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Viewing cable 09KABUL881, DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL881 2009-04-08 10:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2385
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0881/01 0981024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081024Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8297
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000881 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KDEM AF
 
SUBJECT:  DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA 
 
1.  (SBU) Deputy Secretary Jacob Lew, accompanied by CDA Francis J. 
Ricciardone and DCM Christopher W. Dell, met Balkh Provincial 
Governor Atta Mohammed Noor in the governor's office on April 3. 
They discussed development assistance to northern Afghanistan, the 
governor's vision for Balkh province, the proposed opening of an 
embassy office in Mazar-e Sharif, the governor's frustration with 
the Swedish-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar, and 
security and stability in the north. 
 
2.  (U) Governor Atta began the meeting by thanking the United 
States for its continued strong military and development assistance 
to Afghanistan in spite of the heavy loss of life its troops have 
suffered.  He saw the visit of the Deputy Secretary as removing what 
he called a "feeling of isolation from the United States" in the 
north.  Atta said that Afghanistan and the U.S. are "natural 
friends" fighting a common enemy in the Taliban.  He said that the 
northern people's expectations were very high since they believed 
that as the first group of Afghans to fight the Taliban, they would 
be the first to receive assistance from the U.S., but "that did not 
happen." 
 
3.  (U) Deputy Secretary Lew reaffirmed the importance to the U.S. 
of demonstrating interest throughout all regions of Afghanistan.  He 
said the U.S. is looking forward to continued cooperation with 
Governor Atta to take advantage of peaceful conditions in the north. 
 The Deputy Secretary told Governor Atta the U.S. is proud to 
participate in the Swedish-led PRT and to support development 
projects in the area. 
 
4.  (U) Governor Atta noted that despite the progress made with ISAF 
support over the past seven years in furthering peace and security 
in Balkh and the region, many development projects remain 
unrealized.  While acknowledging that the Afghan government bears 
responsibility for the slow pace of development in the north, the 
international community is also to blame due to the lack of 
attention it pays to stable provinces like Balkh.  Atta said that 
despite his outreach to the central government and international 
donors, he has not been successful at drawing their development 
dollars.  He accused Iran of not supporting Afghanistan with 
development assistance because of Afghanistan's ties to the West. 
Atta said the Russians do not help because of the role the 
mujahideen played in fighting the Soviets.  And the U.S., Atta said, 
channels its assistance to those areas in the south and east 
afflicted by insurgency.  He asked rhetorically why tension and 
violence should be preconditions for receiving development 
assistance. 
 
5.  (U) Atta continued by naming the successes Balkh has achieved in 
the areas of poppy eradication, disarmament, disbandment of illegal 
armed groups, and rule of law.  Balkh was also the first province to 
develop a five-year development plan, he said.  He called upon the 
U.S. to revise what he termed its policy of pouring resources into 
areas where there are active insurgencies while ignoring stable 
provinces in the north.  Atta would like to see Balkh become a model 
of development for the rest of the country and a hub for military 
operations given its central location in the region.  While Atta 
supports the government's centralized funding system in which money 
to provincial line departments trickles down from central government 
ministries, he believes that some ministries lack the requisite 
administrative capacity to do this effectively.  He suggested that 
in provinces that have high capacity, good planning and permissive 
security environments, donors should directly fund projects from 
provincial development plans rather than send their development 
assistance through the central government. 
 
6.  (U) Atta expressed his pleasure at what he termed the decision 
of the U.S. to open an office in Mazar-e Sharif, and said he hopes 
that it will be a permanent facility, not a temporary container 
village.  He then turned his attention to the reconstruction work 
being conducted by PRTs, citing the work being done by the Czechs in 
Logar, the Italians in Herat, and the Canadians in Kandahar as fine 
examples.  Atta was pointed in his criticism of the British during 
their control of the PRT in Mazar, and of the Swedes, who now head 
it, chastising both for not having done reconstruction in the 
north. 
 
7.  (U) Helping to bring about relative security and stability in 
the north is the biggest achievement for the international 
community, Atta maintained.  He added that if the international 
community fails to build on those successes and the situation 
deteriorates in stable provinces, then it will have little to show 
for its efforts over the past seven years. 
 
8.  (U) The Deputy Secretary said he would carry the governor's 
message back to Washington, and noted that while we had begun 
initial  planning, the decision to open an embassy office in Mazar 
was not yet final.  He went on to thank Atta for his efforts at 
 
KABUL 00000881  002 OF 002 
 
 
promoting poppy eradication, highlighting the $1 million Balkh 
received just one day earlier from the U.S.-funded Good Performers 
Initiative for maintaining poppy-free status in the province.  The 
Deputy noted that President Obama's Strategic Review calls for the 
U.S. to focus its efforts in southern and eastern Afghanistan, but 
that the U.S. also wants to remain involved in other parts of the 
country, especially in Mazar, where there have been many positive 
developments to be proud of in recent years.  Through the Strategic 
Review, the U.S. is reaffirming its friendship and long-term 
commitment to GIRoA and its people. 
 
9.  (U) The Deputy told Atta that he had come from the Hague 
Conference at which the U.S. asked other donors to step up their 
development assistance to Afghanistan.  All the problems facing 
Afghanistan cannot be dealt with simultaneously by the U.S., and 
that is why more coalition support is needed. 
 
10. (U) The Deputy Secretary did not have an opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
 
RICCIARDONE