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OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSL #0160 0950807
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 050807Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2422
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BRATISLAVA 000160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV LO
SUBJECT: GASPAROVIC REELECTED SLOVAK PRESIDENT 
 
¶1. (U) Incumbent Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic won reelection 
April 4. Gasparovic defeated opposition candidate Iveta Radicova 
55.5 percent to 44.5 percent; most observers had predicted a 
Gasparovic victory.  Turnout was almost 52 percent in this second 
round of presidential voting, up a notch from the 44 percent of 
eligible Slovaks who had voted in the March 22 seven-candidate first 
round. 
 
¶2. (U) Gasparovic, running with the active support of two of the 
three parties that comprise Slovakia's coalition government, is the 
first Slovak president to be reelected.  He will be sworn in June 15 
for his second five-year term, which will not expire until mid-2014. 
 As head of state in a parliamentary system, Gasparovic has a 
limited, largely ceremonial role.  But the Slovak presidency can 
influence government appointments and has constitutional 
responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces. 
Moreover, following parliamentary elections, the president can offer 
the option of forming a government to whichever party leader he 
chooses (assuming that leader can put together a coalition of at 
least 76 deputies). 
 
¶3. (U) An exultant Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose 
coalition-leading Smer party strongly backed Gasparovic, told 
reporters early April 5 that "the result of these elections will 
have important consequences," which Fico promised to enumerate at an 
April 6 press conference. Gasparovic also received aggressive 
support from Fico's coalition partner Jan Slota, head of the 
notorious Slovak National Party (SNS). Slota and his subordinates 
hit Radicova hard for her popularity among Hungarian-speaking 
Slovaks, going so far as to argue that a Radicova victory wouldn't 
have been legitimate if she had been put over the top by ethnic 
Hungarian votes. 
 
¶4. (U) Radicova ran a modern, reform-oriented campaign, but could 
never overcome the advantages Gasparovic held as the incumbent. 
Gasparovic entered 2009 with near-universal name recognition and a 
significant lead in the polls, and was able to use his many official 
public (and thus televised) appearances to great advantage in the 
extended period before official campaigning began in early March. 
He also linked himself tightly to the extremely popular Fico 
government, which continues to enjoy overwhelming support among 
Slovak voters. 
 
¶5. (U) As in the first round, Radicova won Slovakia's two largest 
cities - Bratislava (with 64 percent of the vote) and Kosice (60 
percent) - and ran up large majorities in ethnic Hungarians enclaves 
such as the Sturovo (92 percent) and Komaro (87 percent) regions. 
But Gasparovic won almost every other voting district in the 
country, taking most other cities and securing significant 
majorities in rural areas. 
 
¶6. (U) COMMENT: We will provide a fuller analysis of Gasparovic's 
victory in the coming days, but our initial reaction is that his 
close ties to the ever-popular Fico government and the significant 
advantages of incumbency paved the way for his clear April 4 
victory. Radicova successfully used her reformist image to gain the 
support of the Slovak intelligentsia and of many urban voters, but 
her anti-incumbent message never resonated outside her core, 
change-oriented constituencies. Gasparovic's willingness to play the 
"Hungarian card" (ethnic Hungarians make up about 10 percent of the 
population) turned off many of our interlocutors, but may have 
energized Gasparovic's more-populist, nationalist base to vote in 
greater numbers than on March 22. As we analyze the election 
results, we will particularly examine turnout and voter behavior in 
SNS-inclined regions. 
 
¶7. (U) In any event, Fico's decision to personally and actively 
engage in the presidential campaign clearly showed that the 
governing coalition feared Radicova's candidacy. Particularly in the 
run-up to regional elections (later this year) and the 2010 
parliamentary elections, Fico wanted to ensure that he had a strong 
supporter (and one who owed him something) in the Presidential 
Palace.  And the willingness to play the volatile game of ethnic 
politics by marginalizing - and, on the part of Slota, vilifying - 
Hungarian-speaking voters demonstrated that Gasparovic and his 
supporters were desperate to win at any and all costs.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
EDDINS