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Viewing cable 09KABUL839, AFGHANISTAN LAND TRANSPORT SECTOR PART 1:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL839 2009-04-03 10:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8701
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0839/01 0931043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031043Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8191
INFO RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC 0136
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0770
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000839 
 
DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS FOR AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DELANEY AND DEANGELIS 
DEPT PASS OPIC 
DEPT PASS FOR TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR MHIRSON, ABAUKOL, AWELLER, AND MNUGENT 
COMMERCE FOR DEES, CHOPPIN, AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958 N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV EAID ELTN ETRD AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN LAND TRANSPORT SECTOR PART 1: 
OVERVIEW OF ROAD AND RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
REF: A) KABUL 705, B) KABUL 782, C) KABUL 784 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and Introduction:  Construction on regional and 
provincial roads is ongoing in Afghanistan with an estimated 5,000 
km of roads constructed since 2001.  The international community has 
provided a total of USD 2.4 billion in aid for road construction. 
The Ring Road is nearly complete, and all of the link roads to the 
borders are complete.  Japan expects to finish a portion of the Ring 
Road in Kandahar and Helmand in May, and the Asian Development Bank 
has given its Chinese contractor until the beginning of 2010 to 
complete a 143 km stretch of the Ring Road in the Northeast.  Two 
hundred kilometers of the Ring Road from Herat to Qal-e Naw remain 
unfunded.  Provincial roads are poor and few are paved, especially 
in the central provinces.  The rail sector is slowly developing, 
though rail construction is very costly.  Iran has nearly completed 
a 60 km rail link to Herat, and the Iranians and Chinese are rumored 
to have agreed to develop a rail line linking the northeast 
provinces to Herat.  The Afghan government views rail development 
favorably but is focused on developing a 12,000 km network of roads 
in order to make Afghanistan a true transit hub for central Asia. 
However, at the current construction cost of USD 1 million per 
kilometer, such a network would cost an additional USD 7 billion. 
This message is the first in a three-part series.  Separate cables 
address the economic impact and security challenges in the road 
sector and future development of the road and rail sectors.  End 
Summary 
 
****************************** 
Status of Ring Road, Condition 
of Provincial Roads 
****************************** 
 
2. (SBU) Construction of regional and provincial roads is ongoing 
throughout Afghanistan.  Roads are of varying quality, but for the 
majority of Afghans, aside from the Ring Road, roads are unpaved. 
Afghan officials and business leaders note that the lack of paved 
roads and poor quality of existing roads contribute to highway 
security problems, increase transport times, and hamper commercial 
activity in general (septel).  Numerous international donors have 
contributed to Afghanistan's road network, either through direct 
grants to the GIRoA (Saudi Arabia, Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
World Bank, Japan, UAE, Iran), through PRTs (Germany, Italy, Spain), 
or through private sector construction contracts (Turkey, China, US, 
India).  USAID alone has built 40 percent of all roads constructed 
in Afghanistan since 2001.  In a March 17 meeting, Deputy Minister 
of Public Works (MPW) Rasooli told Econoff that between 2001 and 
2008, the international community has provided in total USD 2.4 
billion to construct and rehabilitate 5,000 km of roads, including 
the Ring Road and the nine link roads from it to the international 
borders. 
 
3. (SBU) The 2,100 km Ring Road (RR) is nearly complete.  The 
portions remaining are a Japanese-funded 114 km stretch between 
Kandahar and Lashkar Gah, an ADB-funded, Chinese-constructed 143 km 
stretch linking Qal-e Naw to Maimana in the Northwest, and the still 
unfunded, 200 km stretch between Herat and Qal-e Naw.  On March 25, 
the Japanese Economic Counselor told Econoff that the Japanese 
portion of the RR will be completed by May, if security problems do 
not further delay the project.  In a February 28 meeting, an ADB 
official told Econoff that the Chinese contractor has completed only 
20 percent of the Qal-e Naw-Maimana road in part due to security 
problems (reftel B).  The nine link roads to Afghanistan's borders 
are finished.  MPW estimates that construction of the RR has had 
tremendous effect on trade and travel times (septel).  However, 
without the remaining 200 km stretch in the Northwest, the RR is 
unable to fully perform its intended role as the backbone of 
Afghanistan's transportation system and the principal ground conduit 
for national and international passenger and freight traffic. 
 
4. (SBU) Deputy Minister Rasooli said that the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA) priorities under the 
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) are to complete the Ring 
Road, develop provincial roads, and expand north-south and east-west 
links across Afghanistan to facilitate transit trade.  Rasooli 
believes Afghanistan needs a network of 12,000 km of roads in order 
for Afghanistan to fulfill its potential as a transit hub for the 
region.  However, Rasooli noted, the cost of road construction has 
 
KABUL 00000839  002 OF 003 
 
 
increased dramatically.  Since 2001, road construction costs have 
increased from USD 60,000 to USD 1 million per kilometer.  Rasooli 
told Econoff that it will take 12-15 years for construction of such 
an extensive network and, if the cost of road construction remains 
at USD 1 million per kilometer, the GIRoA will need an additional 
USD 7 billion to fund construction.  (NOTE: Rasooli's estimate 
excludes the additional funding needed for maintenance.  Currently 
MPW has a budget of USD 30-35 million for road construction.  END 
NOTE) 
 
********************************** 
Provincial Roads: Mediocre At Best 
********************************** 
 
5. (SBU) Anecdotal reports from U.S. PRT representatives note that 
provincial roads are a) a priority of the local population and their 
leaders and b) in generally dismal shape.  Herat's governor has told 
PRT officials that asphalting provincial roads, particularly from 
Herat to Cheste Sherif to the Salma dam project, are a high priority 
for security, commerce, and development needs of Herat province.  In 
central Afghanistan roads remain among the most basic infrastructure 
needs.  PRT representatives report that road networks in Bamyan and 
Dai Kundi provinces are extremely poor and are the single most 
important bottleneck for economic development in the central 
highlands.  Currently, there are no paved roads in Ghor and Dai 
Kundi provinces.  Bamyan province has a total of only 3.7 km of 
paved roads.  PRT Bamyan representatives report that the poor state 
of roads makes travel in either Bamyan or Dai Kundi provinces time 
consuming and punishing for both vehicles and passengers.  Currently 
the 100-mile drive from Kabul to Bamyan takes about eight hours. 
The main routes to Kabul and Herat through the central provinces are 
single lane, dirt tracks that are in extreme states of disrepair. 
The Dai Kundi chief of police has told U.S. PRT representatives that 
even in the summer when roads are passable, it takes over 14 hours 
to drive from the provincial capital of Nili to some of the outlying 
districts located only 30 kilometers or so away. 
 
****************************** 
Developing a Rail Sector; 
Iranian and Chinese Investment 
****************************** 
 
6. (SBU) Afghanistan does not have an operating rail sector, though 
there is great interest in developing rail as an alternative to road 
travel, particularly for freight.  Iran has reportedly nearly 
completed a 60 km rail link from the border crossing point of Islam 
Qala to Herat (ref A).  Latest estimates from PRT Herat indicate 
that the Iranian government has invested USD 50 million in the 
project.  The Afghan portion leading into Herat city has not begun. 
 There is also a rumor that the Iranian and Chinese governments 
agreed at the Economic Cooperation Organization Summit in Tehran in 
early March to jointly fund a rail link from Sher Khan Bander in 
Kunduz province to Herat (ref C).  In the meeting with Econoff, 
Deputy Minister Rasooli was cagey in addressing the current state of 
rail cooperation with Iran and future Iranian investment. 
 
7. (SBU) In addition, as part of the Aynak copper mine development 
project, Chinese contractor China Star is scheduled to construct a 
700 km railroad connecting the northeastern border with Tajikistan 
at Sher Khan Bander to Torkham at the Pakistan border in Nangarhar 
province (reftel C).  Deputy Minister Rasooli told Econoff that the 
Chinese contractor is considering an alternate route for the Aynak 
railway, starting in Hairatan at the Uzbek-Afghan border rather than 
Sher Khan Bander.  On March 18, the Chinese Economic Counselor told 
Econoff that China has no preference for building at Hairatan over 
Sher Khan Bander and that they await the results of a feasibility 
study.  Rasooli estimates that it will cost USD 2 million per 
kilometer to build the 450-600 km railway to Torkham.  Rasooli 
strongly supports the Aynak rail construction and believes that the 
Chinese will follow through with the terms of the contract.  Rasooli 
told Econoff that he believes that rail construction is the future 
of overland transport because there is less maintenance for rail 
once it is built. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  With the help of numerous international partners, 
the GIRoA is well on its way to establishing a road network that 
fully links Afghanistan to neighboring countries.  The missing 200 
 
KABUL 00000839  003 OF 003 
 
 
km stretch of the Ring Road in the Northwest is a concern; security 
problems in that area as well as a lack of agreement with donors 
have prevented MPW from moving ahead with construction plans. 
However, we anticipate that either the ADB or some other donor will 
eventually pick up the cost of this stretch. 
 
RICCIARDONE