O 131045Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9785
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMCONSUL CHENNAI 
AMCONSUL MUMBAI 
AMCONSUL TORONTO 
USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION GENEVA 
HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHDC
CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J332/J52//

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000413 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA (BOUCHER), SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA, DCHA/FFP (DWORKEN, KSHEIN) 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA (MORRISP, ACONVERY, RTHAYER, RKERR) 
ATHENS FOR PCARTER 
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA (WBERGER) 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA AND POL (SBERRY) 
GENEVA FOR RMA (NKYLOH, NHILGERT, MPITOTTI) 
USUN NEW YORK FOR ECOSOC (D MERCADO) 
SECDEF FOR OSD - POLICY 
PACOM ALSO FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF MOPS PHUM PGOV PREL ASEC CE
SUBJECT: Northern Sri Lanka SitRep 51 
 
Ref:  A) Colombo 412  B) Colombo 410  C) Colombo 402  D) Colombo 401 
 E) Colombo 400  F) Colombo 396  G) Colombo 393  H) Colombo 384  I) 
Colombo 374  J) Colombo 368  K) Colombo 361  L) Colombo 360  M) 
Colombo 321 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The government of Sri Lanka announced a 48-hour 
period of restraint, during which the armed forces would confine 
themselves to defensive operations.   International observers noted 
that shelling of the "safe zone" had diminished on April 11 and 12, 
and that no firing was now being reported from the area.  UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the government's move, noting 
it was less than the pause of several days he had called for.  He 
reiterated his appeal to the LTTE to allow civilians freedom of 
movement and to the government to adhere to its commitments not to 
use heavy weapons.  Previously, Ambassador had undertaken numerous 
contacts with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary and Senior 
Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa to urge them to declare a 
longer humanitarian pause and consider the idea of a UN Special 
Envoy to negotiate the release of the civilians trapped in the "safe 
zone."  The ICRC plans to evacuate approximately 600 wounded 
civilians from the safe zone on April 13 and 14.  Basil Rajapaksa 
said that the hold-fire period could be extended, particularly if 
the LTTE begins to release civilians.  According to the UN and GSL 
sources, the earliest a ship can depart for the safe zone with badly 
needed food and medical supplies is April 16.  End summary. 
 
GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES 48 HOUR PERIOD OF RESTRAINT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (U) On April 12, President Rajapaksa announced a 48-hour period 
of restraint in which the Sri Lankan armed forces would confine 
themselves to defensive operations: "The President is deeply 
conscious of the need to give the civilian population entrapped as 
hostages by the ruthless actions of the LTTE the opportunity...  to 
have uninhibited freedom of movement from the No Fire Zone to the 
cleared areas.  With this objective in view, His Excellency has 
directed the Armed Forces of the State to restrict their operations 
during the New Year to those of a defensive nature...  It is timely 
for the LTTE to acknowledge its military defeat and lay down its 
weapons and surrender.  The LTTE must also renounce terrorism and 
violence permanently." 
¶3.  (U) In a statement issued on April 12 in New York, United 
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the Sri Lanka 
government's decision, noting, "This is less than the full 
humanitarian pause of several days I had pressed for but is 
nevertheless a useful first step and an opportunity to move towards 
the peaceful and orderly end to the fighting now so badly needed... 
The United Nations will, therefore, do whatever it can to support 
this humanitarian pause and help end the grave predicament of 
civilians in the conflict zone, including through the provision of 
more aid to those still trapped in the zone."  The Secretary General 
said that during the period of the pause civilians wishing to leave 
the conflict zone should be allowed to do so and should then be 
treated fully in accordance with international standards and 
principles: "In particular, the LTTE must allow civilians to choose 
whether they stay or leave. This is a terrible conflict that must be 
ended as soon as possible. In the meantime, with tens of thousands 
of lives at risk on the beaches of northern Sri Lanka, I call on the 
government forces to adhere scrupulously to the commitments of the 
 
government about non-use of heavy weapons.  I also count on key 
members of the international community to support this pause and to 
continue to do all they can to avert further death and suffering in 
Sri Lanka." 
¶4.  (SBU) Head of the ICRC Colombo office Paul Castella told 
Ambassador on April 13 that ICRC staff in the safe zone reported 
that no firing of any kind had taken place since the 
government-announced pause began at midnight.  Previously, on April 
12, firing had diminished in intensity, without artillery, but 
mortars and automatic weapons were used.  ICRC sources reported 62 
wounded, of whom 16 were children.  Three of the wounded later died 
in the hospital.  Not including those wounded on April 12, 533 
wounded were waiting to be evacuated.  The ICRC plans to get half of 
these out on April 13 and the other half on April 14.  The improved 
weather situation should help.  The ICRC told us that the Ministry 
of Health had approved an ICRC medical shipment to go with the 
vessel for the wounded but that the military had yet to clear the 
delivery. 
 
FOOD SHIP ON APRIL 16? 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator Neil Buhne told Ambassador on 
April 13 that according to Basil Rajapaksa, the earliest a ship 
could sail with WFP food supplies would be April 16.  This would be 
after the government-declared pause expires.  Significantly, Buhne 
reported that Rajapaksa said it could be extended "if the LTTE 
behaves."  Basil also confirmed that badly needed medicine would be 
on board.  Buhne also said that UN staff in the safe zone report it 
had become much quieter in the safe zone.  A few RPG rounds may have 
caused a few casualties, but nothing on the scale of the previous 
several days.  Finally, he noted that it appeared the LTTE was 
trying to move civilians into the southern part of the safe zone in 
anticipation of GSL military operations in the northern part. 
25-30,000 civilians are reluctant to move from their current 
locations, he said. If the LTTE permits them to stay, it is possible 
they might be able to escape to government-controlled territory. 
 
FOREIGN SECRETARY CONTINUES TO QUESTION SHELLING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona reported to Ambassador on 
April 13 that during his recent visit to Washington he was shown 
three satellite photos of the no fire zone, indicating houses with 
roofs blown off and water-filled circular craters.  Kohona 
questioned whether the houses could have been damaged during the 
1996 military campaign when the Mullaitivu camp was attacked by the 
LTTE.  He said he had received assurances that no artillery had been 
directed to the no-fire zone.  Ambassador noted that credible 
medical sources reported large numbers of wounded with shrapnel 
injuries sustained around April 8-9.  Ambassador told Kohona that 
had these been caused by the LTTE, there would likely have been an 
insurrection in the no-fire zone, given our knowledge of existing 
tensions stemming form from the LTTE shootings of IDPs trying to 
escape. 
 
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ON SHELLING, 
HUMANITARIAN PAUSE AND SPECIAL ENVOY IDEA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ambassador met Foreign Minister Bogollagama on April 11 to 
discuss U.S. concerns about shelling of the civilian safe zone, and 
the ideas of a humanitarian pause and of a UN Special Envoy. 
Ambassador noted he and others had held many bilateral meetings with 
senior Sri Lankan officials, including Army Commander Fonseka, 
Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, and Foreign Secretary Kohona, 
all of whom had denied that Sri Lankan forces were shelling the safe 
zone.  Ambassador stated that these denials were not credible.  The 
ICRC had reported 600 wounded waiting to be evacuated, all of whom 
had been wounded April 8 and 9.  The injuries were from shrapnel, 
not bullet wounds.  The Foreign Minister said he would attend a Sri 
Lankan National Security Council meeting later on April 11 which 
would discuss a 4-day humanitarian pause to begin on Monday, April 
¶13.  He asked what should be done during the pause.  Ambassador 
urged that the GSL work with the UN to move up the next planned food 
shipment into that window, and highlighted that medicines and 
surgical supplies of all kinds had to be included, given critical 
shortages. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Ambassador expressed hope that the GSL would not state 
publicly that the pause would be an opportunity for civilians to 
leave, only to announce at the end of that period, it was time for 
the military to act.  Ambassador pointed out that it was common 
knowledge the Tamil Tigers won't let the civilians go.  A better 
alternative, he said, would be for the GSL to allow a UN envoy to go 
in to the safe zone during the pause to talk directly to LTTE 
supremo Prabhakaran about terms for letting the civilians go and 
surrender of those LTTE cadres still in the safe zone. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Bogollagama countered that the GSL was worried that the 
LTTE would seek to generate public relations capital from a visit, 
or try to string out the discussions.  Ambassador explained that the 
UN and others could make clear publicly what the parameters of the 
visit were.  Ambassador said the UN would have to be clear that the 
urgency of getting civilians out of harm's way would not permit 
lengthy negotiations.  He observed the alternative of sending the 
army into the safe zone would be disastrous for Sri Lanka.  The 
GSL's own Unmanned Aerial Vehicle footage confirmed the LTTE is 
building a berm, bunkers and trenches in anticipation of an attack. 
The bunkers will shelter cadres so it is the civilians who will be 
killed, Ambassador noted.  The LTTE would like nothing more than to 
see 10,000 or more civilians killed which would give them a new 
1983-style massacre around which they could rejuvenate the LTTE 
after its military defeat.  Large civilian casualties would also 
have serious longer-term consequences for the GSL.  Ambassador 
sought Bogollagama's personal intervention in raising these issues 
in the National Security Council meeting. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator Neil Buhne saw Bogollagama soon 
afterwards to share with him UN satellite imagery showing recent 
shelling craters. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Foreign Minister called on April 12 to brief 
Ambassador on the outcome of the Sri Lankan Security Council 
meeting.  He previewed the President's announcement of a 48-hour 
"restraint of military operations to defensive nature" to begin at 
midnight.  He said the military had opposed any pause, so as not to 
give the LTTE time to re-group.  The Security Council had settled on 
 
a two-day period of restraint, which he thought was positive. 
Bogollagama also said the GSL would work to find a ship so that 
relief supplies could go in during the 48 hour hold-fire period. 
The Minister reported that he had raised idea of a UN envoy, but 
there was no confidence within the Security Council that an envoy 
could do anything. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Ambassador observed that the President had backtracked on 
his conversation with UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon in which he had held out 
the prospect of a 4-day "humanitarian pause" previously discussed. 
Ambassador noted that holding fire is something the GSL should be 
doing anyway in their own self-declared safe zone.  Further, the GSL 
announcement appeared to leave little or no room for diplomacy. 
Ambassador asked whether the Minister had shared the Norwegian 
information that some LTTE leaders favor talks to work out a 
surrender.  Bogollagama responded that he had, but Norway has lost 
credibility.  Ambassador told the Foreign Minister that he was 
forced to conclude that the Government had decided the military will 
go into the safe zone and settle this, which would be disastrous 
both for the trapped civilians and the GSL.  He asserted that Sri 
Lanka was missing a big opportunity to negotiate an LTTE surrender 
and save many lives.  Bogollagama hesitated, then said, "let's wait 
to see how the 48-hour period goes." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Ambassador subsequently spoke to the President's brother 
and senior advisor, Basil Rajapaksa and sought to convince him of 
the need for time to persuade the LTTE to surrender peacefully. 
Rajapaksa responded that so far the UN had not broached the idea of 
a Special Envoy.  Further, he asked how we could know that the LTTE 
wouldn't take the envoy hostage?  Or that Prabhakaran would agree to 
meet?  He said the GSL would need firm commitments on these issues 
before agreeing to a Special Envoy.  Ambassador responded that those 
conditions were all manageable, but that the main thing was that the 
GSL agree to give time for diplomacy to work.  He emphasized that we 
all want an end to LTTE terror, but not in a way that kills 
thousands of civilians and gives the LTTE a new cause on which to 
re-mobilize opinion behind it.  Rajapaksa agreed and said he would 
talk to the President. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Tamil sources from within the "safe zone" reported 37 
dead and 112 injured April 12 and until 7 am April 13 due to 
artillery fire. 
 
BLAKE