, and even went so far as to say that he would 
not accept the usual excuse that the Taliban are outsiders over whom 
they have no control.  Arman warned others that insurgents face 
waning days in Badghis Province.  The governor emphasized getting 
rid of the Taliban and countering its propaganda is not enough, and 
that the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
must voice its vision for the future of the province in order to 
replace Taliban control. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition to his strong message to GIRoA officials, Arman 
consistently preached a mantra of inclusion of all residents of the 
province in the future of Badghis, not just Pashtuns (as the former 
governor had done).  His message is sure to threaten some local 
officials and power brokers who benefitted from the corrupt 
administration of Governor Naseri and are now without a benefactor, 
including the deputy governor who is from a different political 
party.  They may attempt to discredit the governor by circulating 
rumors of Arman's alleged corruption in Zabul and the local protests 
that spurred his removal.  For now, the public seems to be taking a 
"wait and see" approach to the governor. 
 
5. (U) The governor pressed GIRoA and Coalition Forces (CF) to 
proactively pursue drug traffickers and Taliban rather than merely 
react to their operations.  During a meeting with tribal elders and 
the PRT, he pressed the ANSF and CF to provide more security for the 
construction of the Sang-Atesh to Akazai road and the Qadis to 
Jawand road, telling them that if workers are attacked, they need to 
strike back forcefully.  These comments reportedly left PRT 
Commander Sarabia speechless.  Arman also made it clear that he 
intends to offer more direction to the PRT and AECID (Spanish 
development agency) on how to spend money in the province. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Arman is off to a positive start, and his stated priority 
of fighting endemic corruption in the provincial government could be 
a welcome contrast to the former governor.  He will need to look 
close to home if he seeks to root out corruption - the deputy 
governor, several line ministers, the head of the provincial 
council, and even the capital's mayor all have alleged links to 
corruption in some form.  His push for ANSF and CF to clean out 
Taliban strongholds in Bala Murghab, Qadis and Moqur districts will 
be resisted by some Pashtun leaders at the national and provincial 
levels, possibly earning him more enemies in the province.  The 
governor must watch his traditional allies just as close.  He will 
have to watch officials from his own Hezb-e Islami party (including 
his office director, the Chief Judge, and Mohammad Omer Nezami, a 
powerful community leader) who may attempt to abuse political 
connections with the governor for their own benefit, which would 
taint his tenure.  Thus far, his only trusted ally is his 25-year 
 
KABUL 00000902  002 OF 002 
 
 
old secretary, a man without experience in the province. 
 
7. (SBU) Finally, the governor may not fully appreciate the lesser 
capacities of the Spanish-led PRT, compared to the U.S. PRT to which 
he was accustomed in Qalat.  The Spanish have attempted to reduce 
Arman's expectations, telling him their PRT has limited capacity to 
provide security and development aid compared to the United States. 
The August elections will be an early test of Arman's ability to 
manage these competing powers.  He will face security and 
organizational challenges to make sure they play out without major 
incidents. 
 
RICCIARDONE