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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 000173 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SENV KGHG PINR DA
SUBJECT:  Change of Danish PM: Implications for COP-15 
 
Ref:  A) Copenhagen 168 
B) 08 Copenhagen 601 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000173  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The recent change of Danish Prime Minister is 
unlikely to significantly shift the Danish approach to hosting 
UNFCCC climate talks at COP-15 in December in Copenhagen.  Climate 
policy here enjoys strong political consensus, and the government of 
Lars Lokke Rasmussen will likely continue to pursue an ambitious 
climate agreement at COP-15 in its own political interest.  However, 
the departure of Anders Fogh Rasmussen for NATO may diminish 
Denmark's international stature in the short term, and could change 
the internal dynamics of its climate change team in the run-up to 
COP-15.  The effects could include boosting Climate and Energy 
Minister Connie Hedegaard's control over Denmark's negotiating 
strategy, and could motivate Lars Lokke to seek opportunities to 
boost his international credentials in advance of COP-15 by 
attending climate meetings involving heads of government.  To 
safeguard U.S. interests, we should engage fully with Hedegaard and 
consider opportunities to help Denmark prepare for its role as 
COP-15 host.  End Summary. 
 
COP-15 Still a Prize 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Presiding over success at COP-15 remains a compelling 
political prize in host nation Denmark.  The recent change of Prime 
Minister here does not signify a change of government; the same 
political coalition continues in power and is not required (or 
likely) to seek to renew its popular mandate before COP-15 (see Ref 
A). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Strong political consensus already exists here in favor of 
a more comprehensive global approach to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions globally.  The previous government was initially skeptical 
of global warming and only last year rebranded itself as "green," 
with Fogh Rasmussen touting his government's leadership in favor of 
an ambitious agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol when it expires 
in 2012.  The opposition has been critical of Fogh Rasmussen for 
endangering the outcome at COP-15 by decamping for NATO, and has 
characterized Lokke Rasmussen's green credentials as suspect.  In 
retort, prior to assuming the prime ministership, Lars Lokke 
publicly insisted he would be "no less ambitious" than Anders Fogh 
at COP-15. 
 
Effects of Change on Climate 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Government, media and industry sources here worry the 
change in Danish leadership could slow momentum in international 
climate negotiations, since Lokke Rasmussen lacks the international 
stature of his predecessor.  Some further speculate it will permit 
activist Climate and Energy Minister Connie Hedegaard to consolidate 
her influence over government policy regarding international climate 
negotiations.  Her ministry, specially created for her after the 
elections of 2007, works closely on COP-15 issues with an 
interagency committee headed by the Prime Minister (Ref B).  With 
early pressure on the new PM to prove his leadership on domestic 
economic issues, observers expect him to leave the details of 
protracted climate negotiations to Hedegaard, who has emerged as an 
active and popular minister.  Some speculate here that if COP-15 is 
deemed a political success, Hedegaard could be rewarded with the 
Foreign Ministry. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) We have noted recent signs of tension between Hedegaard 
(who hails from the Conservative Party, the junior partner in the 
governing coalition) and the PM's Office (both Rasmussens represent 
the Liberal Party) over who should attend the upcoming Major 
Economies Forum preparatory meeting in Washington.  Staff close to 
Hedegaard told us she would be the logical choice, but Anders Fogh 
chose instead to send his climate advisor, Bo Lidegaard.  It seems 
likely Lars Lokke will stick with Lidegaard, but Hedegaard may add 
her own people to the delegation. 
 
Building Credibility 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The new PM shares with his predecessor (and Hedegaard) a 
keen political interest in Denmark presiding over a successful 
COP-15 event resulting in agreement on a post-Kyoto regime to deal 
with climate change.  It seems likely that Lars Lokke, who has 
little foreign policy experience, will seek opportunities to boost 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000173  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
his credentials by appearing at selected events on the world stage. 
Most prominent among those events, in our view, would be 
climate-focused gatherings of heads of government including the 
G8-Major Economies Forum (MEF) in La Maddalena in July, and at UN 
climate events in New York in September.  These events combine high 
exposure with short duration. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While Danish climate policy is unlikely to shift 
significantly, the change in Denmark's leadership could still 
adversely affect U.S. interests if the new PM proves an ineffective 
COP-15 host.  In the run-up to COP-15 we can safeguard interests by 
working closely with Hedegaard and her team, and help Lars Lokke 
Rasmussen prepare for his host role by inviting him to share the 
stage at climate meetings involving key heads of government. 
 
McCulley