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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
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DE RUEHCH #0268/01 0921356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021356Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7829
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHISINAU 000268 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL MD
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
SCENESETTER 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please Protect 
Accordingly. 
 
REFS: A. 08 Chisinau 1257  B. 08 Chisinau 1276 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  With the April 5 at-large 
parliamentary elections rapidly approaching, the 
electoral campaign is at its final stage.  The 
most recent poll shows a relatively high 26.4 
percent of voters as still undecided, and likely 
to make up their minds in the very last days.  At 
this point it is still unclear whether the Party 
of Communists (PCRM) will overcome its steady 
slide in popularity since 2001 to win enough votes 
to put together the ruling coalition or whether 
the opposition parties could overcome historical 
animosities to form a coalition of the 61 
parliamentary votes (out of 101) needed to elect 
the president.  An increasingly real possibility 
is a third outcome:  that neither side gets a 
clear majority and that the new parliament remains 
deadlocked and unable to choose a consensus 
president.  If two attempts to choose a president 
fail, the law requires a second round of 
nationwide parliamentary elections.  Post is 
completing its campaign monitoring visits to all 
32 raions (districts) in the country (to be 
reported septel) and will field teams of observers 
on election day.  End summary. 
 
PCRM Steadily Losing Support 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) From its high point in the 2001 
parliamentary elections, when it gained 49.9 
percent of the vote (and 71 seats in Parliament), 
the PCRM has suffered a steady decline:  in the 
2005 parliamentary elections, it received 45.9 
percent (and 56 seats).  The trend in local 
council and mayoral elections was similar.  In the 
2003 mayoral elections, the PCRM won 41 percent of 
the mayoralties, dropping to 37.3 percent in 2007; 
it won 48.1 percent of the votes for raion and 
municipal councils in 2003, dropping to 34.2 
percent in 2007; and in the 2003 town and village 
council elections, the PCRM won 44.9 percent of 
votes, dropping to 32.7 percent in 2007. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The PCRM has continued to suffer from 
declining popularity throughout the country.  Most 
polls put the PCRM somewhere in the 30 percent 
range, representing solid support (i.e., 
respondents express few or no second-party 
preferences) from mostly older and rural voters. 
It is expected that the PCRM will be the largest 
single party in the parliament, but that it will 
not muster enough votes to put together a majority 
without the support of MPs from other parties. 
 
Legal (but Suspect) Means to Gain Advantage May 
Backfire 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Moldovan law prohibits changes to the 
electoral code within six months of the elections. 
In January 2008, in the run-up to the elections, 
the GOM made several changes to the electoral code 
which, though legal, appeared designed to give an 
advantage to the PCRM.  One change to the 
electoral code raised the threshold for 
parliamentary representation from 4 to 6 percent 
of votes, in an attempt to exclude smaller 
parties.  The higher threshold will result in more 
"wasted" votes for smaller parties.  The votes for 
parties that do not receive at least 6 percent of 
votes will be redistributed to the parties which 
cleared the threshold.  The PCRM would, at its 
present poll strength, receive the plurality share 
of the redistributed votes.  The new code also 
banned electoral coalitions during the election 
campaign.  The ban on coalitions divides and 
theoretically weakens the opposition.  The changes 
to the code also disallowed Moldovans with dual 
nationality from holding elected office. 
 
¶5. (SBU) However, these moves may backfire on the 
PCRM:  the threshold will likely eliminate several 
 
CHISINAU 00000268  002 OF 004 
 
 
smaller parties that might have been willing to 
trade their small number of votes in Parliament 
for a minor cabinet position.  The PCRM may find 
itself isolated without smaller parties willing to 
form a coalition, and consequently denied the 
possibility of a majority.  In addition, the three 
major opposition parties have already declared 
that they would not vote with the PCRM in the new 
Parliament to elect the President. 
 
Some Charges of Abuse; Some Problems Resolved 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) During the campaign, some opposition 
party leaders said that police intimidated voters 
with drawn-out checks of their businesses and 
threats of possible job loss.  Some public workers 
(school directors, hospital directors, civil 
servants) reportedly were told that they had to 
attend PCRM campaign meetings.  The government 
also opened or reopened cases against some 
opposition leaders in advance of the electoral 
season.  We have heard consistent reports of 
misuse of administrative resources, e.g., official 
cars and cell phones used for campaign purposes. 
We note that these charges have also been levied 
against other parties, in raions where other 
parties govern at the local level.  A Moldovan 
NGO, which systematically monitored the pre- 
campaign and campaign seasons, reported police 
intimidation of one of its staff during an attempt 
to investigate the violent disruption of campaign 
meetings.  Media not affiliated with the ruling 
party claimed intimidation by governmental 
representatives (e.g., a police officer twisting a 
reporter's arm during an interview and local 
police seizing computers in a warrantless search 
of a TV station).  In reaction to the ProTV case 
(ref A), government decided to postpone any action 
on the licensing of broadcasters until after the 
elections. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In December there were reports that the 
Ministry of Justice was creating roadblocks for 
the re-registration of political parties.  On 
January 30, all 28 parties who sought registration 
received it.  During the electoral campaign, 
parties held political demonstrations.  (See ref B 
for an account of an opposition rally that went 
ahead despite police attempts to block it.  See 
ref A for an account of GOM threats to de-license 
an independent TV station, and the government's 
decision to defer action until "later," under 
international pressure.)  Reports of police 
stopping buses of opposition supporters heading to 
rallies in Chisinau noted drawn-out  document 
checks, and participants being late for the 
demonstration. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Central Election Commission (CEC) 
established and administered the rules for 
campaigning and voting, regularly cooperating with 
international organizations and NGOs.  Donors 
noted a high level of transparency in CEC 
administration of campaign-related activity.  The 
CEC initially resisted Embassy requests to 
register U.S. Embassy Kyiv officials and some 
embassy-affiliated people as election monitors. 
The CEC eventually accredited all our volunteers. 
On the down side, after allowing NDI to register 
short-term observers, the CEC refused the same 
request from IRI. 
 
It's About Personalities not Ideologies 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) There is not a great deal of difference 
between the parties in terms of their platform. 
Despite its "Communist" name, all parties, 
including the PCRM, support a market economy and 
promote European integration as a goal.  The 
liberal parties (the Liberal Democratic Party, 
PLDM, and the Liberal Party, PL) take a more free- 
market stance and favor closer ties with Romania. 
Note that they do not support unification; that 
idea died as a viable platform over a decade ago. 
The PL and PLDM tilt in favor of NATO membership, 
while the PCRM maintains support for the 
 
CHISINAU 00000268  003 OF 004 
 
 
neutrality clause in the Constitution.   However, 
most voters have almost no interest in these 
policies and continue to identify parties by the 
names of their leaders.  For many voters the 
primary concern is solving the economic problems 
that have driven almost a quarter of the 
population out of the country.  The party that 
makes the most believable pitch to improve the 
economy is the one that will receive their votes. 
 
Predictions--and the Best Outlook for the PCRM 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Given historical trends, poll results, 
analyses from contacts, and our own educated 
guesses, we are predicting that fairly counted 
election results would yield about 30-35 percent 
for the PCRM; 10-20 percent for the AMN (Our 
Moldova Alliance), and a maximum of 10-15 percent 
each for the PL and PLDM.  These scenarios assume 
that only the PCRM, AMN, PL, and PLDM get past the 
six percent threshold.  Though some observers 
still consider it possible that Dumitru Diacov's 
Democratic Party (PD) or Vasile Tarlev's UCM 
(Centrist Union of Moldova) might cross the 
threshold, the chances seem marginal. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In a projected scenario representing the 
most favorable outcome for the PCRM (35 percent, 
and an AMN/PL/PLDM aggregate of an equal 35 
percent), the PCRM would receive half of the 
remaining 30 percent "wasted" votes, or 15 
percent, giving it a total of 50 percent of the 
vote, and the AMN/PL/PLDM aggregate the same, 
leaving both sides in deadlock well short of the 
three-fifths vote needed to elect a President.  In 
a second parliamentary election, both sides would 
need the support of smaller parties that did not 
make it over the threshold.  In the past, the PCRM 
has shown itself adept at winning over individual 
opposition membersQin Parliament, in the raions, 
and even in the Chisinau Municipal CouncilQin 
sufficient numbers, and by perfectly legal quid- 
pro-quo offers, to enhance its numbers. 
 
The Real Politics Begin after the Elections 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Election day represents a process of 
dealing the cards to each party.  Once the results 
are counted, the PCRM, AMN, PL, PLDM and other 
parties will each evaluate their positions and 
calculate the strength of their hand.  That's when 
the real political game begins.  On the opposition 
side, several very stubborn, strong-willed men 
will begin the search for the right formula to 
divide the spoils.  If one partyQmost likely the 
AMNQdid significantly better than the other two, 
then its leader, Serafim Urechean, would have the 
best argument to be the coalition candidate for 
President.  It is at the cabinet level that we 
could expect some drawn-out and complicated 
wrangling for positions. 
 
¶13. (SBU) If the April 5 voting gives no clear 
majority in Parliament, as we expect, then it is 
highly doubtful that any candidate will receive 
the required 61 votes in the first round of 
parliamentary voting for president.  In such a 
case a second parliamentary runoff round would be 
held within three days between the two top 
candidates.  If a factionalized Parliament again 
failed to elect a president, then parliamentarians 
would have a final, third try, which must be 
organized within 15 days.  If this last try also 
fails to elect a President, then the Acting 
President must dissolve the newly elected 
Parliament and set a date for new parliamentary 
elections.  During such a political crisis, 
President Voronin would continue on as Acting 
President with the same cabinet in place, until a 
new parliament succeeded in electing a president. 
Such a situation took place in 2000 when the 
Parliament had to elect the president, failed, and 
was dissolved.  "Early" elections were announced 
and resulted in a new parliament and the election 
of President Voronin in 2001. 
 
 
CHISINAU 00000268  004 OF 004 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) As we have noted, predictions are still 
impossible at this point.  For election junkies 
who want to see how things turn out as they turn 
out, Post recommends that they log on to 
www.cec.md or www.voteaza.md, starting around 
11:00 P.M. local (4:00 P.M. EST) on April 5, and 
watch the results as they are posted in real time. 
 
CHAUDHRY