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INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL SU CD EAID EUN
SUBJECT: IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CHAD: JOINT 
U.S.-EU RECOMMENATIONS 
 
¶1.  Summary: The European Commission DG ECHO) and the U.S. 
Government (State/PRM and USAID/OFDA) delivered joint 
recommendations in late March to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office for the Cordinator of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for te improvement of assistance 
to refugees and iternally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
eastern Chad.  Based on a field visit in late January,the 
10-person team recommended changes in coodination structures 
and improved sharing of scurity information, as well as 
continued capacity-building for Chadian government officials 
and institutions.  As the world's two largest humanitarian 
donors, the EU and USG joined forces to speak with one voice 
to key funding partners with the goal of making humanitarian 
assistance more effective and efficient. End summary. 
 
¶2.  As part of a continuing transatlantic partnership, the 
European Commission (DG ECHO) and the U.S. Government 
(State/PRM and USAID/OFDA) conducted a joint field mission 
from January 25-31 to examine humanitarian assistance in 
eastern Chad.  ECHO and USG staffers had teamed up in 
previous assessments, including Burundi/Tanzania, 
Liberia/Guinea (2005) and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (2007).  In Chad, the 10-member team looked at issues 
of coordination, humanitarian reform and clusters, shrinking 
humanitarian space, civil-military relations, security and 
protection, early recovery and transition to development, the 
role of the state, and other concerns.  The text of the 
post-mission report, cleared by PRM DAS William Fitzgerald, 
follows. 
 
Darfur refugees in midst of Chadian poverty 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Chad is among the world's poorest countries, ranked 170 
of 177 countries in UNDP's 2007 Human Development Report. 
The fragile situation in eastern Chad turned into a 
humanitarian emergency in 2003 when Sudanese refugees driven 
by fighting in Darfur crossed the Chadian border.  UNHCR 
erected 11 of the current 12 camps in a 9-month period in 
¶2004.  Two years later, Chadian internally-displaced persons 
(IDPs) fled violence within Chad.  By January 2009, there 
were approximately 250,000 refugees in 12 camps and 185,000 
IDPs in more than 30 sites in eastern Chad, according to 
UNHCR (note: this mission did not cover the estimated 52,000 
refugees from Central African Republic in southern Chad nor 
the estimated 5,000 urban refugees in Ndjamena).  The task of 
providing services for nearly a half-million people is 
complicated by the harsh and inaccessible terrain of eastern 
Chad, extremely low levels of local development, very few 
government services, threats from Sudanese and Chadian armed 
groups, and dramatically increasing crime and banditry.  The 
presence of an international military force (EUFOR followed 
by United Nations) brought some security, but also additional 
layers of coordination.  This report consists of observations 
and recommendations in five general categories: quality of 
assistance, coordination, civil-military relations, protection 
and security, and the role of the Government of Chad. 
 
Quality of humanitarian assistance high 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Observations:  With a few exceptions, the team observed 
no significant gaps in services to refugees and IDPs. 
Indicators show that assistance to refugees and IDPs is 
largely meeting internationally recognized standards in most 
sectors.  There are, however, significant differences in 
services provided to refugees, IDPs, and local residents, a 
result, in part, of differing international mandates.  This 
situation, which exists worldwide, is quite noticeable in 
eastern Chad where refugees and IDPs are sometimes 
co-located.  In addition, competition for scarce resources is 
intensified by the addition of thousands of refugees and IDPs 
using firewood, water, land, and other local goods, thus 
increasing the potential for tensions among populations as 
well as negative environmental impacts.  In the Koukou area, 
for example, 80,000 refugees and IDPs have dwarfed the local 
population of 5,000. 
 
¶5.  Humanitarian actors have overcome serious logistical 
hurdles, for example opening up a second overland supply 
route through Libya to complement the busy corridor from 
Cameroon.  Most officials we spoke with said that there was 
no major shortfall in funding to address refugee and IDP 
needs in Chad.  The $317 million CAP was 80 percent funded in 
2008, making it one of the best-funded 2008 CAPs, according 
to OCHA. 
 
¶6.  Most camps and sites are firmly in the "care and 
maintenance" or "protection awaiting durable solutions" phase 
of delivery.  Humanitarian workers, refugees and IDPs offered 
mixed views on whether the time was ripe for early recovery 
 
BRUSSELS 00000540  002 OF 004 
 
 
and transitions to development.  While justifiable in some 
areas of humanitarian operations, it is rendered difficult by 
limited access to natural resources and land, as well as 
ongoing insecurity.  The UN system is under Phase IV security 
and armed escorts are increasingly used, making access to 
beneficiaries of assistance more difficult.  Humanitarian 
workers rotate frequently due to the hot, isolated and 
dangerous conditions, as well as separation from family and 
friends.  High turnover reduces institutional memory and 
makes continuity of program approach difficult. 
 
¶7.  Recommendations:  While there is value in comparing 
different populations (and international funding streams 
sometimes support that), we recommend that new systems also 
be implemented to allow humanitarian actors to work across 
populations where feasible (e.g. humanitarian workers could 
address shelter or water for all populations).  The close 
proximity of many IDP and refugee sites suggests the need for 
innovative approaches to harmonize services and approaches 
across sectors (water, sanitation, health, etc.). 
Humanitarian actors require flexibility to adapt to 
situations on the ground and develop approaches that make 
sense for the set of needs in their particular area.  While 
large-scale return is not yet feasible, plans for early 
recovery and transitions to development need to be more 
actively discussed and prepared so that they can be 
implemented as conditions permit. 
 
¶8.  We recommend that OCHA fully roll out the early recovery 
cluster in Chad with UNDP playing an active and central role 
and including other relevant development actors, such as the 
Delegation of the European Commission and the Agence 
Francaise de Developpement.  Due to high staff turnover, 
humanitarian agencies should institutionalize a "lessons 
learned" mechanism to ensure continuity.  In addition, the 
Cluster System should be implemented with greater flexibility 
to allow for improved communication (e.g. between clusters) 
and better identification of response gaps.  We note that the 
Cluster System was intended to be flexible in addressing gaps 
and adapting to country-specific environments.  Clusters 
should make strategic recommendations by not only responding 
to immediate problems but also preparing for potential future 
gaps and building capacity (through training and information). 
 
Gaps in humanitarian coordination 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  Observations:  As the number of refugees and IDPs has 
increased during the last five years, the field of 
humanitarian actors has grown larger and increasingly 
complex.  There are at least eight UN agencies and some 52 
NGOs/IOs (40 international, 12 indigenous) operating in 
eastern Chad, most with different mandates, contracts, 
donors, perspectives and organizational cultures. 
Coordination is therefore extremely complex and often 
repetitive and time-consuming, reducing its effectiveness. 
UN agencies coordinate among themselves, NGOs coordinate 
among themselves, the UN and NGOs/IOs coordinate with each 
other, the Government of Chad and humanitarian actors 
coordinate, and the entire humanitarian community coordinates 
with national and international security officials.  Not 
surprisingly, gaps in information flow and leadership exist. 
While there are many levels of coordination and many actors 
empowered to coordinate, the system appears to lack an 
overarching structure and personality to pull it all 
together.   Reports from the field suggest that coordination 
has improved in recent months.  But we noted that the flow of 
information from field level through Abeche to Ndjamena and 
then back out has serious flaws.  In general, we observed 
that coordination among agencies and actors functions better 
at field level than in Abeche and Ndjamena.  Field-level 
actors noted that they send concerns, problems, and analyses 
up the coordination ladder for resolution, but often do not 
receive feedback.  OCHA has not yet achieved its full 
staffing level.  The role of Abeche seems to fall somewhere 
in between making policy and serving as an operational 
headquarters, and is seen by many actors as a hindrance. 
 
¶10.  Recommendations:  We note an urgent need to improve 
vertical coordination so that information flows more openly 
from top to bottom and conversely.  The joint mission also 
recommends both clarifying the role and position of the 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Deputy HC and defining more 
clearly their relationship with OCHA, the SRSG and the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).  The HC will soon 
complete his assignment, and we recommend that his 
replacement be a senior, experienced humanitarian official 
with strong leadership skills, an appreciation of the vital 
role played by NGOs and the ability to work cooperatively 
with a wide variety of other actors and organizational 
cultures (including UN, GoC, NGOs and military).  An ideal HC 
 
BRUSSELS 00000540  003 OF 004 
 
 
would be experienced in the management of a complex crisis 
where a multidimensional UN DPKO mission has been deployed. 
Given the increase in security incidents in Abeche, the 
central role of Abeche in the humanitarian organizational 
structure should be reassessed.  The NGO Coordinating 
Committee (CCO) in Abeche serves an important role in 
coordinating humanitarian NGOs, but should seek a common 
voice with which to speak to multilateral organizatios and 
the Government of Chad.  We noted that N and government 
officials often characterize the NGO community as a disparate 
group speakig with many different voices and each wanting 
different things. 
 
Civil-Military relationskey to security 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  Observations:  The presence f EUFOR necessitated clear 
articulation of th relationship between military and 
humanitaian organizations.  The mission noted that much 
progress has been achieved in that regard. EUFOR gained 
valuable experience working with the humanitarian community 
during its deployment.  EUFOR set up a comprehensive system 
of liaison with humanitarian actors at the field level, which 
significantly facilitated effective civ-mil coordination. 
MINURCAT could benefit from lessons learned on coordination, 
relationships, and the questionable value of military 
implementation of civil affairs projects.  The security 
problem has now shifted from one of armed conflict to one of 
daily criminality.  Attacks on humanitarian workers by armed 
criminals and bandits increased sharply in 2008.  Greater 
insecurity led organizations to centralize expensive vehicles 
and equipment in Abeche, which seems to have pushed Abeche's 
crime levels to new heights.  NGOs remain frustrated with 
their inability to attend UN Security Management Team (SMT) 
meetings and believe they are not receiving sufficient and 
timely security information.  UN officials remain irritated 
that many NGOs refuse to follow UN security guidelines, sign 
MOUs with the UN allowing sharing of sensitive security 
information, and provide requested information about 
personnel in the field.  NGOs note that they do not have a 
central focal point to whom they can report security 
incidents, and that they cannot communicate by radio with 
EUFOR and UN officials because they are not on the same 
frequency. UN officials in Chad could also benefit on this 
issue from lessons learned by the international community in 
neighboring Sudan (Darfur and Khartoum). 
 
¶12.  MINURCAT I was slower than anticipated in training and 
deploying the Integrated Security Detachments (DIS), the 
first link in the security chain, a delay that contributed to 
the increasing insecurity.  EUFOR and other security actors 
acknowledge that counting the number of IDPs who return to 
their homes is not an appropriate measure of mission success, 
and they are correctly, in our view, developing alternative 
ways to assess the impact of their operations. 
 
¶13.  Recommendations: MINURCAT II should be deployed starting 
March 15, with a smooth and effective transition from 
EUFOR/MINURCAT I to ensure no gaps in security.  EUFOR 
officials should continue vigorously to transmit lessons 
learned to MINURCAT.  MINURCAT should integrate lessons 
learned from the humanitarian community, including 
specialized training and implementation of civ-mil 
guidelines, such as those developed by OCHA.  MINURCAT II's 
justice advisory unit, human rights unit and humanitarian 
liaison unit should be deployed quickly and effectively to 
enhance communication within the humanitarian community.  The 
units must be established quickly at the field level, as well 
as in Ndjamena and Abeche, since coordination must occur at 
the Guereda, Iriba, and Goz Beida levels in order to avoid 
duplication of efforts on issues like salaries, incentives 
and hiring practices.  Liaison between the UN and NGOs must 
be improved regarding the sharing of security information. 
Because of their field exposure and their role as UN 
implementing partners, NGOs should be allowed to participate 
in UN security meetings, receive UN security information, and 
be included in evacuation plans if desired.  The mission 
recommends continuing an independent humanitarian air service 
in Chad. 
 
Rising insecurity is key concern 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  Observations:  International humanitarian space has 
shrunk considerably in the last two years as insecurity has 
impeded the free movement of humanitarian workers.  The 
Deputy SRSG and officials on the ground confirmed that 
militarization of camps and sites is becoming a serious 
issue.  They confirmed the recruitment of soldiers, including 
children, takes place in Oure Cassoni, Am Nabak and many 
other camps.  Camp leaders and NGO counterparts stressed the 
 
BRUSSELS 00000540  004 OF 004 
 
 
need for secondary education to deter the recruitment of 
young people in camps and sites. 
 
¶15.  Recommendations:  Banditry and crime are becoming more 
of a problem than armed conflict, and an adequately-resourced 
Integrated Security Detachment (DIS) is essential to enforce 
security.  The DIS should continue to deploy to refugee camps 
as soon as possible.  ICRC and UNHCR must continue their 
important protection role as MINURCAT II assumes a larger 
footprint in eastern Chad.  To create options for teens who 
might otherwise be recruited by armed groups, organizations 
involved in child protection should coordinate their efforts 
and lobby the Government of Chad for the establishment of 
secondary education. 
 
Role of the Government of Chad 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  Observations:  We recognize the Government of Chad's 
important support for the EUFOR and MINURCAT deployments and 
its facilitation of humanitarian work.  In addition, local 
communities and governments have been generous in sharing 
land and resources with refugees and IDPs. 
 
¶17.  However, the Government of Chad has an extremely limited 
presence in much of the country outside of Ndjamena.  Local 
residents receive few health or education benefits from the 
state.  The Governor of Dar Sila province noted that public 
education first came to his region as recently as the 1990s. 
Against that backdrop, the Government has been neither 
willing nor able to provide services for either refugees or 
for its own IDP citizens.  Inadequate or non-existent systems 
of law enforcement and justice lead to a climate of impunity 
for criminals preying on residents, refugees, IDPs, and 
humanitarian workers.  The Government's establishment of the 
Commission Nationale d'Accueil et de Reintegration des 
Refugies (CNAR), Coordination Nationale d'Appui a la Force 
Internationale dans l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT), and the 
Direction des Organisations Non-Gouvernmentales (DONG) has 
the potential to provide important institutional liaisons 
with the humanitarian community that need to be strengthened 
and developed. 
 
¶18.  Recommendations:  The mission stresses the need to 
involve the Chadian government more closely in facing the 
needs of people affected by crisis in eastern Chad.  It is 
the responsibility of national authorities, not the 
international community, to provide services and protection 
for its citizens.  The international community is not a 
substitute for national authorities, particularly in areas of 
governance, law enforcement and rule of law.  The Government 
of Chad should support MINURCAT to facilitate a smooth 
handover from EUFOR to MINURCAT II.  An open and regular 
channel of communication needs to be established with the 
DONG/Ministry of Economy and Planning and the humanitarian 
community.  The Government has a right to receive information 
from NGOs, but in return it must be willing to facilitate 
humanitarian work by securing humanitarian space.  Donors 
need to continue to build the capacity of Chadian officials 
and institutions.  End of report. 
 
¶19.  Comment: These joint U.S.-EU recommendations were 
delivered to UNHCR and OCHA in Geneva in late March.  PRM, 
OFDA and ECHO will follow up with the international 
organizations in a timely manner to ensure that 
recommendations are implemented.  End comment. 
MURRAY 
.