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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL ENRG PINR SCUL BR IR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT A PREVIEW 
TO AHMADINEJAD VISIT 
 
REF: A. 09 BRASILIA 00387 
     ¶B. 07 BRASILIA 001889 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION LISA KUBISKE, REASONS 1.4 B, D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki's visit to 
Brasilia on March 26, reciprocating Foreign Minister Amorim's 
November 2008 visit to Tehran, served as a preview to a 
planned visit to Brasilia by Iranian president Ahmadinejad 
that the media is reporting will happen May 5-6.  During his 
visit, Mottaki met with President Lula, Foreign Minister 
Amorim, and Mines and Energy Minister Lobao (ref a). 
According to Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) contacts, Mottaki 
primarily discussed the two countries' growing bilateral 
relationship; Mottaki also heard from the Brazilians that it 
had lost credibility on the international stage due ot its 
nuclear program.  Brazilian officials also urged Mottaki to 
respond positively to President Obama's Norwuz message to the 
Iranian people.  Although Brazilian officials are mindful of 
sensitivities regarding Iran's defiance of international 
calls for transparency in its nuclear ambitions and maintain 
a cautious approach with Iran -- a fact underscored by the 
low-key nature of Mottaki's visit -- Brazil intends to move 
forward with building ties to Iran -- stopping short of 
building a strategic relationship, as Iran desires -- as part 
of its broader strategy to increase its presence in the 
Middle East (septel).  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
A Preview for Ahmadinejad Visit 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki's visit to Brasilia 
represented the first such visit by an Iranian FM in 16 years 
and reciprocated FM Amorim's visit to Tehran, the first such 
visit by a Brazilian FM in 17 years.  The visits come on the 
heels of a series of high-level meetings that have taken 
place over the past several years, including visits to 
Brasilia by the Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikh Attar in 2008, 
Supreme Council for National Security member Nahavandian's 
visit in 2007.  There have also been political talks at the 
Undersecretary level in 2008 and 2007. 
 
¶3. (C) In an April 8 meeting with Charge d'Affaires Lisa 
Kubiske, Itamaraty Undersecretary for Political Affairs II 
Roberto Jaguaribe, confirmed press reports that a 
presidential-level meeting would happen sometime before 
Iran's June elections, though Jaguaribe noted that both sides 
were still working on dates.  Jaguaribe noted that a stopover 
visit en route to Venezuela or other countries in Latin 
America would not work for Brazil (Comment: Brazil is 
conscious that Venezuela and Iran have a strategic 
relationship.  Brazil likely prefers to avoid the impression 
that it is part of Iran's Latin American support network. End 
comment.)  Jaguaribe said he expects the themes of a 
presidential meeting will be focused on bilateral issues 
primarily, but concedes that other "sensitive" issues 
inevitably will be raised.  He added that this growing level 
of engagement with Iran has gained Brazil credibility with 
the Iranians, which, according to Jaguaribe, enhances 
Brazil's ability to facilitate dialogue between Iran and 
other parties. 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate meeting April 14 with Secretary Carlos 
Leopoldo Goncalves de Oliveira, the Iran desk officer at 
Itamaraty's Middle East Division II, poloff asked de Oliveira 
about a possible Ahmadinejad visit and he reiterated 
Jaguaribe's comments from the week before that both sides 
were working on a meeting but that no dates had been set. 
But when asked if Ahmadinejad could stop in Brazil on the way 
to Venezuela, as press reports were indicating he might do 
around May 5, de Oliveira seemed to back away from that 
stance, and noted that a stop in Brasilia could be a 
possibility, although it would not be Brazil's preference. 
On May 15, Folha de Sao Paulo reported that Ahmadinejad would 
visit Brasilia, probably May 5-6, accompanied by about 100 
person delegation from various sectors of the Iranian 
government and the private sector.  According to the Folha 
article, citing unnamed Brazilian diplomats, after President 
Obama's recent conciliatory gestures towards Iran, President 
Lula judges that such a visit holds less downside risk for 
Brazil on the global stage. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000477  002 OF 003 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Amorim to Mottaki: You Have Lost Credibility 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Jaguaribe described the Mottaki visit as covering the 
"usual" bilateral topics, but acknowledged that some more 
sensitive subjects were discussed as well.  Trade was a 
significant focus of the visit for Brazil, since "we export a 
lot more than we import," even if trade with Iran declined 
last year, mostly as a result of Iran's "credit problems". 
Iran represents one of Brazil's largest Middle East markets, 
accounting for about 30 percent of exports to that region or 
USD 1.8 billion in 2007.  In 2008, that figure dropped 
sharply to USD 1.1 billion and Iran's share of Brazilian 
exports to the Middle East fell to 15 percent.  However, 
according to de Oliveira, trade did not actually drop 40 
percent, but "more like 15-20 percent".  Due to the global 
financial crisis, de Oliveira noted, Iranian importers had 
difficulty obtaining letters of credit, so Brazilian exports 
to Iran were going instead to Bahrain where they were then 
exported to Iran. (Note: in 2008, Bahrain registered a 250 
percent increase in imports from Brazil over 2007, to USD 292 
million, after several years of decline.  End note.) 
According to de Oliveira, most of the increase in exports to 
Bahrain was related to Iran, and not because of increased 
trade with Bahrain. 
 
¶6. (C) Jaguaribe said that Iran's nuclear program was raised, 
despite public claims by Foreign Minister Amorim that the 
issue was not discussed.   Amorim made clear to Mottaki that 
Brazil would maintain its traditional posture of supporting 
Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.  While 
Brazil had not supported bringing the matter of the Iranian 
nuclear program before the UNSC, Amorim stressed to Mottaki 
that Iran had to comply with UNSC resolutions, now that the 
international community had decided on that approach. 
According to Jaguaribe, Amorim told Mottaki that Iran had 
lost credibility in the international stage on this issue, 
and compared Iran's situation with a person who takes a hit 
on his credit rating after failing to make payments on his 
credit card.  Iran would have to undergo a period with a low 
credit score until it can regain the trust of the 
international community. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Norwuz Message: Right Signal At Right Time 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The new U.S. administration was also a topic of 
discussion, according to Jaguaribe.  Amorim strongly 
encouraged Iran to respond positively to President Obama's 
Norwuz message.  Jaguaribe reported that Mottaki responded 
cautiously that the United States would have to follow its 
words with concrete actions. 
 
¶8. (C) Jaguaribe heaped praise on President Obama's message, 
noting that it was exactly the right signal to send to the 
Iranians and that its nods of praise for Iran's history and 
achievements struck the right chords.  Jaguaribe added the 
message puts the ball in Iran's court and that it is 
incumbent on them to respond to it.  Jaguaribe observed that 
Brazil sees engagement, rather than confrontation, as a more 
powerful tool with regimes like Iran, because it weakens the 
hardliners within the regime. 
 
¶9. (C) De Oliveira, who accompanied Amorim on his November 
2008 to Tehran, offered his "personal view" that, as a 
face-saving culture, Iranian leaders will not dial down their 
anti-American rhetoric even after President Obama's 
overtures.  Furthermore, Iran's nuclear program is a matter 
of national honor that it cannot back away from, but it might 
be sufficient for Iran to say that it mastered the nuclear 
fuel cycle, thereby proving that it could develop its own 
nuclear weapons while stopping short of building them. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Factoring U.S. Views on Petrobras Investment Decisions 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Mottaki also met with Minister of Mines and Energy 
(MME) Edison Lobao.  Daniel Lins, Deputy in MRE's 
Non-renewable Energy Department, who attended the meeting, 
confirmed to econoff MME's readout (ref a) that the meeting 
 
BRASILIA 00000477  003 OF 003 
 
 
was filled with "diplomatic pleasantries with no concrete 
steps taken in any direction." According to Lins, the 
discussion consisted almost entirely of a general exchange of 
information regarding energy activities currently being 
undertaken by each side.  The only specific item discussed 
was the invitation for Lobao to go to Iran.  Given prior 
reports that Minister Lobao indicated during the meeting that 
the service provider contract required by Iran was a primary 
obstacle to Petrobras taking on any additional activities 
there, econoff probed as to whether a change in these 
operating conditions would alter Petrobras' intentions not to 
engage further in Iran.  Lins would only note that, while 
Brazil has a genuine desire to be fair with Iran, there is a 
lot of respect within the GOB for the Brazilian relationship 
with the United States.  He believed this would be a factor 
in everyone's minds when making any decisions over engagement 
with Iran and that he didn't see Brazil making any radical 
changes in its current policies. 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Brazil's Relationship with Iran: Normal, Not Strategic 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11. (C) According to de Oliveira, Brazil's efforts to build 
ties to Iran have to be seen in the broader context of 
Brazil's strategic outreach to the Middle East region.  De 
Oliveira noted that Brazil was "in deficit" with two 
countries in the region in terms of their diplomatic 
relations, Iran and Iraq.  For obvious reasons, he observed, 
the "deficit" with Iraq would remain for a while longer, 
although Brazil is moving towards re-opening its Embassy 
there and, he added, has already rented a building in 
Baghdad.  On Iran, he observed, Brazil does not face the same 
obstacles. De Oliveira emphasized, however, that Brazil is 
not looking to reciprocate Iran's desire to forge a strategic 
relationship with Brazil.  Brazil is only looking to have a 
"normal" relationship similar to what it has with other 
countries of Iran's size and influence, and with which Brazil 
has significant trade.  Brazil is aware that Iran hopes to 
bring its relationship with Brazil to the level that Iran has 
with Venezuela, but Brazil has no interest in that. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Comment: Engage Brazil as Brazil Engages Iran 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Brazil and Iran appear equally determined to raise 
the level of their mutual engagement.  Brazil is maintaining 
a cautious approach, however, and will not take a risk of 
being ostracized in order to expand relations with Iran. 
Since President Lula's unfortunate and factually incorrect 
defense of the transparency of Iran's nuclear program in 
September of 2007 (ref b), Brazilian officials have avoided 
any polemical statements on Iran, and Petrobras remains firm 
that it will not expand its investments there--two signs that 
Brazil is sensitive to international concerns over Iran's 
behavior.  On the other hand, Brazil is unlikely to go beyond 
the clearcut international consensus in addressing Iran's 
nuclear program.  Even then, Brazil will handle any sensitive 
discussions in private and cannot be expected to openly 
criticize Iran absent a clearer Iranian provocation.  But as 
evidenced from Jaguaribe's version of the conversations 
between Mottaki and Amorim, Brazil is willing to deliver a 
message to Iran that dovetails with U.S. interests. 
Therefore, engagement with the GOB on Iran offers the 
opportunity to strengthen Brazil's message prior to any 
further high level meetings. 
SOBEL