VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0474/01 1200804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300804Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9895
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6853
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 3796
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2981
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 8617
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1623
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3479
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1147
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J332/J52//
RHMFIUU/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000474 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, JBORNS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, RTHAYER AND RKERR 
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA WBERGER 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA MROGERS AND POL SBERRY 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USUN FOR ECOSOC DMERCADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE LIFE-SAVING ASSISTANCE IN 
NORTH 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: From April 21 to 25, USAID Sri Lanka Mission 
Director and USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID OFDA) acting regional advisor traveled to Northern Sri Lanka 
to assess the humanitarian situation of thousands of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) who fled the so called No Fire Zone (NFZ) 
and arrived en masse over a period of days in Vavuniya District. 
The assessment team encountered disorder and confusion, with aid and 
government agencies struggling to provide humanitarian assistance to 
newly-arrived IDPs relocated throughout various locations in 
Vavuniya.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) lacks a discernable 
plan for rendering life-saving assistance to the newly arrived IDPs, 
as well as the IDPs still en route to Vavuniya.  The GSL's new 
coordinator for IDPs, appointed Apirl 23, has had an impact in his 
first week on the job, quicklymobilizing badly needed resources. 
Further, despie an obvious need for immediately enhanced 
humantarian assistance efforts, particularly in the ares of 
health, food, shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene, GSL 
impediments continue to hinder aid agencies from operating 
effectively.  Advocacy on myriad fronts must continue and be 
strengthened as the humanitarian crisis unfolds.  Without tremendous 
effort, prolonged suffering of the already traumatized IDP 
population will be further exacerbated in a short span of time.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------- 
WHERE WILL IDPS GO? 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) From April 20 to April 26, the total IDP population 
outside the NFZ rose from roughly 63,000 to 150,000, according to 
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  An 
estimated 30,000 more people were en route from the conflict zone. 
The UNHCR indicated that between 50,000 to 100,000 people remained 
in the conflict area and would be moving into GSL-controlled 
territory over the coming days.  Transit sites visited - mostly 
public schools - lacked adequate sanitation facilities and were 
overcrowded, with an average of 52 people sleeping per small 
classroom.  The principal constraint to accommodating these new IDPs 
is the GSL's insistence that the IDPs all be located in Vavuniya 
district only and their failure to clear adequate amounts of land in 
Vavuniya or other districts.  To little avail, the humanitarian 
community has repeatedly requested the GSL to allocate additional 
land, particularly in Mannar District, and to speed up clearance of 
previously allocated land in Vavuniya.  Due to inaction on clearing 
the land in Manik Farms Zone II, relief agencies were setting up 
tents and pit latrines at the same time that IDPs physically arrived 
by GSL bus transportation and then had to stake out their own plots 
by sitting in them.  Riots and clashes over plots and shelter 
purportedly erupted over the past days, when the GSL relocated an 
estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people to land meant to house a maximum 
of 30,000 people.  When asked how the GSL planned to house the 
arriving IDPs, the GSL responded that the government would create 
zones IV, V, and VI in Manik Farms and use an additional 46 schools 
in Vavuniya.  (Note: U.N. agencies have already refused to work in 
zones IV, V, and VI for various reasons, including the fact that the 
land is considered unsuitable due to a lack of a viable water 
table.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Although UNHCR identified three viable sites for camps in 
Mannar, the GSL has continued to refuse to allow any settlement in 
Mannar, other than at schools and then only if necessary and for 
short periods of time.  As of April 26, the GSL has reportedly 
determined to relocate 1,500 families initially, and 20,000 others 
ultimately, from Manik Farms Zone II to Pulmoddai in Trincomalee 
District.  However, no cleared land is available yet and it is 
unknown where newly-arrived IDPs would relocate. 
 
------------------------------ 
WHAT HAPPENS ONCE IDPS ARRIVE? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Basic assistance provided to the approximately 63,000 IDPs 
prior to the influx was deficient in several areas.  The GSL made 
several improvements, including the addition of phone service and 
the erection of visitation centers; however, both interventions were 
sporadic and varied from one site to another.  For instance, in one 
site IDPs needed to have a national identity card to use the phone. 
In another site IDPs could only use the phone for two minutes and in 
a third site, the traveling phone only arrived intermittently.  In 
terms of the new influx, whatever the status of the registration 
system may have been previously, it has seemingly unraveled totally 
since the influx.  Without being registered, the IDPs cannot receive 
any non-food relief items.  Furthermore, newly-arrived IDPs are not 
receiving relief assistance with any punctuality or regularity.  For 
example, on the second day of the trip, the assessment team 
encountered a thousand IDPs who had been relocated to a school in 
Vavuniya that had not been previously used as a site.  Despite the 
harrowing journey from the NFZ through the various GSL checkpoints, 
they arrived at the temporary IDP site without food, adequate water, 
or toilet facilities. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The assessment team followed the progress of an IDP 
transit site population and the assistance being provided for the 
next two days.  According to the team, the site had no organization 
in charge of management, and no IDP registration had taken place. 
Organizations on the ground had not distributed emergency relief 
supplies, partly because there had been no IDP registration and 
because no organization had been tasked to carry out distributions 
in that particular camp.  As for sanitation, no latrines, apart from 
the two existing school latrines, had been constructed.  Open 
defecation was rampant.  In terms of medical assistance, several 
IDPs complained of festering wounds and unattended medical needs. 
Malnutrition was evident.  Though people had received food, 
distribution was irregular and food delivery was delayed by more 
than twelve hours following arrival.  Water for bathing and drinking 
was provided to the entire population through a 2,000 gallon tank 
provided by OXFAM.  Remarkably, the effort to encircle the site with 
barbed wire had not even been made; a true testament to just how 
slowly things were moving. 
 
----------------------- 
WHO'S RUNNING THE SHOW? 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The GSL has made a point of demonstrating to the 
international community that the GSL is in charge of humanitarian 
operations, not the UN.  This point has been demonstrated by the 
government's previous reluctance to grant visas to the U.N. Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff.  OCHA 
staff do not have permission to enter the IDP sites.  As a 
consequence, it is not clear that there is central leadership within 
the U.N., and there appears to be a complete lack of a central 
coordinating agency or mechanism overall.  The U.N. cluster system, 
recently crippled by its replacement with 'Task Forces' by the GSL, 
seems a wounded beast still trying to understand its new identity or 
how to function.  Disparities exist between information in the field 
and headquarters, such as the number of emergency relief supplies 
available.  The result is a void of coordination and much-needed 
cohesion. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Attempting to address the lack of cohesion, the GSL has 
announced the appointment of Major General Chandrasiri as the 
Competent Authority for coordination of the IDP operation, as well 
as dispatching of three more Government Authorities.  The U.N. 
Resident Representative reports that Chandrasiri has had a decisive 
impact in his first week on the job, demonstrating the ability to 
quickly mobilize some of the resources needed to cope with the large 
influx.  The U.N. is sending the Head of OCHA in the short term, and 
both OCHA and UNHCR are sending surge staff from Geneva, with 
promises of finding someone to fill the void for a longer period of 
time. 
 
-------------------------- 
THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Prior to the April 20 IDP influx, there were schisms on 
several fronts within the humanitarian community.  There were 
divisions between organizations in Vavuniya and those in Colombo; 
problems between U.N. organizations and non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs); and issues between local and international 
organizations.  The GSL has hindered relief assistance through 
bureaucratic hurdles and invectives.  These divisions have not 
paralyzed humanitarian relief efforts, but galvanizing a united 
front and modalities for operation in the face of this crisis has 
not been a simple matter.  In terms of resources, the humanitarian 
community is requesting donor assistance and the U.N. is preparing a 
prioritization paper, to be presented on April 30.  While it is 
clear that more resources are required to deal with the new influx 
of IDPs, it is imperative that the community remembers the 
principles of engagement set out in the UNHCR Aide Memoire and other 
documents pertaining to assistance in Sri Lanka. 
 
----------------------------- 
GOVERNMENT STYMIES ASSISTANCE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Several GSL commitments have been floundering, including 
clearing land, draining camps and gullies, disposing of trash, and 
providing food for three days following the arrival of IDPs the 
contested zone.  Had the GSL cleared land at Zone II and drained 
land in Zone III of Manik Farms in a timely manner, the current dire 
situation could have been somewhat mitigated.  The GSL announced to 
the U.N. World Food Program a few days ago that the government no 
longer intended to supply the promised three-day food ration, and 
would instead distribute a one-day food ration.  As of this writing, 
the problem had not yet been resolved.  However, the GSL is 
reportedly supplying food.  The GSL has further hindered assistance 
by holding hostage much needed equipment at the Medawachchiya 
checkpoint, including water bowsers and the pipe required by the 
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) to construct the water source for 
Manik Farms.  They have put IDPs' lives in jeopardy by not approving 
visas of critical medical staff, preventing humanitarian access to 
IDPs at Kilinochchi, and not providing adequate food and water at 
Omanthai checkpoint. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
SUFFERING INCREASES AS THE HEALTH SYSTEM FAILS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The amount of wounded and deceased people is increasing 
as the situation in the NFZ intensifies, with estimates that some 20 
out of every 27 people have at least one injured family member.  The 
assessment team visited three health facilities in Vavuniya, Mannar, 
and Cheddikulum, two of which were clearly overwhelmed.  All three 
facilities were operating at least three times over their capacity 
in terms of patients, and two facilities had patients lying under 
beds.  Patients, including many children and babies, were emaciated 
and exhibited signs of malnourishment.  Many had been separated from 
their companions.  The proportion of patients with amputated hands, 
feet, and legs is staggering.  Others had been transferred through 
several facilities.  Post-operative care had virtually ceased with 
patients being discharged if able to walk. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Several newly-arrived IDPs that the team interviewed 
complained of festering wounds and injuries that had thus far gone 
unattended by medical personnel.  It appeared that either medical 
personnel had not visited IDP sites, as had been intended, or the 
lack of IDP registration had impeded IDP visits to hospitals. 
During a meeting with the GSL Regional Director of Health Services 
(RDHS), the RDHS informed the team that medical staff in Vavuniya 
had threatened to go on strike over fears for their safety following 
the murder of one of the hospital's doctors.  The RDHS had managed 
 
to keep the staff from walking out, but talked about the need for an 
emergency task force to coordinate health efforts, as well as a need 
for greater support and appreciation from the Colombo level. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The RDHS further discussed the urgent need for additional 
staff, as well as more medicine and at least 200-250 more beds.  The 
RDHS referred to the mental health needs of many of the IDPs, and 
the team recognized that there would be a great need for the 
rehabilitation of the large numbers of amputees in the future. 
While several efforts were being made to address the deteriorating 
health situation, including augmenting existing wards, building new 
ones and adding beds to facilities, the RDHS did not believe the 
efforts were sufficient.  In a subsequent meeting with the GSL 
Minister of Health in Colombo, the Minister indicated that 1,000 
more beds were required.  The Minister further advised that he was 
sending about 285 new doctors to the north and opening up access to 
five southern facilities for patients. 
 
THE ADVOCACY MUST CONTINUE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) There are several areas in which the international 
community must continue to advocate, including: 
 
¶A. Assistance to IDPs still trapped in the NFZ:  The last 
significant WFP shipment of food and medicine reached those IDPs 
remaining in the NFZ on April 2.  Approximately 30 metric tons of 
food went in April 28 and again on April 29 an ICRC medical 
evacuation boat, and a similar quantity is expected April 30; 
however, these shipments do not put put the supply of food on a 
sustainable basis.  There are numerous credible reports that food 
stocks have dwindled to near zero.  When asked why they left the 
NFZ, IDPs stated that they left because they were hungry and had 
been repeatedly fired upon. 
 
¶B. Access to Kilinochchi and Omanthai screening points: Given the 
noticeably deteriorating conditions of the arriving IDPs, it is 
critical that more assistance is given to IDPs as they move from the 
NFZ to transit sites and camps.  While organizations have attempted 
to gain access to both Kilinochchi and Omanthai, only ICRC and UNHCR 
have regular access for monitoring (though UNHCR has noted they 
cannot speak to IDPs). No organization has regular access to provide 
relief items. 
 
¶C. Screening: Improved screening modalities could drastically reduce 
overburdened camps and transit sites, as well as minimize costs of 
camp upkeep dramatically.  With a more sophisticated screening 
process, the Government would be able to track IDPs irrespective of 
where IDPs moved to.  Further, in order to reunite families, tracing 
and sharing of registration information with UNHCR and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross must commence.  The team 
heard a report of a pile of unidentified bodies at the Vavuniya 
Hospital morgue, and nearly every IDP interviewed referred to 
missing family members.  Family reunification is critical to mental 
health. 
 
¶D. Registration of IDPs must recommence for the newly-arrived to 
receive emergency relief supplies and medical assistance in a timely 
manner.  (Note: The team met people who had been at Manik Farms for 
over a week and were receiving their first emergency relief supply 
kits because they had only recently been registered.  End note) 
 
¶E. Information to IDPs: The team interviewed IDPs who had received 
little or no information about their whereabouts or future. 
 
¶F. Allocation and clearance of land:  Given the increasing number of 
IDPs and the concomitant scarcity of land, the GSL must immediately 
allocate and clear land, preferably in Mannar, Jaffna and 
Kilinochchi. 
 
¶G. Visas for expatriates: The dearth of available medical 
 
professionals requires that the GSL grant visas to expatriate 
medical staff as soon as possible.  Further, agencies on the ground 
are overwhelmed with relief efforts and need to augment existing 
staff. 
 
¶H. Clearance of equipment: Bowsers and other equipment held up at 
Medawachchiya checkpoint and other locations must be cleared 
immediately if agencies are to be equipped to provide assistance. 
MOORE