VZCZCXRO8636
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0413/01 0931016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031016Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0193
INFO RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0012
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0358
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND SCA/CEN 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN 
 
DUSHANBE 00000413  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Country Conditions 
 
¶1. Tajikistan's continued poverty, high unemployment and 
dependence on remittances from family members abroad result in a 
significant number of working age Tajiks, mostly male, who seek 
to leave Tajikistan for better prospects elsewhere.  Until 
recently, according to unofficial statistics, more than one 
million Tajiks out of a population of seven million worked 
abroad, primarily in the Russian Federation.  However, in recent 
months, the effect of the worldwide economic crisis on the 
Russian economy as well as a December 2008 decree by the Russian 
Prime Minister aimed at cutting quotas of foreign workers has 
resulted in thousands of unemployed Tajik citizens being sent 
back to Tajikistan.  This portion of the population may be 
expected to look for job opportunities outside of Tajikistan 
beyond Russia.  At the same time, living conditions in 
Tajikistan have become even more difficult with rising prices in 
rural areas as well as the major cities and another winter with 
energy outages affecting the entire country.  As the overall 
economic situation in Tajikistan continues to deteriorate, there 
is a concern that all of these factors may contribute to 
increased fraudulent applications related to labor migration and 
that the U.S. visa will be used as a means to seek a better 
economic opportunities. 
 
¶2.  Fraud in Tajikistan is much more primitive compared to the 
efforts of visa applicants in many other countries 
(petition-based fraud, for example).  We uncover most fraud 
easily at the NIV window with a short interview.  However, Post 
sometimes encounters relatively sophisticated attempts, which 
require follow-up investigations and further action by the Fraud 
Prevention Unit or Regional Security Office.  During the 
reporting period, Post saw a case of apparent H1B fraud when a 
Turkish school in the United States petitioned for a Tajik 
teacher.  After the applicant was found unqualified for the 
position through the visa interview, further CCD research 
uncovered numerous H1B visa refusals in Turkey from this same 
petitioner. This petition was sent back to DHS for revocation. 
 
¶3.  When Post uncovers fraud, it is usually in connection with 
tourist (B1/B2) or student (F1) visas.  Discovery often occurs 
during the initial application review or during the interview, 
when it becomes apparent that the applicant does not intend to 
fulfill the stated purpose of the trip and likely seeks either 
to work illegally for a short time or to join relatives who have 
already illegally immigrated.  Applicants often submit false 
employment and invitation letters in support of their 
applications.  Lexis/Nexis searches provide invaluable 
information in this regard.  Post has encountered fraudulent 
applicants traveling in groups for various sporting events 
(usually wrestling, arm wrestling or judo/taekwondo)in the 
United States.  One applicant admitted to paying $3,500 to be 
included in the group; another who recently contacted post 
following deportation by DHS had apparently overstayed by 18 
months.  Applicants in these groups are sometimes well prepared 
for the visa interview and are often supplied with genuine 
supporting documents as they sometimes accompany legitimate 
travelers. 
 
The majority of F1 visa applicants in Tajikistan wish to study 
English as a Second Language (ESL) in schools or programs 
preferably where large Tajik communities exist.  Such places 
include New York City; Lincoln, Nebraska; Denver, Colorado, and 
more recently several schools in Miami and Los Angeles.  Since 
these applicants tend to apply to the same dozen schools in the 
United States, post is interested in whether administrative 
practices of such schools might facilitate non-compliance with 
student visa status. Investigating one case, post requested an 
applicant's transcripts from the Computer Professional Learning 
Center (CPLC), a school that offers an ESL program, to clarify a 
discrepancy between the SEVIS record and applicant's statements. 
 When the initial transcript provided conflicted with the timing 
the student claimed she was in the U.S., the school responded by 
sending a second transcript with data in line with the 
applicant's statements.  While there is no hard evidence of 
fraud here, we are now monitoring this U.S. school closely.  In 
another case, anecdotal information has indicated that students 
applying to a different school in New York City take advantage 
of course hours that allow foreign students to work while 
studying.  In regard to these concerns, post highly values 
recent DHS efforts to investigate further possible fraud trends 
among Tajik students falsely claiming to attend ESL schools, 
especially in New York. 
 
¶4.  Documents are generally untrustworthy in Tajikistan, with 
signatures and seals often forged.  The officer can detect many 
of these documents by asking for supporting details about the 
individual's work, economic situation and financial sponsorship 
 
DUSHANBE 00000413  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
or details of the proposed US travel.  Document forgers can be 
easily found in Tajikistan and provide fake job letters very 
cheaply.  However, not all fraudulent documents are necessarily 
"fake."  For a small bribe an applicant can have the appropriate 
government official write out a real birth or marriage 
certificate with false information, including all of the 
appropriate seals.  Data mismatches usually make this sort of 
fraud easy to detect.  Corrupt government officials continue to 
thwart attempts to tighten the issuance and regulations of 
national identity documents.  Anti-corruption laws exist, but 
enforcement and implementation remain elusive, and internal 
controls on identity documents are lax. 
 
NIV Fraud 
 
¶5.  Post began processing nonimmigrant visas in August 2006 and 
has experienced continued growth in the number of applicants, 
with the exception of the last quarter.  The total number of 
issuances and refusals in FY07 was 2,384 which grew to 4,022 in 
FY08 and leveled off somewhat in the first half of FY09 (through 
March 15) with 1,179 applications.  Post's NIV refusal rate for 
FY07 was only 39.3%. For FY08 it jumped to 48.8%. The refusal 
rate for the first half of FY09 has been only slightly higher at 
51.7%.  It is important to take into account the fact that F1 
students make up a disproportionate number of all NIV 
applications.  We have seen the percentage of F1s rise from 47% 
of all applications in FY07 to 63% in FY08, and stay at about 
57% for the first half of FY09. 
 
Post completed its second validation study for F1s during the 
period of 1 February 2007 through 22 August 2008.  The results 
are as follows: 
 
Total Issued: 1282 
In status: 923 (72%) 
Out of status: 165 (13%) 
Departed: 188 (15%) 
Unable to determine status: 6 
 
A full report on the validation study will be submitted in a 
separate cable to the Department of State. 
 
¶6.  Tajik students often have trouble proving their ability to 
fully finance their study in the United States.  Post has sees 
attempts to work around this by presenting suspicious letters of 
support from sponsoring firms or organizations as well as 
inflated bank statements.  One indicator of fraud is bank 
statements that show an even number such as exactly USD 9,000 or 
15,000 in the account.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that an 
applicant can purchase such a statement for a hundred dollars; 
the money will be deposited into the account, and will remain 
there for approximately a month. 
 
¶7.  Post has encountered some instances of fraudulent 
sponsorship letters provided by legitimate organizations and 
NGOs.  During this reporting period, post has had cases where 
applicants presented documents on legitimate letterhead claiming 
that a government office, private company or local NGO would 
sponsor the full cost of an individual's English study in the US 
- which made little sense in these instances.  Follow up phone 
calls usually reveal that employers who may even have signed the 
letter don't really intend to fund such `training'.  In other 
cases, phone calls to official phone numbers provided on 
company/organization letterhead reach a private party with no 
relationship to the company or organization.  A small positive 
exception to the trend occurred when post discovered that one 
international organization - ACTED - headquartered in Paris - 
does sponsor specific employees for English courses abroad as 
part of its employee incentive program. 
 
¶8.  Post processed its first ever Summer Work and Travel visas 
last Spring and conducted its first validation study of all 86 
Tajik J-1 visa recipients who participated in the 2008 Summer 
Work and Travel Program.  The validation study was based on 
records of the students' return received from local implementing 
agencies as well as ADIS information obtained by the Consular 
Section. 
 
The results of the validation study are as follows: 
 
Visas issued - 86 
Visas refused - 24 
Returned from the U.S. - 58 (67 %) 
Did not return from the U.S./Changed status -19(22 %) 
Confirmed overstay - 9 (11 %) 
 
In summary, of 110 SWT J1 Applications received at Post in 2008, 
86 were granted visas while 24 were refused. Of these 86 
 
DUSHANBE 00000413  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
issuances, 58 applicants returned to Tajikistan after their 
travel to the United States, 9 applicants are believed to have 
overstayed (6 male and 3 female) and 19 applicants are pending 
change to F1 status. 
 
This current SWT season post anticipates a twofold increase in 
applications  compared to last year. 
 
IV Fraud 
 
¶9.  Post accepts and processes a limited number of I-130 
petitions(approximately one a month).  Marriage fraud in 
Tajikistan is not common, although we have seen some cases among 
DV applicants.  Tajik society is very traditional and is 
generally not open to marriage to foreign citizens.  In 
addition, there are relatively few Tajik-Americans, eliminating 
the types of marriage fraud found in connection with large 
diaspora communities. 
 
DV Fraud 
 
¶10.  DV fraud in Tajikistan echoes that of the Central Asian 
region.  Almaty and Tashkent have seen suspected sham marriages 
in Tajik DV cases processed at those posts.  Although it is 
difficult to draw conclusions based on unreliable high school 
equivalency documents, Tajiks fall roughly into two categories: 
agricultural laborers from villages and the mountains (unlikely 
to have earned a high school education) and city residents 
(often have college degrees in addition to high school 
equivalent education).  Post has seen suspicious cases of 
children added to a DV case after notification and before the 
interview. 
 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
 
¶11.  Post has not discovered any ACS or passport fraud in 
Tajikistan.  Due to the small American citizen community, the 
Consular Officer and Embassy local staff are often personally 
acquainted with resident Americans.  Few Tajiks have U.S. 
citizenship.  Post has yet to issue more than five Consular 
Reports of Birth Abroad per year, and many of the Americans 
residents in Tajikistan have diplomatic or official passports. 
Passports are rarely lost or stolen, and in the past few years 
lost passports were usually returned within one week.  There are 
thirteen children currently registered with the Embassy born to 
Tajik parents while in the United States (often as out-of-status 
students).  This is an area of concern for post. 
 
Adoption Fraud 
 
¶12.  On May 3, 2006, Tajikistan changed its Family Code to 
prohibit inter-country adoption of Tajik orphans. While couples 
which consist of at least one Tajik citizen may be still allowed 
to adopt, all other adoptions by non-Tajik citizens are 
forbidden by Tajik law. 
 
Use of DNA Testing 
 
¶13.  Post has not had need to require DNA testing of any 
applicants. 
 
Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud 
 
¶14.  Post provides all assistance requested by DHS to verify 
documents such as birth certificates or proof of 
nationality/ethnicity, many of which have turned out to be 
fraudulent.  No concrete asylum or other DHS benefits fraud has 
come to light in the past two quarters. 
 
 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
 
¶15.  Tajikistan is a source country for women trafficked through 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia to the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), 
Turkey, and Russia for the purpose of commercial sexual 
exploitation. Women are also reportedly trafficked to Pakistan 
for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Men 
are trafficked to Russia and Kazakhstan for the purpose of 
forced labor, primarily in the construction and agricultural 
industries. Boys and girls are trafficked internally for various 
purposes, including forced labor and forced begging.  There have 
been no reports of trafficking in persons from or through 
Tajikistan to the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), al-Qaida, and 
the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remain active in Central 
Asia, as do anti-Western, anti-semitic extremist organizations 
 
DUSHANBE 00000413  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
such as Hizb'ut-Tahrir.  Members of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan have been arrested and convicted for organized crime, 
murder and weapons charges in Tajikistan in the past. 
Tajikistan is primarily a transit center for illegal terrorist 
travel.  Canada and Mexico do not have diplomatic representation 
in Tajikistan, and EU consular officials have not reported any 
use of fraudulent U.S. passports or visas to assist visa 
applications to EU countries. 
 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
 
¶16.  The Regional Security Office and Consular Section maintain 
a close working relationship.  Fraud, as stated above, is 
relatively simple.  Post's fraud prevention manager, the 
consular section chief, refers the occasional case to the RSO. 
The RSO in turn conveys the disposition of each case to the 
consular section chief. During the last year, the Regional 
Security Office and Consular Section have cooperated on two 
cases; one which had been opened by the local authorities 
regarding a visa fixer, another between DHS and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan regarding visa 
fraud and alien smuggling using F1 student visas.  One case 
concluded with an arrest and prosecution and the other case is 
ongoing. 
 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
 
¶17.  Post continues to have serious concerns about both the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
capacity in terms of the security and accountability of the 
passport issuance process.  For example, physical presence of 
the applicant is often forgone in applying for passports.  All 
Tajik civil documents should be scrutinized carefully.  Post has 
encountered cases in the past of previously issued applicants 
having received new Tajik passports with identities to which 
they had no legal claim. 
 
¶18.  Most Tajik elite have returned to using traditional names, 
eliminating the Russian variants of surnames (the "-ev" and 
"-ov" endings for example) and patronymics.  Post continues to 
be cognizant of possible name variations to recognize any fraud 
such as visa reapplication under the 'new' name to avoid 
discovery of adverse information or previous refusals. 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
¶19.  Document fraud is technically a criminal offense in 
Tajikistan.  In combating these crimes, the Tajik Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is at best an occasionally competent partner. 
The MFA periodically informs us by diplomatic note about the 
numbers of lost or stolen Tajik passports and also cooperates 
with Post's requests for verification of civil documents (though 
usually months later than requested).  However, endemic 
corruption, shoddy record keeping, and lack of prosecution for 
document fraud limit the utility of cooperation. 
 
Areas of Particular Concern 
 
¶20.  Despite the most recent drop in applications, in general, 
post has seen a steady increase in NIV applications since visa 
issuance began in 2006.  This can be attributed to the low 
living standards in the country as well as increased awareness 
of the possibility of applying for a U.S. visa.  Due to various 
factors mentioned above, post anticipates that the number of 
applicants will continue to increase overall in FY09, albeit 
perhaps at a slower rate.  Post is currently processing its 
second year of Summer Work and Travel applicants in Tajikistan - 
with higher numbers, and other programs such as au pair are 
likely to follow.  The continuing increase in applicants and 
difficult living situation in Tajikistan will undoubtedly lead 
to some rise in instances of fraud, and post does not discount 
the possibility that more sophisticated methods may be used to 
obtain visas fraudulently. 
 
 
Staffing and Training 
 
¶21.  Consular Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager is Elisabeth 
Wilson.  Fraud Prevention FSN is Tahmina Dehoti.  Tahmina Dehoti 
has taken PC542 - FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington. 
JACOBSON