VZCZCXRO0899
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHWN #0219/01 0962025
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 062025Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7308
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRIDGETOWN 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR AND INL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM ECON PGOV XL
SUBJECT:  Counter-Narcotics on our Eastern Caribbean Third Border: 
Drug Flows Rise as Resources Decline 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are seeing a steady 
increase in narcotics trafficking and the attendant problems of gun 
and gang violence in their communities.  Trafficking is on the rise 
as drug runners look for alternate routes to compensate for 
successes under Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative.  Local law 
enforcement, while receptive to training and aware of the growing 
threat, is under-resourced and plagued with antiquated legal codes 
and corruption in the ranks, sapping their ability to fight the 
growing problem.  At this critical juncture, the donor community 
seems to be retreating in the face of competing priorities elsewhere 
-- despite the fact that the drugs are bound for their own shores. 
Additional resources for the thinly-stretched law enforcement 
agencies in the region, to include a robust regional maritime entity 
-- possible under the Regional Security System, will be a 
pre-requisite for gaining any real ground against narco-traffickers 
along the Third Border.   End Summary. 
 
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AWASH IN A SEA OF DRUGS 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The island nations that make up Embassy Bridgetown's area 
of responsibility -- Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines - have seen a steady increase in the volume of narcotics 
transshipment in recent years.  The drugs, destined for both the 
North American and European markets, have begun to flow through the 
Caribbean at greater levels, as the launch of Plan Colombia and the 
Merida Initiative appear to have pushed traffickers to seek 
alternate routes.  Last year, local law enforcement with the help of 
DEA and other international partners interdicted some 5,291 
kilograms of cocaine, 35,297 kilograms of marijuana, and 3,302 units 
(pills) of MDMA (ecstasy), along with approximately $1.8 million in 
currency.  Local law enforcement made over 200 trafficking-related 
arrests.  These volumes are large -- especially for a region that is 
home to only about one million people -- but they represent, by DEA 
estimates, less than five percent of the flow through the region. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to JIATF and DEA intelligence estimates and 
projections for drug flows through the region in 2009, approximately 
1450 metric tons of cocaine will flow from South America.  Roughly 
one third of that will transit from Venezuela, with over 220 metric 
tons predicted to flow through the Eastern Caribbean.  These 
projections are a significant increase from past years. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) These expectations for increased flow through the Eastern 
Caribbean are based on the assumption that continued counter drug 
successes in the Eastern Pacific, Mexico and Western Caribbean will 
continue to force traffickers to find paths of lesser resistance. 
They also are predicated on the assumption that drug runners do not 
feel threatened by interdiction efforts and capabilities by regional 
law enforcement.  Some also believe that political ties between some 
Eastern Caribbean islands (notably St. Vincent and Dominica) and 
Venezuela may facilitate narcotics trafficking through the region. 
Already, DEA has seen evidence of increased use of these islands as 
stash and distribution locations by Venezuelan Trafficking 
organizations.  More disturbingly for these small, thinly-stretched 
police forces, increasing demand in Europe and sustained U.S. demand 
is starting to be matched with developing local demand due to 
"spillover" from trafficking operations. 
 
------------------------------- 
INTERDICTION CAPABILITY LAGGING 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While the senior leaders in all these countries recognize 
the threat posed by narcotics trafficking, they face several hurdles 
to mounting a robust defense:  lack of funding and equipment, 
corruption within the ranks and among some in government, and 
competing demands from the need to project a tourism-friendly image 
all sap at the political will needed to admit to and tackle the 
trafficking problem. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) All the countries in the region have a basic level of 
competence in regards to Counter Drug (CD) interdiction capacity, 
and have demonstrated willingness, even an eagerness, to engage in 
training to build capacity.  However, the lack of basic 
investigative, prosecutorial and judicial tools, coupled with a lack 
of equipment and training for the equipment, are impediments to 
better interdiction. These deficiencies have limited complex 
conspiracy investigations and prosecutions necessary to dismantle 
modern Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) (i.e. surveillance, use 
of undercover and informants, recorded calls, controlled buys and 
deliveries, judicial wire intercepts, plea bargaining, the 
 
BRIDGETOWN 00000219  002 OF 004 
 
 
establishment of cooperating defendants, financial analysis, asset 
forfeiture).  Training to date by U.S. and international partners to 
mentor and train the local agencies in these skills has been 
somewhat effective, but hampered by lack of funding for follow-up 
and lack of coordination within the donor community. 
 
---------------------- 
WHAT'S IN THE CUPBOARD 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) DRUG SQUADS:  Each of the countries in this area of 
responsibility has its own police force with a designated drug squad 
with primary responsibility for conducting drug investigations. 
These drug squads tend to operate reactively rather than 
proactively.  Intelligence gathered is used solely to identify 
when/where a load of drugs might be intercepted.  When a vessel 
containing drugs is intercepted, the only persons arrested are the 
actual crew members on the vessel and the investigation typically 
terminates at this point.  The principals running the organizations 
are not arrested.  Cooperation by arrested crew members is rare due 
in large part to a lack of plea bargaining tools and minimalist 
penalties for trafficking offenses.  Although some islands have 
conspiracy, money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, the 
prosecuting and judicial authorities have yet to use them - the 
notable exception being St. Vincent, which in a landmark event made 
its first arrest under such provisions in January, 2009.  For the 
most part, drug squads do not know how to marshal evidence against 
those not found in "actual possession" of drugs. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) SPECIAL UNITS:  In addition to drug squads, each island 
may also have other agencies or units (i.e., Financial Intelligence 
Units, Intelligence Units, and Special Branch Units) that support 
the CD efforts of the drug squad.  These specialized units operate 
within the same criminal justice system that lacks the institutional 
will or capacity to arrest or prosecute anyone other than the person 
found in possession of drugs.  Although many of those assigned to 
the drug squads and specialized units are extremely dedicated, they 
have inadequate facilities, and are poorly paid, trained and 
equipped to carry out complex and long term investigations.  There 
also exists very little inter-island cooperation in terms of CD 
targeting and/or coordination, unless carried out under the umbrella 
of a U.S. DEA or British SOCA-led investigation. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) CUSTOMS AUTHORITY:  Each of the seven island nations has a 
Customs authority or ministry responsible for controlling the goods 
and persons moving through the ports and airports.  In addition to 
uniformed officers, some agencies dedicate a small number of persons 
(1-2) to conduct more in-depth investigations including illegal drug 
importation.  With the possible exception of St. Lucia, though, none 
of the local Customs authorities have been significant contributors 
to CD efforts in the region. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) PORTS:  The consensus among CD partners, both local and 
donor community, is that there is a very high probability that large 
quantities of drugs are being moved through the maritime ports of 
the island nations of the Eastern Caribbean (including Martinique 
and Guadeloupe).  Virtually no effort is made to verify what cargo 
is passing through unless specific intelligence exists to conduct 
further inquiry.  The majority of the agencies lack the manpower, 
technology and basic tools to perform their duties, such as 
centralized databases and/or drug detector canines.  Moreover, 
corruption in the ports is believed to be rampant.  Numerous customs 
officers and guards working at the ports were arrested this past 
year.  DEA has identified drug sources of supply (SOS) who utilize 
corrupt brokers at the port to aid in their trafficking efforts as 
well as sources of supply who were actually brokers themselves. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) AIRPORTS:  With the exception of Barbados, security at 
airports in the Eastern Caribbean is lax, and the use of technical 
support such as cameras, computer automation and centralized 
databases is lacking.  DTO's employ couriers or corrupt baggage 
handlers to place bags containing drugs onto airplanes.  Couriers 
are also used to smuggle drugs into the U.S., UK and Canada. 
Commuter airlines between the islands are frequently used to move 
drugs and proceeds.  DEA has provided examples of swallowers coming 
from Jamaica or other mules with marijuana in their luggage on a 
weekly basis to all islands in our AOR.  Cocaine is also coming in 
from Guyana and Trinidad, and cash is regularly transported from 
Barbados to Trinidad. Investigations and intelligence have uncovered 
airline employees putting drugs on inter-island flights that have 
been transferred to U.S.-bound aircraft destined for JFK airport. 
TSA has initiated a program in St. Lucia to improve airport security 
at one of the country's two airports, but there are reports that 
significant drug transshipment activity continues unabated at the 
other airport. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) COAST GUARD/POLICE MARINE UNITS:  Each island has either 
a Coast Guard or a marine police unit or both for patrolling coastal 
 
BRIDGETOWN 00000219  003 OF 004 
 
 
waters and supporting CD interdiction efforts.  Their effectiveness 
has been minimal due to poorly maintained or inoperable assets, lack 
of discipline, poor communication and/or operational protocols, 
incompetence and/or corruption.  The Barbados Coast Guard has the 
best maritime assets in the region; however, concerns about 
corruption have relegated the agency to being a virtual non-entity 
in CD planning and operations.  Recent evidence suggests that 
persons within the agency actively assist the DTO's in their drug 
trafficking activities, as reflected by the December, 2008 arrest of 
a Barbados Coast Guard officer who was on board a vessel that was 
returning to St Vincent after delivering approximately 423 pounds of 
marijuana to Barbados.  In that case, the Barbados drug squad 
contacted the St Vincent Coast Guard, not the Barbados Coast Guard, 
to intercept the transporting vessel. 
 
---------------------------- 
RSS: UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The sole aviation asset in the region with capacity to 
provide aerial support of CD interdiction operation is the Regional 
Security System (RSS) Air Wing, based in Barbados.  The RSS is the 
common military defense force that is shared and in theory 
contributed to by all seven of the Eastern Caribbean partner 
countries.  The primary mission of the RSS air wing is to provide 
detection and monitoring capacity with their two Fairchild C-26 twin 
engine turbo-prop aircraft that were manufactured in 1989 and 
donated by INL to the RSS in the 1990's. Unfortunately, since that 
time the avionic and navigational systems of these aircraft have 
become dated or obsolete, and resources to repair or update them has 
dwindled with the continued reduction in INCLE assistance funds. 
The staff is extremely professional, experienced and generally 
successful in detecting and monitoring suspected trafficking 
vessels, especially during intelligence-driven CD operations. 
Unfortunately, they must rely upon inept, incompetent or corrupt 
local coast guard or marine police units to conduct the actual 
interdiction.  The predictable result is that the RSS is far more 
likely to watch a drug runner sail off into the sunset than to 
coordinate an apprehension.  A competent and capable surface 
interdiction capacity is necessary for the full benefit of their 
services to be realized. 
 
------------------------ 
DONOR COMMUNITY ACTIVITY 
----------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) At present, the only consistent presence of international 
or NATO CD capacity within the region is provided by the French, a 
serendipitous byproduct of the proximity of the French island 
departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe.  In June, 2008, the 
commander of the French forces in the French Antilles and the 
Director of the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) 
signed a memorandum of agreement establishing a JIATFS counter-drug 
task group and regional counter-drug coordination center under 
leadership of the French in Martinique. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Based on the ineffectiveness of maritime assets in the 
region, international agencies (DEA and SOCA) have increasingly 
sought to utilize French assets during maritime interdiction 
operations.  In coordination with JIATFS, the French will bring 
additional assets into the region to participate in periodic CD 
maritime interdiction surge operations, to include long range 
detection and monitoring aircraft, interdiction helicopters and high 
speed surface assets with special forces tactical support.  During 
these operations, the U.S. and NATO allies will also typically 
divert some surface assets to the region to participate. 
Unfortunately these operations are conducted on an infrequent basis 
(bi-annually) and generally for a short period of time (2-3 weeks) 
during which many of the DTO's quickly notice the beefed up LE 
presence and cease operations with the knowledge that they will not 
last long. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Our British and Canadian partners have been subjected to 
a reduction in manpower and funding.  The British had traditionally 
funded a marine training center in Antigua via the RSS for Coast 
Guard members but were forced to close the project due to lack of 
funding.  On March 31, 2009, a UK program for vetting/polygraph of 
police and coast guard personnel with whom they worked was also 
terminated because of funding issues.  In addition, the UK Security 
Advisory Team, currently assigned to the British High Commission in 
Bridgetown, will cease to exist on March 31, 2010, barring any 
change of policy from their new Home Secretary.  The Canadians are 
in the process of re-deploying their RCMP assets in the region and 
will be served by one officer in Jamaica, two officers in the 
Dominican Republic and one in Trinidad.  The European Union, with a 
budget of approximately 6 million Euros for counter drug initiatives 
in the region this coming year, is focusing their priorities towards 
West Africa and their partners are not optimistic about an increase 
 
BRIDGETOWN 00000219  004 OF 004 
 
 
of funding for the Eastern Caribbean. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶17.  (SBU) The level of cooperation among the various international 
partners involved in CD activities in the region (U.S., UK, and 
France) as well as select elements within the regional partner 
nations to include the RSS/Air Wing is outstanding.  The quality of 
intelligence being generated by the regional and international 
partners regarding the DTO's is extremely high and generally 
includes precise information regarding planned shipments.  The 
missing piece to achieve successful interdictions is competent and 
non-corrupt surface asset interdiction support.  A common solution 
proposed by CD donor countries is to allocate funding to establish a 
highly trained and vetted maritime interdiction strike force 
equipped with one or more surface intercept vessels which would be 
under the leadership of and directly coordinated with the RSS/Air 
Wing.  With an RSS surface group -- a regional coast guard -- to 
complement the RSS air assets, the region could be a capable partner 
for U.S. counter-drug efforts.  As we move forward with the Security 
Dialogue with the Caribbean, the development of an RSS Regional 
Coast Guard should be a priority.  Other donors, such as the EU, 
recognize the need for such a force and may be willing to work with 
us to explore how to move toward that goal. 
HARDT