VZCZCXRO5769
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1016/01 1120729
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220729Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8568
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001016 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: WARDAK PROVINCE WARILY ENGAGING IN AFGHAN PUBLIC 
PROTECTION PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. KABUL 897 
     ¶B. KABUL 937 
 
¶1. (SBU) Begin Summary.  The pilot Afghan Public Protection 
Program (AP3) is slowly taking shape with its first Afghan 
Public Protection Force (APPF) deployed in Jalrez District in 
Wardak Province.  The creation of the Afghan-led force is 
proving to be a slow process, but one designed to build a 
long-term commitment by the local population for the program. 
 Recruiting for the second training class from the Nerkh 
District has proven difficult, resulting in the postponement 
of the start date for the class as the Wardak governor and 
U.S. military engage local Afghan elders and leaders.  A key 
vulnerability of the AP3 will be its sustainability, both 
because to be sustainable it must rely on the Ministry of 
Interior (MoI) for APPF salaries and equipment, and because 
it is seen by some in the Afghan National Police (ANP) as 
undermining ANP funding and authorities.  Additionally, 
public perceptions of the AP3 are mixed and continue to be 
shaped through local shuras and engagement with leaders; most 
leaders likely will remain wary until the program proves it 
can meet its promise of increased security.  The Taliban is 
expected to test the APPF early in an effort to undermine 
confidence in the program, and it remains to be seen whether 
the ANP will work cooperatively with the APPF when these 
tests present themselves. End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.    (SBU) The pilot AP3 is slowly taking shape with its 
first APPF deployed in Jalrez District in Wardak Province. 
The AP3 is designed as an Afghan program, run by the Ministry 
of Interior (MoI), with its recruits selected with the full 
approval of the provincial governor and the community 
councils established by the Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (IDLG).  The APPF is not intended to be a "tribal" 
or "militia" force, but an Afghan National Security Force 
(ANSF) organization providing community-based security.  If 
successful, the AP3 will supplement the Afghan National 
Police (ANP) and provide enhanced security to extend the 
legitimate governance of the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to designated districts in 
key provinces.  The program,s implementation will hinge on 
the Afghans themselves and key local government elements, 
particularly the Operational Command Center-Provincial 
(OCC-P), the District Community Council, and the ANSF, who 
will lead the AP3 with Special Forces (SF) elements training, 
advising and assisting through the initial phases of each 
class of APPF deployment.  SF also provides initial quick 
impact project support and assessment for long term 
development of the AP3 Districts.  The program seeks to gain 
and maintain popular support for the APPF through coordinated 
and synchronized distribution of humanitarian and quick 
impact projects followed by long term development programs in 
districts that agree to provide recruits for the program. 
These activities will be transferred based on conditions to 
the conventional unit battle space owner during the hold 
phase in each district. 
 
¶3.    (SBU) Special Forces (SF) and CJTF-101 have constructed 
five effects and associated measures of effectiveness to 
track the success of the AP3.  These measures will be 
reviewed periodically and refined as necessary.  The current 
effects measurements include enhancing the GIRoA legitimacy 
in Wardak by: preventing emergence of an insurgent popular 
support base, protecting the population from insurgent 
attacks, preventing insurgent influence on the population, 
disrupting insurgent freedom of action, and protecting the 
freedom of movement of friendly forces. 
 
First APPF Deploys in Jalrez 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.    (SBU) The first 243 trainees completed their 21 day 
training course on March 26 and returned to Jalrez District 
in Wardak shortly thereafter.  Significantly, Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) 101 reported that all trainees reported for 
duty after the course.  The same is not always the case for 
Afghan National Police (ANP) trainees.  Since their arrival 
in Jalrez, the APPF has integrated into the district and 
completed a communications exercise to test their alert plan. 
 Additional exercises are expected.  A more important 
measurement of the APPF integration and utility, however, 
will come when they are called upon to respond to an attack 
and whether they stay the course. 
 
 
KABUL 00001016  002 OF 003 
 
 
Public Perception 
------------------ 
 
¶5.    (SBU) Local leaders remain wary of the AP3 and are 
likely to be convinced to support it only when the program 
demonstrates it can meet its promise of increased security. 
Pashtun leaders have been particularly suspicious of the 
program.  Pashtun elders from Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and 
Wardak told Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (SRAP) Holbrooke thaQthe AP3 is arming, rather than 
disarming, local groups and its participants are picked by 
local commanders rather than the tribes, with the result that 
the AP3 does not enhance community policing. 
 
¶6.    (SBU) A key element of U.S. efforts to shape the 
support for the AP3 program is civilian assistance and 
communications.  On the ground, the military has been using 
its Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to 
undertake quick impact projects in the Jalrez District, has 
engaged in consistent messaging through shuras and other 
leadership discussions to highlight that the APPF is a GIRoA 
project, and has provided equipment to the APPF to 
demonstrate to incoming recruits the commitment of the GIRoA 
to the AP3.  For example, humanitarian assistance was 
distributed in Jalrez in conjunction with the return of the 
APPF class, and a radio station was opened at that time in 
the provincial capital.  (Note: One issue is the provision of 
funds to the MoI; because CERP funds may not be provided to 
the MoI, the military is looking at the use of Title 22 ASF 
funds for foreign assistance and reconstruction.) 
Additionally, a key element of assuring the APPF remains an 
Afghan program is the acceptance of local governance.  This 
is proving more challenging in Wardak since the PRT is 
Turkish led.  Not only has Turkey made clear it will not 
participate in the AP3, but the Turkish PRT spends less 
effort on governance capacity building.  To off-set this 
issue, CJTF-101 has undertaken added steps to directly engage 
with provincial and district officials. 
 
Expanding the AP3 to Nerkh 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.    (SBU) While CSTC-A has the logistics in place for a 
second class of students from the Nerkh District of Wardak 
Province, the numbers of recruits continue to rise as 
coalition forces, during clearing operations, meet with 
success in Nerkh and the surrounding areas.  The target 
number for the course is 250 students, but an original list 
of 200 students was reduced to 30 names, likely as a result 
of the Nerkh District Administrator pulling the names due to 
intense Taliban activity.  Given the lack of registered 
students, the start date for the training session has been 
pushed back.  Coalition forces are carrying out routine 
shaping and clearing operations in Nerkh District.  While the 
AP3 is not the genesis for these operations, the operations 
will enhance the perception of the GIRoA to increase APPF 
recruitment.  According to a weekly AP3 update by CJTF 101, 
the battle space owner in Nerkh reported that the district is 
clear enough to promote the introduction of AP3 into the 
area, and the next step is to return to additional shaping 
operations to promote public support with and through the 
governor so that local elders and leaders will provide a list 
of candidates for the next AP3 course.  Discussions are 
underway as to which district will be the third, Chak or 
Sayyidabad.  As with Jalrez, the location and sequencing of 
the APPF is set by the governor; this local ownership of the 
program is essential to its success. 
 
Sustainability a Challenge 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.    (SBU) The key vulnerability of the AP3 is its 
sustainability as a force.  Especially problematic is the 
will and capability of the MoI to maintain the program.  From 
the logistical standpoint, in addition to chronic graft and 
corruption, the MoI,s inability to regularly pay the ANP is 
a serious problem.  Since the APPF will be paid monthly by 
the MoI using the same system as the ANP, a failure to pay 
APPF salaries could bring an early break-down in the AP3. 
The goal remains ensuring that AP3 is an Afghan-led program, 
therefore it is imperative to ensure that systems for funding 
and logistic support for both the APPF and ANP are set in 
place at the national level of the MOI.  If this does not 
occur, the U.S. will be ensnared into sustaining the program 
or watching it fail through lack of GIRoA ability to 
effectively manage its security forces.  An additional 
challenge is the fact the APPF falls under the ANP. 
 
KABUL 00001016  003 OF 003 
 
 
(Comment:  The ANP tashkil is limited to 82,000 with 81,000 
currently on the books.  Increases in the AP3 will push the 
numbers of the ANP beyond the authorized limit.  Who is 
responsible for paying salaries over the next year has yet to 
be resolved.  While APP forces are currently being paid with 
MoI funds, Minister Atmar expects that the Law and Order 
Trust Fund (LOTFA) will soon assume responsibility and 
reimburse the MOI.  The international community is currently 
divided over whether or the use of the LOTFA to fund what 
some view as a risky pilot program is appropriate.  End 
Comment.)  In Jalrez, this poses particular problems since 
the ANP have not gone through reform training.  CJTF is 
working with CSTC-A to get the Jalrez ANP into a Focused 
District Development (FDD) program on 19 April and provide 
them with better equipment.  This should help reduce the 
chances of the ANP strong-arming the APPF for their equipment. 
 
UK and Canadian Officials Worry About APPF in RC-South 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9.    (SBU) During an embassy roundtable discussion on April 
16 regarding issues relating to RC-South, UK and Canadian 
officials expressed concerns about rushing to establish an 
APPF in Kandahar or Helmand.  They noted that the test 
conditions in Wardak are not the same as in the south since 
the population is mostly Pashtun, unlike the multiple ethnic 
groups in Wardak.  They also expressed concern about the 
resource-intensive nature of the AP3, which has required a 
major outlay of personnel and funding by U.S. Special Forces, 
the MoI, and the ANA.  They said the ANA simply does not have 
the troops to spare for the AP3. (Comment: The ANA and MOD do 
not pay additional costs as a result of the AP3, nor do the 
ANA participate in the program.  The ANA supports security 
operations when required to help establish the conditions to 
allow the ANP and the APPF to take over the "hold" mission 
from the ANA. End Comment.)  U.S. officials noted that the 
AP3 is a pilot program, limited to Wardak Province, but the 
UK and Canadian officials pushed back noting that MoI 
Minister Atmar has stated publicly his desire to see the APPF 
replicated in the south.  Rather, they recommended that more 
effort be invested in the ANP, including training and an 
increase in the tashkil level. 
RICCIARDONE