VZCZCXRO7647
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0127/01 0921059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021059Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4901
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0089
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0973
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 
TAGS: EU FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY: EU AN END POINT OR 
WAY-POINT? 
 
REF: HELSINKI 79 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Media attention on the Finnish Government's 
(GOF) quadrennial defense and security white paper focused 
more on the "strong case" in favor of Finland's possible NATO 
membership than the fact that the document places primary 
importance on the European Union's role in promoting 
security.  According to the GOF, the EU can combat a variety 
of threats - weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource 
scarcity, climate change - through its policies (crisis 
management, neighborhood) and "key role" in certain sectors 
(energy, transport).  The white paper places particular 
importance on a "European solidarity" that would be 
strengthened by ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Reliance 
on the EU as a security promoter reflects wide public support 
for an EU security role and offers traditionalists a 
counterweight to NATO as the primary source of security in 
Europe.  For others, including Foreign Minister Stubb and 
counterparts in the National Coalition Party, focus on the EU 
as font of security also provides a way-station on the route 
to eventual NATO membership.  Ultimately, any decision 
regarding NATO membership is at least three years down the 
line, and will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU, 
and on the political will of the next government to take 
Finland into NATO.  End summary. 
 
NATO gets the attention ... 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Upon the January 23 release of Finland's quadrennial 
defense and security white paper, the media focused on its 
treatment of Finland's possible NATO membership (REF).  The 
paper addresses Finnish-NATO relations in greater depth and 
more positively than the 2004 version; in a March 11 briefing 
on the paper for Embassy personnel, Defense Ministry 
officials emphasized the positive evolution of successive 
post-Cold War white papers' description of those relations. 
The paper states "strong grounds exist" for Finland's 
membership, but nevertheless concludes that the option to 
join will remain open. (NOTE: President Halonen has ruled out 
Finland's NATO membership during her tenure. END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (U) The paper highlights another important reason to 
pursue NATO cooperation (if not membership) - the U.S.'s role 
as sole remaining superpower and the most important NATO 
member.  The paper departs in small but significant ways from 
prior treatment of the U.S. and the transatlantic 
relationship.  Reflecting the U.S.-EU tensions over Iraq, the 
2004 version refers to a U.S. readiness to act unilaterally, 
"bypassing well-established cooperation forums," and 
neutrally refers to "fostering" bilateral relations.  The 
2009 version dispenses with unilateralist references and 
explicitly identifies the need for Finland to maintain close 
relations with the U.S. 
 
... but EU gets top billing 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The media gave significantly less heed to the 
organization given the most prominent attention in the paper: 
the European Union.  The paper describes the EU as "a 
fundamental security policy choice" because EU integration, 
enlargement, neighborhood policies and a "solid EU-Russia 
partnership" have strengthened Finland's security. In a March 
12 briefing on the paper for the diplomatic corps, MFA Under 
Secretary Markus Lyra stressed the EU's importance in 
combating a broad range of threats, including crises and 
conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource 
scarcity and climate change.  According to the paper, the EU 
affects security policy through such means as development of 
policies related to crisis management and internal security, 
and being a "key actor" in fields like energy and transport. 
 
¶5. (C) For the GOF, "European solidarity" appears to be 
fundamental to the security benefits the EU provides, as the 
paper states EU Member States (MSs) belong to "a close-knit 
political grouping" that shares "the will to act in unison." 
The Lisbon Treaty's "solidarity clause" would not create a 
new obligation, rather it would reinforce existing 
"instruments and capabilities" and strengthen mutual 
solidarity.  For Finland, a strong sense of solidarity 
reflects "the readiness to defend the other Member States by 
all available means," such that "Finland will provide 
assistance to the other Member States and expects others to 
 
HELSINKI 00000127  002 OF 003 
 
 
act likewise."  In his briefing Lyra stated that Finland's 
participation in crisis management operations, like the 
currently EU-led operation in Chad, demonstrates their 
willingness and ability to assist other MSs. 
 
Fellow EU Members comment on Finland's position 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (C) Speaking to Finnish perceptions of the EU, Dutch DCM 
Thomas van Leeuwen told Polchief that in the absence of 
membership of a military alliance like NATO, and with a 
sizable number of Finns uncertain about or opposing NATO 
membership, the Finns must necessarily look to the EU. 
Polish Political Counselor Stanislaw Cios told Polchief that 
in several bilateral meetings in Helsinki in February GOF 
officials emphasized the role of the EU as a "security 
promoter." Cios said both sides agreed that demonstrating the 
willingness and ability to participate in crisis management 
operations signals an expectation and acceptance of similar 
assistanc. Cios also described frustration about the EU, 
ith the Finns complaining of a lack of strategic tinking 
and cooperaton; for example, on Afghanisan, they complained 
that at the political level E officials are focused on and 
distracted by techical matters like the number of ciilian 
slots for police trainers, something best left for the expert 
level.  (NOTE: In a March 11 conversation with Charge, Lyra 
said some GOF officials are frustrated by the strong 
influence of France, Germany and the United Kingdom within 
the EU, and by the failure of the Lisbon Treaty to come into 
force.  END NOTE.) 
 
Security role for EU: necessary and sufficient? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (C) Across the coalition government and the political 
spectrum, there is a consensus that the EU plays a necessary 
role in advancing Finland's security interests.  Polls show 
the public strongly considers the EU to be an important 
factor in increasing Finland's security.  Whether the "EU 
factor" is sufficient depends on two things: (1) whom one 
asks, and (2) how one defines threats.  On the former, 
roughly half of those polled feel Finland should remain 
militarily non-aligned, reflecting a deeply-ingrained sense 
that Finland will always "go it alone" militarily and a 
concern about having to fight "someone else's war" as part of 
an alliance.  Regarding threats, the white paper adopts a 
broad concept of threat that includes, for example, energy 
scarcity and climate change.  For Finns who eschew military 
alliances, who deem military threats to Finland a distant 
prospect, and as see a strong EU role in addressing climate 
change and other challenges, the EU is a final destination. 
Within the coalition government, the center and center-left 
members - Center Party (of PM Vanhanen), Green Party and 
Swedish People's Party - more so than the center-right 
National Coalition Party (NCP) contain the strongest EU 
support. 
 
¶8. (C) The NCP largely represents a different view, one that 
acknowledges an important role for the EU while arguing for 
the fundamental importance of NATO and Finland's eventual 
NATO membership.  For supporters of this view, the EU might 
be seen as an enduring and integral component of a 
multi-faceted security policy, or more simply a way-station 
on the path to NATO membership.  For them, the EU also serves 
as a useful tool to reassure NATO skeptics, given the 
considerable overlap of EU and NATO goals and membership (a 
point included in the white paper).  For some, the question 
of the EU's role is moot: As Lyra told Charge, regardless of 
the emphasis some officials place on the EU, the medium- to 
long-term burden of maintaining an army of 250,000-350,000 
soldiers dedicated to territorial defense was the strongest 
argument for Finland,s entry into NATO. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Embedded in the paper's text is the debate within the 
GOF about how to define the center of gravity in Finland's 
security policy.  The media coverage of the white paper 
suggested a "NATO or EU" divide, given the tendency among 
government officials or others to emphasize the importance of 
one or the other.  Certainly, one sees the influence of the 
more transatlantic-oriented NCP in the paper, reflected in 
the more positive treatment of NATO and the U.S., though U.S. 
language also reflects a general openness to the new 
Administration.  EU supporters also had their say (as Lyra 
 
HELSINKI 00000127  003 OF 003 
 
 
said, the paper contained more favorable NATO language "but 
then the politicians got in the way").  Nevertheless, the 
differences within the GOF regarding the weight and 
importance of the EU and NATO are not stark or polar. 
Ultimately, any Finnish decision regarding NATO membership 
will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU, and on 
the configuration of the next coalition government, the 
stance of the next President and the collective political 
will to take Finland into NATO without a majority supporting 
membership.  End comment. 
 
BUTLER